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This book attempts to fuse two topical subjects and deal with them in a holistic manner. It is oft said and is also widely believed that the 21st century belongs to Asia and that the two giants of Asia, namely, China and India are going to dominate the world in the ensuing decades. It is also implicitly accepted that nuclear weapons are going to be there, at least for the foreseeable future. These are the two topics that have been analysed in this book; nuclear weapons and the emerging epicenter of global affairs, namely, Asia. The book deals with the fundamental nature of nuclear weapons itself. It purposely steers away from the Cold War mindset of viewing nuclear weapons in a western manner and attempts to unravel the manner in which the nations of Asia view these weapons in their own unique way. It is also about the nature of disputes in Asia and the security environment in Asia, both presently as well as in the foreseeable future. Since it is a fact that there are unresolved disputes in the region, the book also deals with the aspect of analysis of potential conflict scenarios. Will the countries succeed in settling their disputes diplomatically? Can deterrence succeed? What will happen if that fails? What will be the shape of future conflicts? This book makes a modest attempt to provide answers to some of these perplexing questions that plague policy makers and strategists in Asia today. Since the study is from an Indian perspective, the focus is naturally biased more towards South Asia vis-a-vis the other parts of Asia. Though the book attempts to answer all questions, some tough questions typically deny neat solutions. As the author admits, the aim of the book is to get both the policy and decision makers as well as the professional military to think about these issues, so that, in time, workable solutions can be evolved."
This book attempts to fuse two topical subjects and deal with them in a holistic manner. It is oft said and is also widely believed that the 21st century belongs to Asia and that the two giants of Asia, namely, China and India are going to dominate the world in the ensuing decades. It is also implicitly accepted that nuclear weapons are going to be there, at least for the foreseeable future. These are the two topics that have been analysed in this book; nuclear weapons and the emerging epicenter of global affairs, namely, Asia. The book deals with the fundamental nature of nuclear weapons itself. It purposely steers away from the Cold War mindset of viewing nuclear weapons in a western manner and attempts to unravel the manner in which the nations of Asia view these weapons in their own unique way. It is also about the nature of disputes in Asia and the security environment in Asia, both presently as well as in the foreseeable future. Since it is a fact that there are unresolved disputes in the region, the book also deals with the aspect of analysis of potential conflict scenarios. Will the countries succeed in settling their disputes diplomatically? Can deterrence succeed? What will happen if that fails? What will be the shape of future conflicts? This book makes a modest attempt to provide answers to some of these perplexing questions that plague policy makers and strategists in Asia today. Since the study is from an Indian perspective, the focus is naturally biased more towards South Asia vis-à-vis the other parts of Asia. Though the book attempts to answer all questions, some tough questions typically deny neat solutions. As the author admits, the aim of the book is to get both the policy and decision makers as well as the professional military to think about these issues, so that, in time, workable solutions can be evolved.
SCOTT (Copy 1): From the John Holmes Library Collection
For close to sixty years, the United States has maintained alliances with Japan and South Korea that have included a nuclear umbrella, guaranteeing their security as part of a strategy of extended deterrence. Yet questions about the credibility of deterrence commitments have always been an issue, especially when nuclear weapons are concerned. Would the United States truly be willing to use these weapons to defend an ally? In this book, Terence Roehrig provides a detailed and comprehensive look at the nuclear umbrella in northeast Asia in the broader context of deterrence theory and U.S. strategy. He examines the role of the nuclear umbrella in Japanese and South Korean defense planning and security calculations, including the likelihood that either will develop its own nuclear weapons. Roehrig argues that the nuclear umbrella is most important as a political signal demonstrating commitment to the defense of allies and as a tool to prevent further nuclear proliferation in the region. While the role of the nuclear umbrella is often discussed in military terms, this book provides an important glimpse into the political dimensions of the nuclear security guarantee. As the security environment in East Asia changes with the growth of North Korea's capabilities and China's military modernization, as well as Donald Trump's early pronouncements that cast doubt on traditional commitments to allies, the credibility and resolve of U.S. alliances will take on renewed importance for the region and the world.
This book examines the theory and practice of nuclear deterrence between India and Pakistan, two highly antagonistic South Asian neighbors who recently moved into their third decade of overt nuclear weaponization. It assesses the stability of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence and argues that, while deterrence dampens the likelihood of escalation to conventional—and possibly nuclear—war, the chronically embittered relations between New Delhi and Islamabad mean that deterrence failure resulting in major warfare cannot be ruled out. Through an empirical examination of the effects of nuclear weapons during five crises between India and Pakistan since 1998, as well as a discussion of the theoretical logic of Indo-Pakistani nuclear deterrence, the book offers suggestions for enhancing deterrence stability between these two countries.
Hagerty analyzes how India and Pakistan interacted in diplomatic and military crises before their 1998 nuclear tests. He presents detailed studies of the January 1987 Indo-Pakistani crisis, precipitated by India's Brasstacks military exercises, and the 1990 confrontation over Kashmir. Hagerty concludes that relations between India and Pakistan in recent years support the argument that nuclear proliferation does not necessarily destabilize international relations and may even reduce the risk of war.
One of the gravest issues facing the global community today is the threat of nuclear war. As a growing number of nations gain nuclear capabilities, the odds of nuclear conflict increase. Yet nuclear deterrence strategies remain rooted in Cold War models that do not take into account regional conflict. Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments offers an innovative theory of brokered bargaining to better understand and solve regional crises. As the world has moved away from the binational relationships that defined Cold War conflict while nuclear weapons have continued to proliferate, new types of nuclear threats have arisen. Moeed Yusuf proposes a unique approach to deterrence that takes these changing factors into account. Drawing on the history of conflict between India and Pakistan, Yusuf describes the potential for third-party intervention to avert nuclear war. This book lays out the ways regional powers behave and maneuver in response to the pressures of strong global powers. Moving beyond debates surrounding the widely accepted rational deterrence model, Yusuf offers an original perspective rooted in thoughtful analysis of recent regional nuclear conflicts. With depth and insight, Brokering Peace in Nuclear Environments urges the international community to rethink its approach to nuclear deterrence.
An important and critical re-evaluation of South Asia's post-tests nuclear politics. Unlike other books, this volume emphasises the political dimension of South Asia's nuclear weapons, explains how the bombs are used as politico-strategic assets rather than pure battlefield weapons and how they are employed by India and Pakistan in an extremely complex and competitive South Asian strategic landscape.
The definitive guide to the history of nuclear arms control by a wise eavesdropper and masterful storyteller, Michael Krepon. The greatest unacknowledged diplomatic achievement of the Cold War was the absence of mushroom clouds. Deterrence alone was too dangerous to succeed; it needed arms control to prevent nuclear warfare. So, U.S. and Soviet leaders ventured into the unknown to devise guardrails for nuclear arms control and to treat the Bomb differently than other weapons. Against the odds, they succeeded. Nuclear weapons have not been used in warfare for three quarters of a century. This book is the first in-depth history of how the nuclear peace was won by complementing deterrence with reassurance, and then jeopardized by discarding arms control after the Cold War ended. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace tells a remarkable story of high-wire acts of diplomacy, close calls, dogged persistence, and extraordinary success. Michael Krepon brings to life the pitched battles between arms controllers and advocates of nuclear deterrence, the ironic twists and unexpected outcomes from Truman to Trump. What began with a ban on atmospheric testing and a nonproliferation treaty reached its apogee with treaties that mandated deep cuts and corralled "loose nukes" after the Soviet Union imploded. After the Cold War ended, much of this diplomatic accomplishment was cast aside in favor of freedom of action. The nuclear peace is now imperiled by no less than four nuclear-armed rivalries. Arms control needs to be revived and reimagined for Russia and China to prevent nuclear warfare. New guardrails have to be erected. Winning and Losing the Nuclear Peace is an engaging account of how the practice of arms control was built from scratch, how it was torn down, and how it can be rebuilt.