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At the height of the 1990s boom, Jack Grubman, one of the most successful analysts in Wall Street proclaimed ‘what used to be conflicts of interest are now synergies’. This myopia contributed dramatically to the elevation of a culture in which greed was deified, oversight denigrated and misfeasance justified. Since the fall of the markets and the implosion of confidence in the American corporate business model, one man has proved instrumental in deconstructing the rhetoric of the 1990s: Eliot Spitzer, the combative Attorney General of New York. In the process, his innovative application of state law has reconfigured the governance of Wall Street. Over the past three years the pursuit of transparency and accountability in the structure of the markets has propelled Spitzer to the forefront of regulatory policy. His investigations into tainted analyst research, the mutual funds industry, the governance of the New York Stock Exchange and the insurance industry have focused attention not just on corrupted individuals but also the complicity of the financial structure itself. Spitzer exploited the inherent conflicts of interest to the full, forcing regulators to adopt a much more proactive approach and creating a national platform for his own wider political ambitions. Now holding the Democratic nomination for the Governorship of New York, Spitzer has begun a path for higher national office. This groundbreaking book features exclusive access with many of the key actors in these changes to the governance of Wall Street. It examines how Eliot Spitzer exploited gaps in the regulatory framework to capture the corporate reform agenda and explores the implications of his actions on policy formation and recalibration. Key incidents include: changing the terms of reference governing analyst research; the defenestration of Dick Grasso’s tenure over the NYSE (which is now being heard in state court in New York); and the battles for control between the former Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission, Harvey Pitt, and Spitzer. The book details not only the contested, contingent and interdependent connections between the American political and financial systems but reveals how Spitzer’s manipulation of those connections have proved instrumental in enhancing his own wider political ambitions.
At the height of the 1990s boom, Jack Grubman, one of the most successful analysts in Wall Street proclaimed ‘what used to be conflicts of interest are now synergies’. This myopia contributed dramatically to the elevation of a culture in which greed was deified, oversight denigrated and misfeasance justified. Since the fall of the markets and the implosion of confidence in the American corporate business model, one man has proved instrumental in deconstructing the rhetoric of the 1990s: Eliot Spitzer, the combative Attorney General of New York. In the process, his innovative application of state law has reconfigured the governance of Wall Street. Over the past three years the pursuit of transparency and accountability in the structure of the markets has propelled Spitzer to the forefront of regulatory policy. His investigations into tainted analyst research, the mutual funds industry, the governance of the New York Stock Exchange and the insurance industry have focused attention not just on corrupted individuals but also the complicity of the financial structure itself. Spitzer exploited the inherent conflicts of interest to the full, forcing regulators to adopt a much more proactive approach and creating a national platform for his own wider political ambitions. Now holding the Democratic nomination for the Governorship of New York, Spitzer has begun a path for higher national office. This groundbreaking book features exclusive access with many of the key actors in these changes to the governance of Wall Street. It examines how Eliot Spitzer exploited gaps in the regulatory framework to capture the corporate reform agenda and explores the implications of his actions on policy formation and recalibration. Key incidents include: changing the terms of reference governing analyst research; the defenestration of Dick Grasso’s tenure over the NYSE (which is now being heard in state court in New York); and the battles for control between the former Chairman of the Securities Exchange Commission, Harvey Pitt, and Spitzer. The book details not only the contested, contingent and interdependent connections between the American political and financial systems but reveals how Spitzer’s manipulation of those connections have proved instrumental in enhancing his own wider political ambitions.
Examining the subject from a holistic and multidisciplinary perspective, Principles of Financial Regulation considers the underlying policies and the objectives of financial regulation.
Examines the law and policy of financial regulation using a combination of conceptual analysis and strong empirical research.
An “intriguing plan” addressing shadow banking, regulation, and the continuing quest for financial stability (Financial Times). Years have passed since the world experienced one of the worst financial crises in history, and while countless experts have analyzed it, many central questions remain unanswered. Should money creation be considered a “public” or “private” activity—or both? What do we mean by, and want from, financial stability? What role should regulation play? How would we design our monetary institutions if we could start from scratch? In The Money Problem, Morgan Ricks addresses these questions and more, offering a practical yet elegant blueprint for a modernized system of money and banking—one that, crucially, can be accomplished through incremental changes to the United States’ current system. He brings a critical, missing dimension to the ongoing debates over financial stability policy, arguing that the issue is primarily one of monetary system design. The Money Problem offers a way to mitigate the risk of catastrophic panic in the future, and it will expand the financial reform conversation in the United States and abroad. “Highly recommended.” —Choice
The past thirty years have witnessed a transformation of government economic intervention in broad segments of industry throughout the world. Many industries historically subject to economic price and entry controls have been largely deregulated, including natural gas, trucking, airlines, and commercial banking. However, recent concerns about market power in restructured electricity markets, airline industry instability amid chronic financial stress, and the challenges created by the repeal of the Glass-Steagall Act, which allowed commercial banks to participate in investment banking, have led to calls for renewed market intervention. Economic Regulation and Its Reform collects research by a group of distinguished scholars who explore these and other issues surrounding government economic intervention. Determining the consequences of such intervention requires a careful assessment of the costs and benefits of imperfect regulation. Moreover, government interventions may take a variety of forms, from relatively nonintrusive performance-based regulations to more aggressive antitrust and competition policies and barriers to entry. This volume introduces the key issues surrounding economic regulation, provides an assessment of the economic effects of regulatory reforms over the past three decades, and examines how these insights bear on some of today’s most significant concerns in regulatory policy.
"In the wake of the global financial crisis that began in 2008, offers a systematic overview of recent developments in regulatory frameworks in advanced and emerging-market countries, outlining challenges to improving regulation, markets, and access in developing economies"--Provided by publisher.
This book offers the first systematic discussion of a new and promising field: the economics of independence, accountability and governance of financial supervision institutions. For a long time the design of supervision had been an irrelevant issue, both in theory and practice. This perception changed dramatically in the mid-1990s, and over the past decade many countries have witnessed changes in the architecture of financial supervision. This book presents frameworks for analyzing the emerging supervisory architectures and sheds light on the different supervisory regimes, with a particular focus on the role of central banks. It takes a country-specific, comparative and empirical approach. Designing Financial Supervision Institutions will be an accessible reference tool for multidisciplinary scholars and academics (principally economics, but also politics and law), policymakers, regulators and supervisory institutions. All royalties from this book to go to the UK charity, NSPCC.
Financial regulation can fail when it is needed the most. The dynamics of asset price bubbles weaken financial regulation just as financial markets begin to overheat and the risk of crisis spikes. At the same time, the failure of financial regulations adds further fuel to a bubble. This book examines the interaction of bubbles and financial regulation. It explores the ways in which bubbles lead to the failure of financial regulation by outlining five dynamics, which it collectively labels the "Regulatory Instability Hypothesis." . The book concludes by outlining approaches to make financial regulation more resilient to these dynamics that undermine law.
Policymakers and program managers are continually seeking ways to improve accountability in achieving an entity's mission. A key factor in improving accountability in achieving an entity's mission is to implement an effective internal control system. An effective internal control system helps an entity adapt to shifting environments, evolving demands, changing risks, and new priorities. As programs change and entities strive to improve operational processes and implement new technology, management continually evaluates its internal control system so that it is effective and updated when necessary. Section 3512 (c) and (d) of Title 31 of the United States Code (commonly known as the Federal Managers' Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA)) requires the Comptroller General to issue standards for internal control in the federal government.