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Rivals for Power is a lively description of the power struggle between the president and Congress. In it, leading congressional and presidential scholars and knowledgeable former public officials consider the historical, political, and constitutional foundations of conflict between the two branches. The authors give practical advice about how to build cooperative policymaking between the president and Congress as they struggle over major crises in solving economic problems and addressing domestic issues and the challenges in defense and foreign policy making. The book features original academic research and practitioner knowledge from the White House and the Hill. This fourth edition includes all new essays with unique and critical viewpoints on the role of the president and Congress in the policy making process. Many of the essays focus on lessons learned about cooperation and conflict between the two branches from the Clinton and Bush presidencies. The essays include preliminary analyses of President Barack Obama's relationship with Congress. Because the authors have made major contributions as congressional and presidential scholars, and have played key roles in Congress, in the White House, in the media, and as lobbyists, each chapter presents a different perspective. The new edition of Rivals for Power is intended for students, scholars, public officials, the media, and the general public. Contributions by Gary Andres, Richard S. Conley, Roger H. Davidson, The Honorable Mickey Edwards, Louis Fisher, Patrick Griffin, The Honorable Lee H. Hamilton, Mark J. Oleszek, Walter J. Oleszek, John E. Owens, James P. Pfiffner, Mark J. Rozell, Andrew Rudalevige, Barbara Sinclair, Mitchel A. Sollenberger, James A. Thurber, Stephen J. Wayne, and Joseph White.
CHOICE 2000 Outstanding Academic Title Explaining Congressional-Presidential Relations examines government activities involving direct interactions between presidents and Congress and considers whether they are influenced by executive, legislative, and/or exogenous factors. The book encompasses presidential position taking on legislative votes, legislative support of presidents' positions, presidents' propensity to veto legislation, and budget agreement between the two branches, all of which are elements in the adoption of public policy.
Examines how presidents and Congress work together
Can presidents influence whether Congress enacts their agenda? Most research on presidential-congressional relations suggests that presidents have little if any influence on Congress. Instead, structural factors like party control largely determine the fate of the president’s legislative agenda. In The President on Capitol Hill, Jeffrey E. Cohen challenges this conventional view, arguing that existing research has underestimated the president’s power to sway Congress and developing a new theory of presidential influence. Cohen demonstrates that by taking a position, the president converts an issue from a nonpresidential into a presidential one, which leads members of Congress to consider the president’s views when deciding how to vote. Presidential position taking also converts the factors that normally affect roll call voting—such as party, public opinion, and policy type—into resources that presidents can leverage to influence the vote. By testing all House roll calls from 1877 to 2012, Cohen finds that not only do presidents have more influence than previously thought, but through their influence, they can affect the substance of public policy. The President on Capitol Hill offers a new perspective on presidential-congressional relations, showing that presidents are not simply captives of larger political forces but rather major players in the legislative process.
Nearly five hundred times in the past century, American presidents have deployed the nation's military abroad, on missions ranging from embassy evacuations to full-scale wars. The question of whether Congress has effectively limited the president's power to do so has generally met with a resounding "no." In While Dangers Gather, William Howell and Jon Pevehouse reach a very different conclusion. The authors--one an American politics scholar, the other an international relations scholar--provide the most comprehensive and compelling evidence to date on Congress's influence on presidential war powers. Their findings have profound implications for contemporary debates about war, presidential power, and Congress's constitutional obligations. While devoting special attention to the 2003 invasion of Iraq, this book systematically analyzes the last half-century of U.S. military policy. Among its conclusions: Presidents are systematically less likely to exercise military force when their partisan opponents retain control of Congress. The partisan composition of Congress, however, matters most for proposed deployments that are larger in size and directed at less strategically important locales. Moreover, congressional influence is often achieved not through bold legislative action but through public posturing--engaging the media, raising public concerns, and stirring domestic and international doubt about the United States' resolve to see a fight through to the end.
American Gridlock is a comprehensive analysis of polarization encompassing national and state politics, voters, elites, activists, the media, and the three branches of government.
With an insider's perspective based on thirty-four years in Congress, Hamilton elucidates current domestic and international pressures influencing U.S. foreign policy, strengths and weaknesses in the foreign policy process, and ways to improve the performance of the president and Congress. A Creative Tension argues that better consultation between the executive and legislative branches is the most effective way to strengthen American foreign policy.
“It is the nature of war to increase the executive at the expense of the legislative authority,” wrote Alexander Hamilton in the Federalist Papers. The balance of power between Congress and the president has been a powerful thread throughout American political thought since the time of the Founding Fathers. And yet, for all that has been written on the topic, we still lack a solid empirical or theoretical justification for Hamilton’s proposition. For the first time, William G. Howell, Saul P. Jackman, and Jon C. Rogowski systematically analyze the question. Congress, they show, is more likely to defer to the president’s policy preferences when political debates center on national rather than local considerations. Thus, World War II and the post-9/11 wars in Afghanistan and Iraq significantly augmented presidential power, allowing the president to enact foreign and domestic policies that would have been unattainable in times of peace. But, contrary to popular belief, there are also times when war has little effect on a president’s influence in Congress. The Vietnam and Gulf Wars, for instance, did not nationalize our politics nearly so much, and presidential influence expanded only moderately. Built on groundbreaking research, The Wartime President offers one of the most significant works ever written on the wartime powers presidents wield at home.