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SAFECOMP '92 advances the state-of-the-art, reviews experiences of the past years, considers the guidance now available and identifies the skills, methods, tools and techniques required for the safety of computer control systems.
Safety-related computer systems are those which may lead to loss of life, injury or plant and environmental damage. Such systems therefore have to be developed and implemented so that they meet strict require and security because their applications cover ments on safety, reliability nearly all areas of daily life and range from controlling and monitoring industrial processes, through robotics and power generation, to transport systems. Highly reliable electronic systems for safety-related applications represent an area in which industry has been involved for many years and which is now gaining increasing importance in academia. Their relevance also results from an increased perception of safety by society. Therefore, not only are technicians involved in this area, but psycho logical and sociological aspects also play a major role. Dealing with safety-related systems we have to consider the whole lifecycle of these systems, starting from specification up to implementation, assessment and operation. All those issues mentioned above are covered in this book, which represents the proceedings of the 14th International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security, SAFECOMP '95, held in Belgirate, Italy, 11-13 October 1995. The conference continues the series of SAFECOMP conferences which was originated by the European Workshop on Industrial Computer Systems, Technical Committee 7 on Safety, Security and Reliability (EWICS TC7) and reflects the state of the art, experience and new trends in the area of safety-related computer systems.
The safe and secure operation ofcomputer systems continues to be the major issue in many applications where there is a threat to people, the environment, investment or goodwill. Such applications include medical devices, railway signalling, energy distribution, vehicle control and monitoring, air traffic control, industrial process control, telecommunications systemsand manyothers. This book represents the proceedings of the 16th International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security, held in York, UK, 7-10 September 1997. The conference reviews the state ofthe art, experience and new trends in the areas of computer safety, reliability and security. It forms a platform for technology transfer between academia, industry and research institutions. In an expanding world-wide market for safe, secure and reliable computer systems SAFECOMP 97 provides an opportunity for technical developers, users and legislators to exchange and review the experience, to consider the best technologies now available and to identify the skills and technologies required for the future. The papers were carefully selected by the Conference International Programme Committee. The authors of the papers come from twelve different countries. The subjects covered include safe software, safety cases, management & development, security, human factors, guidelines standards & certification, applications & industrial experience, formal methods & models andvalidation, verification and testing. SAFECOMP '97 continues the successful series of SAFECOMP conferences first held in 1979 in Stuttgart. SAFECOMP is organised by the European Workshop on Industrial Computer Systems, Technical Committee 7 on Safety, Security and Reliability (EWICS TC7).
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 26th International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability, and Security, SAFECOMP 2007. The 33 revised full papers and 16 short papers are organized in topical sections on safety cases, impact of security on safety, fault tree analysis, safety analysis, security aspects, verification and validation, platform reliability, reliability evaluation, formal methods, static code analysis, safety-related architectures.
The safe operation of computer systems continues to be a key issue in many applications where people, environment, investment, or goodwill can be at risk. Such applications include medical, railways, power generation and distribution, road transportation, aerospace, process industries, mining, military and many others. This book represents the proceedings of the 12th International Conference on Computer Safety, Reliability and Security, held in Poznan, Poland, 27-29 October 1993. The conference reviews the state of the art, experiences and new trends in the areas of computer safety, reliability and security. It forms a platform for technology transfer between academia, industry and research institutions. In an expanding world-wide market for safe, secure and reliable computer systems SAFECOMP'93 provides an opportunity for technical developers, users, and legislators to exchange and review the experience, to consider the best technologies now available and to identify the skills and technologies required for the future. The papers were carefully selected by the International Program Com mittee of the Conference. The authors of the papers come from 16 different countries. The subjects covered include formal methods and models, safety assessment and analysis, verification and validation, testing, reliability issues and dependable software tech nology, computer languages for safety related systems, reactive systems technology, security and safety related applications. As to its wide international coverage, unique way of combining partici pants from academia, research and industry and topical coverage, SAFECOMP is outstanding among the other related events in the field.
Each year there are improvements in safety-critical system technology. These arise both from developments in the contributing technologies, such as safety engineering, software engineering, human factors and risk assessment, and from the adoption or adaptation of appropriate techniques from other domains, such as security. For these improvements to be of real benefit, they need to be applied during the appropriate stage in the life cycle of the system, whether it be development, assessment, or operation. For this to occur, they must be communicated and explained. Each year the Safety-critical Systems Symposium offers a distinguished forum for the presentation of papers on such developments, and also for papers from industry on the lessons learned from the use of technologies and methods. The results of many collaborative research projects, with components from both industry and academia, are reported in a universally understandable form. In 1995 the Symposium was held in Brighton, a venue calculated to stimulate not just the presenters of papers, but all the delegates. Yet, this book of Proceedings is intended not only for the delegates but also for readers not able to attend the event itself. We welcome both categories of reader. Delegates have the benefit of attending the presentations and the opportunity to participate in the discussions; those who take up this book after the event can peruse it attheir leisure and, perhaps, on account of it will resolve to attend subsequent symposia.
The last few years have borne witness to a remarkable diversity of formal methods, with applications to sequential and concurrent software, to real-time and reactive systems, and to hardware design. In that time, many theoretical problems have been tackled and solved, and many continue to be worked upon. Yet it is by the suitability of their industrial application and the extent of their usage that formal methods will ultimately be judged. This volume presents the proceedings of the first international symposium of Formal Methods Europe, FME'93. The symposium focuses on the application of industrial-strength formal methods. Authors address the difficulties of scaling their techniques up to industrial-sized problems, and their suitability in the workplace, and discuss techniques that are formal (that is, they have a mathematical basis) and that are industrially applicable. The volume has four parts: - Invited lectures, containing a lecture by Cliff B. Jones and a lecture by Antonio Cau and Willem-Paul de Roever; - Industrial usage reports, containing 6 reports; - Papers, containing 32 selected and refereedpapers; - Tool descriptions, containing 11 descriptions.
Errata, detected in Taylor's Logarithms. London: 4to, 1792. [sic] 14.18.3 6 Kk Co-sine of 3398 3298 - Nautical Almanac (1832) In the list of ERRATA detected in Taylor's Logarithms, for cos. 4° 18'3", read cos. 14° 18'2". - Nautical Almanac (1833) ERRATUM ofthe ERRATUM ofthe ERRATA of TAYLOR'S Logarithms. For cos. 4° 18'3", read cos. 14° 18' 3". - Nautical Almanac (1836) In the 1820s, an Englishman named Charles Babbage designed and partly built a calculating machine originally intended for use in deriving and printing logarithmic and other tables used in the shipping industry. At that time, such tables were often inaccurate, copied carelessly, and had been instrumental in causing a number of maritime disasters. Babbage's machine, called a 'Difference Engine' because it performed its cal culations using the principle of partial differences, was intended to substantially reduce the number of errors made by humans calculating the tables. Babbage had also designed (but never built) a forerunner of the modern printer, which would also reduce the number of errors admitted during the transcription of the results. Nowadays, a system implemented to perform the function of Babbage's engine would be classed as safety-critical. That is, the failure of the system to produce correct results could result in the loss of human life, mass destruction of property (in the form of ships and cargo) as well as financial losses and loss of competitive advantage for the shipping firm.
As the complexity of embedded computer-controlled systems increases, the present industrial practice for their development gives cause for concern, especially for safety-critical applications where human lives are at stake. The use of software in such systems has increased enormously in the last decade. Formal methods, based on firm mathematical foundations, provide one means to help with reducing the risk of introducing errors during specification and development. There is currently much interest in both academic and industrial circles concerning the issues involved, but the techniques still need further investigation and promulgation to make their widespread use a reality. This book presents results of research into techniques to aid the formal verification of mixed hardware/software systems. Aspects of system specification and verification from requirements down to the underlying hardware are addressed, with particular regard to real-time issues. The work presented is largely based around the Occam programming language and Transputer microprocessor paradigm. The HOL theorem prover, based on higher order logic, has mainly been used in the application of machine-checked proofs. The book describes research work undertaken on the collaborative UK DTI/SERC-funded Information Engineering Dictorate Safemos project. The partners were Inmos Ltd., Cambridge SRI, the Oxford University Computing Laboratory and the University of Cambridge Computer Laboratory, who investigated the problems of formally verifying embedded systems. The most important results of the project are presented in the form of a series of interrelated chapters by project members and associated personnel. In addition, overviews of two other ventures with similar objectives are included as appendices. The material in this book is intended for computing science researchers and advanced industrial practitioners interested in the application of formal methods to real-time safety-critical systems at all levels of abstraction from requirements to hardware. In addition, material of a more general nature is presented, which may be of interest to managers in charge of projects applying formal methods, especially for safety-critical-systems, and others who are considering their use.
Aspects of Safety Management contains the invited papers presented at the ninth annual Safety-critical Systems Symposium, held in Bristol, February 2001. For some time, it has been recognised that technical issues are only one side of the safety coin. The other, often dominant feature, is active, informed and committed management. An understanding of risk, emphasis on education and the use of language, attention to learning lessons from both research and other industry sectors, and the development of the appropriate staff competences, are all aspects of safety management. The papers contained within this volume cover a broad range of subjects, but all have the common link of safety management. They present a great deal of industrial experience, as well as some recent academic research.