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Seminar paper from the year 2012 in the subject Politics - International Politics - Region: USA, grade: 1,3, University of Würzburg (Institut für Politikwissenschaft und Sozialforschung), course: American Government, language: English, abstract: In his article “Presidential Power and Congressional Acquiescence in the ‘War’ on Terrorism: A New Constitutional Equilibrium?” John E. Owens of the University of Westminster suggests the existence of a new constitutional equilibrium between the President and Congress in America. He builds his thesis on Burnham’s punctuated equilibrium theory and analyzes Bush’s policy and his war on terrorism. In this essay I will explain the main thesis of the punctuated equilibrium theory at first, to build on that basis the critical analysis whether the system of Checks and Balances in the United States is or has been out of work and whether we can truly speak of a change of system. This will be checked by analysing the constitution, the role of the Congress and the presidency of George W. Bush. In a second part of this essay I will take up the punctuated equilibrium theory again and explain that the equilibrium of the American system has been punctuated but it was not pushed on a new level, but levelled off again on the old equilibrium and re-established the system of Checks and Balances.
Thirty years after the Church Committee unearthed COINTELPRO and other instances of illicit executive behavior on the domestic and international fronts, the Bush administration has elevated the flaws identified by the committee into first principles of government. Through a constellation of non-public laws and opaque, unaccountable institutions, the current administration has created a “secret presidency” run by classified presidential decisions and orders about national security. A hyperactive Office of Legal Counsel in the Department of Justice is intent on eliminating checks on presidential power and testing that power's limits. Decisions are routinely executed at senior levels within the civilian administration without input from Congress or the federal courts, let alone our international allies. Secret NSA spying at home is the most recent of these. Harsh treatment of detainees, “extraordinary renditions,” secret foreign prisons, and the newly minted enemy combatant designation have also undermined our values. The resulting policies have harmed counterterrorism efforts and produced few tangible results. With a partisan Congress predictably reluctant to censure a politically aligned president, it is all the more important for citizens themselves to demand disclosure, oversight, and restraint of sweeping claims of executive power. This book is the first step.
For this new edition, Louis Fisher has updated his arguments to include critiques of the Clinton & Bush presidencies, particularly the Use of Force Act, the Iraq Resolution of 2002, the 'preemption doctrine' of the current U.S. administration, & the order authorizing military tribunals.
The Case for Congress: Separation of Powers and the War on Terror examines the constitutional relationship between Congress and the President in the post-September 11 world, arguing that Congress should exercise its legitimate authority in guiding United States policy. While many commentators have focused on the extent of the President's national security and foreign affairs authority, both domestically and abroad, this title focuses on the constitutional authority of Congress to serve as a check on executive power. As a national consensus has developed around the notion that the Bush administration made grave errors in its policy decisions, a reminder of the leading role that Congress can play in those decisions is particularly appropriate. Unlike scholarly work devoted either to detailing or criticizing the Bush administration's policy decisions, this accessible and balanced book focuses on the policies themselves, and on the way in which Congress can influence those policies for the better. The authors further offer specific and useful recommendations for legislative measures that may correct existing policy deficiencies and promote sounder decision-making in the area of national security and foreign affairs.
How has 9/11 and George W. Bush's self-declared "war" on terror changed American government and US foreign policy? This is the central question addressed in the nine original essays in this book. Following an introduction by the editors, in which they survey issues and debates raised by America's "War" on Terrorism and its consequences for US government and politics, foreign policy, and for American foreign relations, the contributions to this volume--from British and American scholars--explain the implications of the post-9/11 mobilization and reconfiguration of US foreign and internal security policies. Issues addressed in the book include: the growth of presidential power, executive branch reconfiguration and the managerial presidency, the Bush doctrine of pre-emption, the changing role of the US in the international order, the impact of the "war" on terrorism on the US military, intelligence failure and the changed role of US intelligence, renewed tension in US-European relations, and Bush's alliance with Tony Blair's government in the United Kingdom. Taken together, the essays represent an original and timely assessment of the domestic and international repercussions of George W. Bush's responses to the terrorist attacks September 11, 2001.
Extension of presidential leadership in foreign affairs to war powers has destabilized our constitutional order and deranged our foreign policy. Stephen M. Griffin shows unexpected connections between the imperial presidency and constitutional crises, and argues for accountability by restoring Congress to a meaningful role in decisions for war.
As a presidential candidate, Barack Obama criticized the George W. Bush administration for its unrestrained actions in matters of national security. In secret Justice Department memos, President Bush’s officials had claimed for the executive branch total authority to use military force in response to threats of terrorism. They set aside laws made by Congress, even criminal laws prohibiting torture and warrantless surveillance. Candidate Obama promised to restore the rule of law and make a clean break with the Bush approach. President Obama has not done so. Why? In a thorough comparison of the Bush and Obama administrations’ national security policies, Chris Edelson demonstrates that President Obama and his officials have used softer rhetoric and toned-down legal arguments, but in key areas—military action, surveillance, and state secrets—they have simply found new ways to assert power without meaningful constitutional or statutory constraints. Edelson contends that this legacy of the two immediately post-9/11 presidencies raises crucial questions for future presidents, Congress, the courts, and American citizens. Where is the political will to restore a balance of powers among branches of government and adherence to the rule of law? What are the limits of authority regarding presidential national security power? Have national security concerns created a permanent shift to unconstrained presidential power?
“Can Orentlicher be serious in calling for a plural executive? The answer is yes, and he presents thoughtful and challenging arguments responding to likely criticisms. Any readers who are other than completely complacent about the current state of American politics will have to admire Orentlicher’s distinctive audacity and to respond themselves to his well-argued points.” —Sanford Levinson, author of Framed: America’s 51 Constitutions and the Crisis of Governance “In this refreshingly provocative book, David Orentlicher explains why it is due time for us to reconsider dominant ideas about the presidency, now arguably our most powerful political institution.” —William E. Scheuerman, Indiana University When talking heads and political pundits make their “What’s Wrong with America” lists, two concerns invariably rise to the top: the growing presidential abuse of power and the toxic political atmosphere in Washington. In Two Presidents Are Better Than One, David Orentlicher shows how the “imperial presidency” and partisan conflict are largely the result of a deeper problem—the Constitution’s placement of a single president atop the executive branch. Accordingly, writes Orentlicher, we can fix our broken political system by replacing the one person, one-party presidency with a two-person, two-party executive branch. Orentlicher contends that our founding fathers did not anticipate the extent to which their checks and balances would fail to contain executive power and partisan discord. As the stakes in presidential elections have grown ever higher since the New Deal, battles to capture the White House have greatly exacerbated partisan differences. Had the framers been able to predict the future, Orentlicher argues, they would have been far less enamored with the idea of a single leader at the head of the executive branch and far more receptive to the alternative proposals for a plural executive that they rejected. Analyzing the histories of other countries with a plural executive branch and past examples of bipartisan cooperation within Congress, Orentlicher shows us why and how to implement a two-person, two-party presidency. Ultimately, Two Presidents Are Better Than One demonstrates why we need constitutional reform to rebalance power between the executive and legislative branches and contain partisan conflict in Washington. David Orentlicher is Samuel R. Rosen Professor at Indiana University Robert H. McKinney School of Law. A scholar of constitutional law and a former state representative, David also has taught at Princeton University and the University of Chicago Law School. He earned degrees in law and medicine at Harvard and specializes as well in health care law and ethics.