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This book is distilled from articles presented at two seminars held at Rutgers -- The State University of New Jersey on October 25, 1991, and May 1, 1992, entitled 'Economic Innovations in Public Utility Regulations'. These contributions represent the best new research on various topics in public utility regulation, including topics in antitrust law, the environmental impact of public utility regulation, incentive regulation, price-cap regulation, and contractual relationships.
This book is based on two seminars held at Rutgers on October 22, 1993, and May 6, 1994 entitled `Incentive Regulation for Public Utilities'. These contributions by leading scholars and practitioners represent some of the best new research in public utility economics and include topics such as the theory of incentive regulation, dynamic pricing, transfer pricing, issues in law and economics, pricing priority service, and energy utility resource planning.
companies to diversify may outweigh the costs of doing so, and that some traditional regulatory concerns may be excessively restrictive. The papers by Hillman, Harris, and Jang and Norsworthy, while all relating to individual industries, have lessons for other regulated industries. Hillman's paper, "Oil Pipeline Rates: A Case for Yardstick Regulation," deals with the important topic of yardstick regulation for oil pipelines. While his application is highly specific, the potential application of yardstick regulation goes beyond oil pipelines. He reviews the evolution in the law regulating oil pipelines. While showing that some progress has been made in introducing economic efficiency considerations into regulation, he provides a careful critique of the operation of existing regulation and suggests an alternative based upon a yardstick approach. His approach seeks to use competitive market prices as the yardstick, with administration of price discrimination limited to dealing with possible "favoritism" to subsidiaries and affiliates. "Telecommunications Services as a Strategic Industry: Implications for United States Public Policy" by Harris and "Productivity Growth and Technical Change in the United States Telecommunications Equipment Manufacturing Industries" by Jang and Norsworthy provide important insights for telecommunications.
Regulation Under Increasing Competition brings together practitioners, regulators, and economists to examine the important policy and regulatory issues facing the telecommunications and electricity industries. This volume reviews such topics as competitive entry, stranded costs, pricing and market mechanisms. It provides a unique perspective on problems in a newly deregulated environment.
Emerging Competition in Postal and Delivery Services brings together practitioners, postal administrators, the courier industry, regulators, academic economists and lawyers to examine important policy and regulatory issues facing the postal and delivery industries. This volume reviews such topics as cost and productivity analysis, universal service and entry, demand analysis and the structure of postal payment system, price regulation and competition.
This book is based on a conference on `Regulation and the Evolving Nature of Postal and Delivery Services: 1992 and Beyond' held at Village PTT, La Londe les Maures, France, on March 18, 1992. Leading practitioners, worldwide postal administrations, and the express delivery industry, as well as a number of regulators, academic economists, and lawyers examine the important policy and regulatory issues facing the postal and delivery industries. This includes such issues as: international postal policy and the role of the Universal Postal Union; regulation and terminal dues; competition, entry and the role of scale and scope economies; the nature and role of costs analysis in postal service; productivity; and service standards.
xiii • We have almost the cheapest letter price in the OEeD. • We've quadrupled the retail outlets where you can buy stamps, but closed three quarters of our Post Offices. On time delivery is better than 97%. • The workforce has been reduced by 40%, with a 25% increase in volumes over the period. Real unit costs, measured by total real expenditure divided by total volumes, have been reduced by over 20%. What do these results and achievements mean for policy setters around the world? In particular, do these results for New Zealand Post prove that it is a commercial business, and what are the lessons for other postal businesses? Market Forces New Zealand Post presently has a limited letter monopoly, a 45 cent letter price against an 80 cent competitive floor price. The existence of this level of protection somehow negates the company's commercial achievements. The combination of high efficiency and low prices cannot persuade everyone that the results are not my view, are the only ones that can solely monopoly driven. Market forces, in answer my question: is New Zealand Post a commercial organization? We need the test offree and open competition to see whether we've got the business formula right. Before advancing this argument, which in essence is the case for deregulation, it may be useful to distinguish between market behavior and Post behavior.
5 care reforms. Part II: Price Regulation The second partofthis volume examines the role ofprice regulation in controlling health care costs. It contains three chapters. In chapter seven, I examine the alternatives for regulating pharmaceutical prices. In chapter eight, Jack Hadley examines the impactofvarious forms ofhospital price regulation; while in chapter nine,MarkPaulyexaminestheroleofpriceregulation incontrollingphysician fees. Chapter seven focuses on the issue of regulating pharmaceutical prices. There are two key issues examined in this paper. First, is there a clear need for price regulation, and second, can price regulation work in this industry? In response to the first question, I come to the conclusion that the proponents ofprice regulation have not really proven their case. Although the financial returns in the pharmaceu tical industry have been slightly higher than expected during the 1970s and 1980s, there is not overwhelming evidence of"price gouging" or excessive profits on the part of the industry. In response to the second question, the answer is clearly no. The traditional approaches to price regulation will not have the intended affect of eliminating excess profits from the industry while maintaining the incentives for research and development. First, rate-of-return regulation, the most natural approach, would result in many adverse incentives-includingexcessive investment in research and developmentinorderto inflatetheratebaseused tocalculatedtheallowablereturns.