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Violence during war often involves upswings and downturns that have, to date, been insufficiently explained. Why does violence at a particular point in time increase in intensity and why do actors in war decrease the level of violence at other points? Duyvesteyn discusses the potential explanatory variables for escalation and de-escalation in conflicts involving states and non-state actors, such as terrorists and insurgents. Using theoretical arguments and examples from modern history, this book presents the most notable causal mechanisms or shifts in the shape of propositions that could explain the rise and decline of non-state actor violence after the start and before the termination of conflict. This study critically reflects on the conceptualisation of escalation as linear, rational and wilful, and instead presents an image of rebel escalation as accidental, messy and within a very limited range of control.
Duyvesteyn critically examines the potential explanations for the escalation and de-escalation during conflicts involving states and non-state actors, such as terrorists and insurgents.
This is the first book to examine and compare how rebels govern civilians during civil wars in Latin America, Africa, Asia, and Europe. Drawing from a variety of disciplinary traditions, including political science, sociology, and anthropology, the book provides in-depth case studies of specific conflicts as well as comparative studies of multiple conflicts. Among other themes, the book examines why and how some rebels establish both structures and practices of rule, the role of ideology, cultural, and material factors affecting rebel governance strategies, the impact of governance on the rebel/civilian relationship, civilian responses to rebel rule, the comparison between modes of state and non-state governance to rebel attempts to establish political order, the political economy of rebel governance, and the decline and demise of rebel governance attempts.
Seventeen million people have died in civil wars and rebel violence has disrupted the lives of millions more. In a fascinating contribution to the active literature on civil wars, this book finds that some contemporary rebel groups actually comply with international law amid the brutality of civil conflicts around the world. Rather than celebrating the existence of compliant rebels, the author traces the cause of this phenomenon and argues that compliant rebels emerge when rebel groups seek legitimacy in the eyes of domestic and international audiences that care about humanitarian consequences and human rights. By examining rebel groups' different behaviors such as civilian killing, child soldiering, and allowing access to detention centers, Compliant Rebels offers key messages and policy lessons about engaging rebel groups with an eye toward reducing civilian suffering in war zones.
Why do only some incipient rebel groups become viable challengers to governments? Only those that control local rumor networks survive.
Civil wars are among the most difficult problems in world politics. While mediation, intervention, and peacekeeping have produced some positive results in helping to end civil wars, they fall short in preventing them in the first place. In Incentivizing Peace, Jaroslav Tir and Johannes Karreth show that considering civil wars from a developmental perspective presents opportunities to prevent the escalation of nascent armed conflicts into full-scale civil wars. The authors demonstrate that highly-structured intergovernmental organizations (IGOs such as the World Bank, IMF, or regional development banks) are particularly well-positioned to engage in civil war prevention. When such IGOs have been actively engaged in nations on the edge, their potent economic tools have helped to steer rebel-government interactions away from escalation and toward peaceful settlement. Incentivizing Peace provides enlightening case evidence that IGO participation is a key to better predicting, and thus preventing, the outbreak of civil war.
Why Men Rebel was first published in 1970 after a decade of political violence across the world. Forty years later, serious conflicts continue in Africa, Asia and the Middle East. Ted Robert Gurr reintroduces us to his landmark work, putting it in context with the research it influenced as well as world events. Why Men Rebel remains highly relevant to today's violent and unstable world with its holistic, people-based understanding of the causes of political protest and rebellion. With its close eye on the politics of group identity, this book provides new insight into contemporary security challenges.
The international community frequently calls for negotiations when civil wars break out, encouraging combatants to come to the table to resolve their differences. Despite the critical role that getting to the table plays in the negotiated settlement of civil conflicts, little attention has been paid to the question of which rebels get negotiated with in the first place. We argue that the character of rebel leadership plays a key role in determining which rebels get to the table. Specifically, the election of rebel leaders provides a signal to the state of the legitimacy of the leader and coherence of the rebel group. Consequently, these leaders are better equipped to make promises on behalf of rebel constituents and are more likely to be negotiated with than leaders who came to power through other means. Using an original dataset on rebel leadership from 1989-2011 and two-stage modeling, we demonstrate empirically that elected rebel leaders are more likely to be negotiated with in the first place and that, in turn, these negotiations are more likely to lead to successful conflict termination. Survival analysis shows that leaders that are selected through some democratic process see negotiations and conflict end sooner than all other types of rebel leaders.
Some rebel groups abuse noncombatant populations, while others exhibit restraint. Insurgent leaders in some countries transform local structures of government, while others simply extract resources for their own benefit. In some contexts, groups kill their victims selectively, while in other environments violence appears indiscriminate, even random. This book presents a theory that accounts for the different strategies pursued by rebel groups in civil war, explaining why patterns of insurgent violence vary so much across conflicts. It does so by examining the membership, structure, and behavior of four insurgent movements in Uganda, Mozambique, and Peru. Drawing on interviews with nearly two hundred combatants and civilians who experienced violence firsthand, it shows that rebels' strategies depend in important ways on how difficult it is to launch a rebellion. The book thus demonstrates how characteristics of the environment in which rebellions emerge constrain rebel organization and shape the patterns of violence that civilians experience.
For some rebel groups, governance is not always part of a military strategy but a necessary element of realizing revolution through civil war.