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This paper provides a critical survey of the literature on politico-institutional determinants of the government budget. We organize our discussion around two questions: Why did certain OECD countries, but not others, accumulate large public debts? Why did these fiscal imbalances appear in the last 20 years rather than before? We begin by discussing the “tax smoothing” model and conclude that this approach alone cannot provide complete answers to these questions. We will then proceed to a discussion of political economy models, which we organize in six groups: (i) models based upon opportunistic policymakers and naive voters with “fiscal illusion;” (ii) models of intergenerational redistributions; (iii) models of debt as a strategic variable, linking the current government with the next one; (iv) models of coalition governments; (v) models of geographically dispersed interests; and (vi) models emphasizing the effects of budgetary institutions. We conclude by briefly discussing policy implications.
This paper focuses on the management of fiscal deficits and the public debt in the industrial democracies. Given the large deficits in many OECD countries in recent years, and the resulting sharp rise in the public debt, it is important to determine the economic and political forces leading to such large deficits. We find only partial support for the "equilibrium approach to fiscal policy", which assumes that tax rates are set over time in order to minimize the excess burden of taxation. Tax rates do not seem to be smoothed, and budget deficits in many countries in recent years appear to be too large to be explained by appeal to transitory increases in government spending. We suggest that in several countries the slow rate at which the post-'73 fiscal deficits were reduced resulted from the difficulties of political management in coalition governments. There is a clear tendency for larger deficits in countries characterized by a by a short average tenure of government and by the presence of many political parties in a ruling coalition
By discussing the available theoretical and empirical literature, this paper argues that budget procedures and budget institutions do influence budget outcomes. Budget institutions include both procedural rules and balanced budget laws. We critically assess theoretical contributions in this area and suggest several open and unresolved issue. We also examine the empirical evidence drawn from studies on samples of OECD countries, Latin American countries and the United States. We conclude with a discussion of the normative implications of this literature and with some concrete proposals.
Since the global financial crisis, government debt has soared globally by 40 percent and now exceeds an astonishing $100 trillion. Not all countries, though, have fared the same. Indeed, even prior to the financial crisis, the fiscal fates of countries have been diverging, despite predictions that pressures from economic globalization push countries toward more convergent fiscally conservative policies. Featuring the work of an international interdisciplinary team of scholars, this volume explains patterns of fiscal performance (persistent patterns of budget deficits and government debt) from the 1970s to the present across seven countries – France, Italy, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, and the United States. Employing a comparative case study approach, seldom employed in studies of fiscal performance, contributions illuminate the complex causal factors often overlooked by quantitative studies and advances our theoretical understanding of fiscal performance. Among other things, the cases highlight the role of taxpayer consent, tax structure, the welfare state, organization of interests, and labor and financial markets in shaping fiscal outcomes. A necessary resource to understand a broader array of factors that shape fiscal outcomes in specific national contexts, this book will reinvigorate the study of fiscal performance.
This book is the first systematic study of how the interdependence of fiscal and monetary policies and the interaction of party governments and central banks affect the fiscal-policy mix in eighteen industrial democracies in North America, Western Europe, Japan and Oceania. Sakamoto argues that central banks influence on economic policy is far mor
Here is the most comprehensive and authoritative work to date on relationships between the economy and politics in the years from Eisenhower through Reagan. Extending and deepening his earlier work, which had major impact in both political science and economics, Hibbs traces the patterns in and sources of postwar growth, unemployment, and inflation. He identifies which groups win and lose from inflations and recessions. He also shows how voters' perceptions and reactions to economic events affect the electoral fortunes of political parties and presidents. Hibbs's analyses demonstrate that political officials in a democratic society ignore the economic interests and demands of their constituents at their peril, because episodes of prosperity and austerity frequently have critical influence on voters' behavior at the polls. The consequences of Eisenhower's last recession, of Ford's unwillingness to stimulate the economy, of Carter's stalled recovery were electorally fatal, whereas Johnson's, Nixon's, and Reagan's successes in presiding over rising employment and real incomes helped win elections. The book develops a major theory of macroeconomic policy action that explains why priority is given to growth, unemployment, inflation, and income distribution shifts with changes in partisan control of the White House. The analysis shows how such policy priorities conform to the underlying economic interests and preferences of the governing party's core political supporters. Throughout the study Hibbs is careful to take account of domestic institutional arrangements and international economic events that constrain domestic policy effectiveness and influence domestic economic outcomes. Hibbs's interdisciplinary approach yields more rigorous and more persuasive characterizations of the American political economy than either purely economic, apolitical analyses or purely partisan, politicized accounts. His book provides a useful benchmark for the advocacy of new policies for the 1990s--a handy volume for politicians and their staffs, as well as for students and teachers of politics and economics.
On August 24-25, 2010, the National Defense University held a conference titled “Economic Security: Neglected Dimension of National Security?” to explore the economic element of national power. This special collection of selected papers from the conference represents the view of several keynote speakers and participants in six panel discussions. It explores the complexity surrounding this subject and examines the major elements that, interacting as a system, define the economic component of national security.
This paper looks at the factors that have to be considered when designing an aggregate expenditure ceiling. It is argued that expenditure ceilings are effective in promoting fiscal discipline and sustainability, but that a number of trade-offs have to be made when setting up a fiscal framework that will survive in a politically charged environment. The paper illustrates the discussion with a case study of medium-term aggregate expenditure ceilings in three countries: Finland, the Netherlands and Sweden.
This edited collection is a critical evaluation of the impact of fiscal imbalances on the economy of industrialized and developing countries as prepared by a diverse group of scholars involved in advanced research on public finance. Technical issues, economic consequences and the political economy of budget deficits and government debt are covered in one succinct volume. The work provides a balanced presentation of neo-classical views on measures of government deficits; the budget process and major budgetary legislation in the United States; and the impact of deficits on economic activity, exchange rates, inflation, financial markets, trade balance, and economic growth. It also examines the political economy of government budgets in the OECD, select developing economies, and South Africa. From the 1950s to the 1980s, economic activity and growth were affected by fiscal imbalances and excessive government activity in many countries. Although many actors have made retrenchment attempts, economic research has not resolved the conflicting arguments about the impact of fiscal imbalances on the global economy. This book provides a balanced presentation of all major issues related to the impact of fiscal activity on the economy.
The purpose of this paper is to empirically determine the effects of political instability on economic growth. Using the system-GMM estimator for linear dynamic panel data models on a sample covering up to 169 countries, and 5-year periods from 1960 to 2004, we find that higher degrees of political instability are associated with lower growth rates of GDP per capita. Regarding the channels of transmission, we find that political instability adversely affects growth by lowering the rates of productivity growth and, to a smaller degree, physical and human capital accumulation. Finally, economic freedom and ethnic homogeneity are beneficial to growth, while democracy may have a small negative effect.