Download Free Renewing The Physical Infrastructure Of English Further Education Colleges Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Renewing The Physical Infrastructure Of English Further Education Colleges and write the review.

In 2001, the newly established Learning and Skills Council (the Council) took over a programme of capital works in the further education sector, to renew an estate that was too large, with much of it in poor condition and no longer fit for modern educational purposes. By March 2008, a total of £4.2 billion of projects had been approved 'in detail', including grant support from the Council of £1.7 billion, and about half of the estate had been renewed. Since April 2008, there has been a very serious failure in the management of the programme. It approved 'in principle' 79 colleges' projects, which required nearly £2.7 billion of Council funding more than it could afford. Before the current problems arose, the programme had achieved some successes, enabling the estate to be reduced in size, and the buildings are generally of good quality and are contributing to increased learner participation. The economic downturn could affect colleges' ability to fund projects by restricting their access to loan finance or their ability to sell surplus assets. The indebtedness of the sector is rising. The Council needs to monitor closely the financial health of some colleges, particularly those that have borrowings that exceed 40 per cent of their annual income. In 2010, the Council is expected to be dissolved and its functions taken over by the Skills Funding Agency and the Young People's Learning Agency. There needs to be clarity about responsibilities for the capital programme, and additional administrative burdens on colleges must be avoided.
The further education capital programme is enabling colleges in England to make good progress in renewing and rationalising their estate, replacing poor quality buildings with high quality, more suitable facilities. The programme has taken advantage of colleges' accumulated reserves, access to loan funding, and scope to dispose of surplus assets.
(BSF) programme believe that it is leading to more strategic procurement of school infrastructure than previous school building programmes. Local Authorities are using BSF to rearrange the location, type and number of schools in their area and create facilities and school environments which support their educational objectives. BSF schools are built to higher specifications and space standards than previous schools. The Department for Children, Schools and Families (DCSF) and Partnerships for Schools (the body established by DCSF to manage the BSF programme centrally) were too optimistic in their assumptions of how quickly the first schools could be delivered. By December 2008, only 42 of the planned 200 schools had been built, with 54 due to open next year and 121 the year after. To include all schools in the programme, 250 schools will need to be built a year and the number of schools in procurement and construction at any one time will need to double from 2011 onwards. The extent to which problems in the finance markets will affect BSF is still unclear. DCSF and Partnerships for Schools estimate that the total cost of renewing the school estate will be between £52 billion to £55 billion which is £7 billion to £10 billion more than was estimated at the outset of the programme.
The whole landscape of space use is undergoing a radical transformation. In the workplace a period of unprecedented change has created a mix of responses with one overriding outcome observable worldwide: the rise of distributed space. In the learning environment the social, political, economic and technological changes responsible for this shift have been further compounded by constantly developing theories of learning and teaching, and a wide acceptance of the importance of learning as the core of the community, resulting in the blending of all aspects of learning into one seamless experience. This book attempts to look at all the forces driving the provision and pedagogic performance of the many spaces, real and virtual, that now accommodate the experience of learning and provide pointers towards the creation and design of learning-centred communities. Part 1 looks at the entire learning universe as it now stands, tracks the way in which its constituent parts came to occupy their role, assesses how they have responded to a complex of drivers and gauges their success in dealing with renewed pressures to perform. It shows that what is required is innovation within the spaces and integration between them. Part 2 finds many examples of innovation in evidence across the world – in schools, the higher and further education campus and in business and cultural spaces – but an almost total absence of integration. Part 3 offers a model that redefines the learning landscape in terms of learning outcomes, mapping spatial requirements and activities into a detailed mechanism that will achieve the best outcome at the most appropriate scale. By encouraging stakeholders to creating an events-based rather than space-based identity, the book hopes to point the way to a fully-integrated learning landscape: a learning community.
Government failure is affecting everyone. The single mum worried sick by a tax credit demand from HMRC to 'repay' thousands of pounds she never received; the family whose holiday was ruined because the Passport Office couldn't issue passports in time; the school that couldn't open at the start of term because CRB checks were being carried out by an organisation in meltdown; the farmers led to bankruptcy and even suicide by a Kafkaesque system for administering farm payments; and rail operators facing an uncertain future because the Department for Transport inadvertently landed the whole rail franchising system in chaos. Why is government getting it so wrong? Richard Bacon and Christopher Hope delve into the astonishing world of cock-ups and catastrophes and ponder why those at the top continue to fall short.
A report that recommends a reform of the way, financial liabilities arising from private finance projects (PFPs) are treated in public accounts. It also deals with the growth in the secondary market for PFPs where investors sell on their stake in a project, in many cases once the construction period of that project has been completed.
On cover and title page: House, committees of the whole House, general committees and select committees
The Department for Children, Schools and Families' Building Schools for the Future Programme (BSF) plans to renew every secondary school in the country, by rebuilding half of them, structurally remodelling 35 per cent, refurbishing 15 per cent and providing Information Communication Technology to all. Its aim is to use capital investment in new buildings as a catalyst to improve educational outcomes. The Department estimates that the programme will cost £52-£55 billion over its lifetime. The Department was over-optimistic in its original planning assumptions for BSF: of the 200 schools originally planned to be completed by December 2008, only 42 had been by that date. The Department now expects the programme to take 18 years, with the last school completed in 2023. Local authorities are responsible for the local delivery of BSF. They plan, procure and manage the BSF school buildings. In 2004, the Department established Partnerships for Schools to manage the national delivery of the programme. The Department and Partnerships for Schools encourage local authorities to procure their schools through a Local Education Partnership. These are 10-year partnerships to procure a flow of projects, structured as joint ventures between the local authority, a consortium of private companies that build, finance and maintain schools, and Building Schools for the Future Investments. It is too early to conclude whether BSF will achieve its educational objectives. To date, over-optimism has meant the programme could not live up to expectations. Establishing Partnerships for Schools to manage the programme centrally has helped local authorities to deliver more effectively, but while Local Education Partnerships have potential advantages, their value for money is yet to be proven. And it will be very challenging to deliver all schools by 2023.
The declining financial health of many further education colleges has potentially serious consequences for learners and local economies, but the bodies responsible for funding and oversight have been slow to address the problem. Too often, they have taken decisions without understanding the cumulative impact that these decisions have on colleges and their learners. Oversight arrangements are complex, sometimes overlapping, and too focused on intervening when financial problems have already become serious rather than helping to prevent them in the first place. The Department for Business, Innovation & Skills and the Department for Education appear to see area-based reviews of post-16 education as a fix-all solution to the current problems, but the reviews do not cover all types of provider and it is not clear how they will deliver a robust and financially sustainable sector.
Under the Customer First Programme, delivery of grants and loans to higher education students in England is being transferred from local authorities to the Student Loans Company (the Company), a non-departmental public body of the Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (the Department). In 2009 the Company began assessing applications from new students; by 2011 it will be responsible for applications from all students in England. Performance in processing applications and communicating with students in this first year was completely unacceptable. Many students waited weeks or months for their financial support. Fewer than half of all applications were fully processed by the start of term, and applications took on average a third longer to process than local authorities had achieved. The Company answered fewer than half the calls it received in 2009; in September 87% of calls went unanswered. Disabled students suffered disproportionately in 2009, as the Company devoted too few staff to processing their applications. The Company also demonstrated a number of IT failings in 2009: most importantly, it did not sufficiently test its crucial document scanning - the failure of which was the catalyst for the failure of the entire system. The Department underestimated the risks in centralising the service, the Programme Board lacked skills and experience, and there was poor communication between the Programme Board, the Company's Board, and the Department. There has been limited improvement in 2010 but uncertainties remain over the Company's ability to deliver and maintain a service that provides value for money.