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David Gabel and David F. Weiman The chapters in this volwne address the related problems of regulating and pricing access in network industries. Interconnection between network suppliers raises the important policy questions of how to sustain competition and realize economic efficiency. To foster rivalry in any industry, suppliers must have access to customers. But unlike in other sectors, the very organization of network industries creates major impediments to potential entrants trying to carve out a niche in the market. In traditional sectors such as gas, electric, rail, and telephone services, these barriers take the form of the large private and social costs necessary to duplicate the physical infrastructure of pipelines, wires, or tracks. Few firms can afford to finance such an undertaking, because the level of sunk costs and the very large scale economies make it extremely risky. In other newer sectors, entrants face less tangible but no less pressing constraints. In the microcomputer industry, for example, high switching costs can prevent users from experimenting with alternative, but perhaps more efficient hardware platforms or operating systems. Although gateway technologies can reduce these barriers, the installed base of an incumbent can create powerful bandwagon effects that reinforce its advantage (such as the greater availability of compatible peripherals and software applications). In the era of electronic banking, entrants into the automated teller machine· (A TM) and credit card markets face a similar problem of establishing a ubiquitous presence.
This report addresses the regulation of access to telecommunication networks. Development of competition and the success of liberalisation often depend on the access terms and conditions chosen, and public policy interest in getting these terms and conditions right is important.
This book reviews the economic literature on cooperative investment in next generation broadband networks and geographic regulation. It additionally proposes innovative models for estimating the level of competition and investment in the fixed telephony market and the retail market for newspapers. In doing so, it addresses two hotly debated issues in business strategy and economic policy: the determinants of investment and competition and the impacts of innovative investment schemes. The first chapter reviews the literature on new cooperative investment schemes in next generation broadband networks and geographic regulation. The effects on competition, investment and welfare of such schemes crucially depend on the details of the agreements. For instance, in the case of joint-ventures, the manner in which investment costs are shared and internal and external access prices are determined significantly impacts the outcome. In the case of long-term access agreements, it is essential to consider how access tariffs are structured, whether they can adapt to market developments ex-post, and whether contracts are signed before or after the investment takes place. Generally, many of these agreements allow for some extent of risk sharing, offering the possibility of increasing investment incentives when firms are not risk neutral. It is suggested that regulators consider introducing regulated co-investment agreements complementing current regulation, in addition to considering geographically segmented access prices. The second chapter assesses entry and competition in local retail markets for newspapers. It builds on the new empirical industrial organisation (NEIO) literature to estimate sustainable coverage and competitive effects of entry for Swiss newspaper sellers which sell composite goods (newspapers, food and other goods of daily use). An entry threshold ratio methodology is used, allowing for model estimation even when the range of products under examination is not exactly defined and when price and quantity data are not available. It is found that under duopoly prices the market size of a Commune required for single firm entry is about twice as large as under monopoly prices. A clear and quantifiable trade-off between competition and investment therefore exists. Moreover, it is found that while a second entrant in this market strongly increases competition, further entry doesn’t have a significant additional competitive effect. From a welfare perspective, therefore, it can be stated that “two is enough” to ensure competition in this market. In the third chapter, competition and market strategies in the Swiss fixed telephony market are assessed. A market model based on a generalised version of the traditional “dominant firm – competitive fringe” model, is developed. Direct estimation of the incumbent’s intertemporal residual demand function is performed by instrumenting the market price with incumbent-specific cost shifting variables, as well as other variables. The concrete estimates show that residual retail demand for voice traffic is highly inelastic. Such a level of elasticity is only compatible with a profit maximising incumbent in the case of largely competitive conduct. It is therefore found that the Swiss incumbent acted largely competitively, and that current regulated telephony retail price caps could not be justified on the basis of a lack of competition.
The rapid growth of network industries has generated much comment amongst academics and policy makers. This timely volume takes an interdisciplinary, case study-based approach to examining network issues and experiences in order to develop recommendations that can inform antitrust, regulatory and legislative policy. Legal, economic, political and institutional aspects of network access are analyzed. The first part of the volume focuses on five topics that are central to reasoned analysis of the access problem. The second part presents ten case studies of network access in the energy, transportation, telecommunications, internet and banking industries. The volume concludes with comparisons and contrasts across the cases and policy recommendations. Network Access, Regulation and Antitrust will prove invaluable to students of business, economics, law and economics and industrial economics, policy makers and academics working in the field.
Traditionally engineers devised communication services without reference to how they should be priced. In today's environment pricing is a very complex subject and in practice depends on many parameters of the actual market - including amount of traffic, architecture of the network, technology, and cost. The challenge is to provide a generic service model which accurately captures aspects such as quality and performance, and can be used to derive optimal pricing strategies. Recent technology advances, combined with the deregulation of the telecommunication market and the proliferation of the internet, have created a highly competitive environment for communication service prividers. Pricing is no longer as simple as picking an appropriate model for a particular contract. There is a real need for a book that explains the provision of new services, the relation between pricing and resource allocation in networks; and the emergence of the internet and how to price it. Pricing Communication Networks provides a framework of mathematical models for pricing these multidimensional contracts, and includes background in network services and contracts, network techonology, basic economics, and pricing strategy. It can be used by economists to fill in the gaps in their knowledge of network services and technology, and for engineers and operational researchers to gain the background in economics required to price communication services effectively. * Provides a broad overview of network services and contracts * Includes a primer on modern network technology and the economic concepts relevant to pricing and competition * Includes discussion of mathematical models of traffic flow to help describe network capability and derive pricing strategies * Includes coverage of specialist topics, such as regulation, multicasting, and auctions * Illustrated throughout by detailed real examples * Suitable for anyone with an understanding of basic calculus and probability Primarily aimed at graduate students, researchers and practitioners from electrical engineering, computer science, economics and operations research Pricing Communication Networks will also appeal to telecomms engineers working in industry.
Editor's description : "During the past two decades, Latin American countries have made pioneering efforts in reforming infrastructure services. The "first generation of reforms" encompassed widespread privatization, deregulation and restructuring of the provision of energy, water, transport and telecommunications services. Second-Generation Reforms in Infrastructure Services evaluates the current challenges, leading to the consolidation of the initial reforms. This volume deals with post-privatization dispute settlement mechanisms, access arrangements in network industries, and inroads to effective competition in the reformed industries. The authors evaluate a set of contractual adjustments resulting from renegotiations and disputes that have taken place since the beginning of the reform process. In an effort to promote competition in the provision of public services, the authors suggest some practical rules for pricing access in network industries. The book presents a dynamic, global vision of second-generation reforms underway in energy markets around the world. - See more at: https://publications.iadb.org/handle/11319/310#sthash.M23WTIKV.dpuf"
This volume focuses on incentive regulation and competition. While much of the regulatory action is taking place in telecommunications, the impact of competition and the resultant regulatory change is being felt in other traditional public utilities including electricity. The book reviews topics including price caps, incentive regulation, market structure and new regulatory technologies.
The authors analyze regulatory reform and the emergence of competitionin network industries using the state-of-the-art theoretical tools ofindustrial organization, political economy, and the economics ofincentives.