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Drawing on many revealing and sometimes colorful court cases of the past two centuries, Private Lives offers a lively short history of the complexities of family law and family life--including the tensions between the laws on the books and contemporary arrangements for marriage, divorce, adoption, and child rearing.
In the English-speaking world, Karl Renner is by far the best-known among the Austro-Marxists who were active in the Austrian socialist movement during the first few decades of the twentieth century. Recognition of Renner's scholarship is due largely to the English translations of his works on Marxism, as well as to the secondary writings on his notions of socialist legality and national cultural autonomy. Renner has for over half a century been celebrated for the only book of his that has, to date, been wholly translated into English. It remains the classic socialist attempt to off er a realistic understanding of the role of the legal institution of private property in modern society: The Institutions of Private Law and Their Social Functions. In his introduction to this edition, A. Javier Trevii?1/2o discusses the volume's relevance for today, and briefly describes that aspect of Renner's life that occupied most of this time and energy: his involvement in Austrian social democratic politics. The substance of Renner's exposition remains intact. The text provides one of the best insights into the relationship between capitalism and property's economic functions. It emphasizes how this fundamental institution's application has, since the initial stage of finance capitalism, increased or diminished, been externally transformed, or inherently metamorphosed. In an age of unprecedented global financial crisis, emerging market countries, and increased government regulation, Trevii?1/2o suggests we would do well to heed the book's message. It might help us understand the complex situations we encounter today as we grapple with our hybrid identities as salaried workers and economic investors.
Privacy is one of the most urgent issues associated with information technology and digital media. This book claims that what people really care about when they complain and protest that privacy has been violated is not the act of sharing information itself—most people understand that this is crucial to social life —but the inappropriate, improper sharing of information. Arguing that privacy concerns should not be limited solely to concern about control over personal information, Helen Nissenbaum counters that information ought to be distributed and protected according to norms governing distinct social contexts—whether it be workplace, health care, schools, or among family and friends. She warns that basic distinctions between public and private, informing many current privacy policies, in fact obscure more than they clarify. In truth, contemporary information systems should alarm us only when they function without regard for social norms and values, and thereby weaken the fabric of social life.
This book provides a set of proposals for the new conceptual network required in order to establish civil law rules for a world permeated by Artificial Intelligence. These proposals are intended by their authors to push the debate on the new civil law forward. In spite of the natural conservatism of jurists, some innovative or even futuristic ideas are called for, also because the future, even this not-so-distant one, is difficult to foresee. Paradoxically, and unlike in the past, this lack of knowledge must not stop us from planning. If it does, humankind may, as some pessimists already claim, lose its chance to win the battle for control of the world. The rise and expansion of Artificial Intelligence and robotics in recent years has highlighted a pressing need to create a suitable legal framework for this new phenomenon. The debate on the subject, although wide-ranging and involving many new legal documents, is still quite general and preliminary in nature, although these preparatory works illustrate the very real need to develop appropriate new civil law arrangements. It is exactly the branch of private law where the necessity of these new rules appears to be the most imperative. Autonomous vehicles, medical robots, and expertise software raise fundamental questions on aspects of civil liability such as culpability; whereas the growth in popularity of automated, intelligent software systems for concluding contracts requires a new approach to many fundamental and deeply rooted elements of contract law, e.g. consciousness, intent, error, deception, interpretation of contracts and good faith. Ruling on these specific matters demands the identification and clarification of certain key points, which shall become the foundation for constructing AI/robot civil law.
Nearly twenty years after its original publication, The Idea of Private Law is widely recognized as a seminal contribution to legal philosophy, and one of the leading attempts to explain and justify the moral foundations of private law. Rejecting the functionalism popular among legal scholars, Ernest Weinrib advances the provocative idea that private law is an autonomous and non-instrumental moral practice, with its own structure and rationality. Weinrib draws on Kant and Aristotle to set out an approach to private law that repudiates the identification of law with politics or economics. Weinrib argues that private law is to be understood not as a mechanism for promoting efficiency but as a juridical enterprise in which coherent public reason elaborates the norms implicit in the parties' interaction. Private law, Weinrib tells us, embodies a special morality that links the doer and the sufferer of harm. Weinrib elucidates the standpoint internal to this morality, in opposition to functionalists, who view private law as an instrument in the service of external and independently justifiable goals. After establishing the inadequacy of functionalist approaches, Weinrib traces the implications of the formalism he proposes for our ideas of the structure, coherence, and normative grounding of private law. Furthermore, the author shows how this formalism manifests itself in the leading doctrines of private law liability. Finally, he describes the public but non-political role of the courts in articulating the special morality of private law. This revised edition makes accessible one of the major works of modern legal theory. It includes a new introduction by the author, looking back at the work, its origins, and its aspirations.
This book is a large-scale historical reconstruction of liberal legalism, from its inception in the mid-nineteenth century, the moment in which the jurists forged the alliance between political liberalism and legal expertise embodied in classical private law doctrine, to the contemporary anxiety about the possibility of both a liberal solution to the problem of political justification and of law as a respectable form of expert knowledge. Each stage in the history is a moment of synthesis between a substantive and a methodological idea. The former is the liberal political theory of the period, purporting to provide a solution to the problem of political justification. The latter is a conception of legal method or science, supposedly vindicating the access of the expert to the political choices embodied in the law. Thus, each moment in the history of liberal legalism integrates a political theory with a jurisprudential conception. Although it reaches the unsettling conclusion that liberal legalism has largely failed by its own standards, the book urges us to avoid quietism, scepticism or cynicism, in the hope that a deeper understanding of the fragility of our values and institutions inspires a more thoughtful, broadminded and nurtured citizenship.
Mounting a lawsuit against someone who has wronged you is a prospect no less fearful than being on the receiving end of such a lawsuit. Litigation in the courts has a reputation for being a byzantine process far removed from ordinary life, often failing to address people's real grievances while adding to their pain. Yes, there is money to be had if you win. But beyond that, what is it all in aid of? In this book John Gardner argues that, in spite of their legal intricacy, many of the questions that perennially occupy the courts in civil cases are actually timeless puzzles about the human condition. The architecture of the law of torts and the law of contract turns out to track the contours of personal life much more closely than you might expect. Using a wide range of examples from literature and life as well as law, Gardner explores big questions about our relationships to our own pasts and our own futures as well as to other people. What are friends for? Why does it matter how your actions turn out? What is the good of saying sorry? Why regret your mistakes? How can anyone be compensated for an irreversible loss? Why would you want to hold onto the life you already have? And what does any of this have to do with all those protracted legal disputes about damaged cars, ruined holidays, and leaky roofs?
Private International Law is often criticized for failing to curb private power in the transnational realm. The field appears disinterested or powerless in addressing global economic and social inequality. Scholars have frequently blamed this failure on the separation between private and public international law at the end of the nineteenth century and on private international law's increasing alignment with private law. Through a contextual historical analysis, Roxana Banu questions these premises. By reviewing a broad range of scholarship from six jurisdictions (the United States, France, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, and the Netherlands) she shows that far from injecting an impetus for social justice, the alignment between private and public international law introduced much of private international law's formalism and neutrality. She also uncovers various nineteenth century private law theories that portrayed a social, relationally constituted image of the transnational agent, thus contesting both individualistic and state-centric premises for regulating cross-border inter-personal relations. Overall, this study argues that the inherited shortcomings of contemporary private international law stem more from the incorporation of nineteenth century theories of sovereignty and state rights than from theoretical premises of private law. In turn, by reconsidering the relational premises of the nineteenth century private law perspectives discussed in this book, Banu contends that private international law could take centre stage in efforts to increase social and economic equality by fostering individual agency and social responsibility in the transnational realm.