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The Bagwell and Staiger (1990) theory of cooperative trade agreements predicts new tariffs (i) increase with imports, (ii) increase with the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticities, and (iii) decrease with the variance of imports. The authors find US import policy during 1997-2006 to be consistent with this theory. A one standard deviation increase in import growth, the inverse of the sum of the import demand and export supply elasticity, and the standard deviation of import growth changes the probability that the US imposes an antidumping tariff by 35 percent, by 88 percent, and by -76 percent, respectively.
This paper considers self-enforcing trade agreements among privately informed governments. A trade agreement that uses weak bindings (i.e., maximal tariff levels) is shown to offer advantages relative to a trade agreement that uses strong bindings (i.e., precise tariff levels). Consistent with practice, the theory also predicts that governments sometimes apply tariffs that are strictly below their bound rates. When private information is persistent through time, an enforcement "ratchet effect" is identified: a government reveals that it is "weak," and thus that it is unlikely to retaliate in an effective manner, when it applies a low tariff. This effect suggests that a government with a low type may "pool" at an above-optimal tariff, in order to conceal weakness. It also suggests a new information-based theory of gradualism in trade agreements.
If all cross-country externalities travel through the terms-of-trade, efficient trade agreements target the terms-of-trade but ignore domestic policies. This argument has been advanced by prominent studies on trade agreements. The present paper shows that its logic fails if production possibilities are intertemporally linked -- for example, under dynamic factor accumulation. In this case, past policies shape current production possibilities and thus affect defection temptations. Therefore, self-enforcing trade agreements that leave the choice of domestic policies to individual countries risk that countries abandon the zone of voluntarily cooperation while optimizing their policies. Consequently, trade agreements that target only the terms-of-trade suffer inefficiencies that are absent in trade agreements that target policies directly. The losses are strictly positive except for knife-edge cases, which existing studies have focussed on.
From American master Ward Just, returning to his trademark territory of "Forgetfulness "and "The Weather in Berlin," an evocative portrait of diplomacy and desire set against the backdrop of America's first lost war
In less than three decades, China has grown from playing a negligible role in international trade to being one of the world's largest exporters, a substantial importer of raw materials, intermediate outputs, and other goods, and both a recipient and source of foreign investment. Not surprisingly, China's economic dynamism has generated considerable attention and concern in the United States and beyond. While some analysts have warned of the potential pitfalls of China's rise—the loss of jobs, for example—others have highlighted the benefits of new market and investment opportunities for US firms. Bringing together an expert group of contributors, China's Growing Role in World Trade undertakes an empirical investigation of the effects of China's new status. The essays collected here provide detailed analyses of the microstructure of trade, the macroeconomic implications, sector-level issues, and foreign direct investment. This volume's careful examination of micro data in light of established economic theories clarifies a number of misconceptions, disproves some conventional wisdom, and documents data patterns that enhance our understanding of China's trade and what it may mean to the rest of the world.
Introduction -- Intellectual property rights basics -- Global intellectual property holdings -- Contribution of intellectual property to U.S. economy -- The organized structure of IPR protection -- U.S. trade law -- Issues for Congress.