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This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the First International Joint Conference on Qualitative and Quantitative Practical Reasoning, ECSQARU-FAPR'97, held in Bad Honnef, Germany, in June 1997. The volume presents 33 revised full papers carefully selected for inclusion in the book by the program committee as well as 12 invited contributions. Among the various aspects of human practical reasoning addressed in the papers are nonmonotonic logics, default reasoning, modal logics, belief function theory, Bayesian networks, fuzzy logic, possibility theory, inference algorithms, dynamic reasoning with partial models, and user modeling approaches.
Qualitative models are better able than traditional models to express states of incomplete knowledge about continuous mechanisms. Qualitative simulation guarantees to find all possible behaviors consistent with the knowledge in the model. This expressive power and coverage is important in problem solving for diagnosis, design, monitoring, explanation, and other applications of artificial intelligence.
This book argues for the restoration of theoretical and practical reason to economics, presenting the ideas of Nancy Cartwright and Amartya Sen, and showing they can foster a useful understanding of practical reason for solving problems in science and society.
The first volume in this new series explores, through extensive co-operation, new ways of achieving the integration of science in all its diversity. The book offers essays from important and influential philosophers in contemporary philosophy, discussing a range of topics from philosophy of science to epistemology, philosophy of logic and game theoretical approaches. It will be of interest to philosophers, computer scientists and all others interested in the scientific rationality.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 11th European Conference on Symbolic and Quantitative Approaches to Reasoning with Uncertainty, ECSQARU 2011, held in Belfast, UK, in June/July 2011. The 60 revised full papers presented together with 3 invited talks were carefully reviewed and selected from 108 submissions. The papers are organized in topical sections on argumentation; Bayesian networks and causal networks; belief functions; belief revision and inconsistency handling; classification and clustering; default reasoning and logics for reasoning under uncertainty; foundations of reasoning and decision making under uncertainty; fuzzy sets and fuzzy logic; implementation and applications of uncertain systems; possibility theory and possibilistic logic; and uncertainty in databases.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 10th International Workshop on Abstract State Machines, ASM 2003, held in Taormina, Italy in March 2003. The 16 revised full papers presented together with 8 invited papers and 12 abstracts were carefully reviewed and selected for inclusion in the book. The papers reflect the state of the art of the abstract state machine method for the design and analysis of complex software/hardware systems. Besides theoretical results and methodological progress, application in various fields are studied as well.
We confess that the first part of our title is somewhat of a misnomer. Bayesian reasoning is a normative approach to probabilistic belief revision and, as such, it is in need of no improvement. Rather, it is the typical individual whose reasoning and judgments often fall short of the Bayesian ideal who is the focus of improvement. What have we learnt from over a half-century of research and theory on this topic that could explain why people are often non-Bayesian? Can Bayesian reasoning be facilitated, and if so why? These are the questions that motivate this Frontiers in Psychology Research Topic. Bayes' theorem, named after English statistician, philosopher, and Presbyterian minister, Thomas Bayes, offers a method for updating one’s prior probability of an hypothesis H on the basis of new data D such that P(H|D) = P(D|H)P(H)/P(D). The first wave of psychological research, pioneered by Ward Edwards, revealed that people were overly conservative in updating their posterior probabilities (i.e., P(D|H)). A second wave, spearheaded by Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky, showed that people often ignored prior probabilities or base rates, where the priors had a frequentist interpretation, and hence were not Bayesians at all. In the 1990s, a third wave of research spurred by Leda Cosmides and John Tooby and by Gerd Gigerenzer and Ulrich Hoffrage showed that people can reason more like a Bayesian if only the information provided takes the form of (non-relativized) natural frequencies. Although Kahneman and Tversky had already noted the advantages of frequency representations, it was the third wave scholars who pushed the prescriptive agenda, arguing that there are feasible and effective methods for improving belief revision. Most scholars now agree that natural frequency representations do facilitate Bayesian reasoning. However, they do not agree on why this is so. The original third wave scholars favor an evolutionary account that posits human brain adaptation to natural frequency processing. But almost as soon as this view was proposed, other scholars challenged it, arguing that such evolutionary assumptions were not needed. The dominant opposing view has been that the benefit of natural frequencies is mainly due to the fact that such representations make the nested set relations perfectly transparent. Thus, people can more easily see what information they need to focus on and how to simply combine it. This Research Topic aims to take stock of where we are at present. Are we in a proto-fourth wave? If so, does it offer a synthesis of recent theoretical disagreements? The second part of the title orients the reader to the two main subtopics: what works and why? In terms of the first subtopic, we seek contributions that advance understanding of how to improve people’s abilities to revise their beliefs and to integrate probabilistic information effectively. The second subtopic centers on explaining why methods that improve non-Bayesian reasoning work as well as they do. In addressing that issue, we welcome both critical analyses of existing theories as well as fresh perspectives. For both subtopics, we welcome the full range of manuscript types.
The first reference on rationality that integrates accounts from psychology and philosophy, covering descriptive and normative theories from both disciplines. Both analytic philosophy and cognitive psychology have made dramatic advances in understanding rationality, but there has been little interaction between the disciplines. This volume offers the first integrated overview of the state of the art in the psychology and philosophy of rationality. Written by leading experts from both disciplines, The Handbook of Rationality covers the main normative and descriptive theories of rationality—how people ought to think, how they actually think, and why we often deviate from what we can call rational. It also offers insights from other fields such as artificial intelligence, economics, the social sciences, and cognitive neuroscience. The Handbook proposes a novel classification system for researchers in human rationality, and it creates new connections between rationality research in philosophy, psychology, and other disciplines. Following the basic distinction between theoretical and practical rationality, the book first considers the theoretical side, including normative and descriptive theories of logical, probabilistic, causal, and defeasible reasoning. It then turns to the practical side, discussing topics such as decision making, bounded rationality, game theory, deontic and legal reasoning, and the relation between rationality and morality. Finally, it covers topics that arise in both theoretical and practical rationality, including visual and spatial thinking, scientific rationality, how children learn to reason rationally, and the connection between intelligence and rationality.