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This book seeks to understand why almost all commentators on the Irish economy were unprepared for the scale of the recent economic crisis. It analyses the public contributions from a broad range of observers, including domestic and international agencies, academics, the newspapers and politicians. This approach gives new insights into the analytical and institutional shortfalls that inhibited observers from recognising the degree of the risk. The book demonstrates that most commentators were either impeded in what they could say, or else lacked the expertise to challenge the prevailing view. The findings have significant implications for a broad range of institutions, particularly the media and the Oireachtas (the Irish Parliament).
The industrialized world has long been rocked by economic crises, often caused by policy makers who are guided by ideology rather than cold, hard analysis. WRONG examines the worst economic policy blunders of the last 250 years, providing a valuable guide book for policy makers... and the citizens who elect them.
Offers a deeply informed diagnosis of Ireland's current socio-economic and political malaise, suggesting a political earthquake may benefit the left.
Examines how the Celtic Tiger, an economy that was hailed as one of the most successful in history, fell into a macroeconomic abyss necessitating an unheard of bail-out. A highly-readable account of the unprecedented near collapse of the Irish economy, it covers property market bubbles, regulatory incompetency, and disastrous economic policies.
The Financial Crisis Inquiry Report, published by the U.S. Government and the Financial Crisis Inquiry Commission in early 2011, is the official government report on the United States financial collapse and the review of major financial institutions that bankrupted and failed, or would have without help from the government. The commission and the report were implemented after Congress passed an act in 2009 to review and prevent fraudulent activity. The report details, among other things, the periods before, during, and after the crisis, what led up to it, and analyses of subprime mortgage lending, credit expansion and banking policies, the collapse of companies like Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, and the federal bailouts of Lehman and AIG. It also discusses the aftermath of the fallout and our current state. This report should be of interest to anyone concerned about the financial situation in the U.S. and around the world.THE FINANCIAL CRISIS INQUIRY COMMISSION is an independent, bi-partisan, government-appointed panel of 10 people that was created to "examine the causes, domestic and global, of the current financial and economic crisis in the United States." It was established as part of the Fraud Enforcement and Recovery Act of 2009. The commission consisted of private citizens with expertise in economics and finance, banking, housing, market regulation, and consumer protection. They examined and reported on "the collapse of major financial institutions that failed or would have failed if not for exceptional assistance from the government."News Dissector DANNY SCHECHTER is a journalist, blogger and filmmaker. He has been reporting on economic crises since the 1980's when he was with ABC News. His film In Debt We Trust warned of the economic meltdown in 2006. He has since written three books on the subject including Plunder: Investigating Our Economic Calamity (Cosimo Books, 2008), and The Crime Of Our Time: Why Wall Street Is Not Too Big to Jail (Disinfo Books, 2011), a companion to his latest film Plunder The Crime Of Our Time. He can be reached online at www.newsdissector.com.
The questions surrounding how the Irish economy was brought to the brink - who was to blame, and who should pay for these mistakes - have been rightly debated at length. But beyond this very legitimate exercise, there are deeper questions that need to be answered. These questions relate to why we made the decisions we did, not just in the last ten years, but over the last eighty. How did certain industries become more prominent at the expense of others, banking as opposed to fisheries, international markets as opposed to indigenous industry and job creation? Are our problems structural in nature, and most importantly, what do we need to know to make sure that this crisis does not happen again? These are the questions set by this book. It will look at the development of the Irish economy over the past eight decades, and will argue that the 2008 financial crisis, up to and including the IMF bailout of 2010 and the subsequent change of government, cannot be explained simply by the moral failings of those in banking or property development alone. The problems are deeper, more intricate, and more dangerous if we remain unaware of them, but also potentially avoidable in the future if we break the cycle.
The deflation of the subprime mortgage bubble in 2006-7 is widely agreed to have been the immediate cause of the collapse of the financial sector in 2008. Consequently, one might think that uncovering the origins of subprime lending would make the root causes of the crisis obvious. That is essentially where public debate about the causes of the crisis began—and ended—in the month following the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers and the 502-point fall in the Dow Jones Industrial Average in mid-September 2008. However, the subprime housing bubble is just one piece of the puzzle. Asset bubbles inflate and burst frequently, but severe worldwide recessions are rare. What was different this time? In What Caused the Financial Crisis leading economists and scholars delve into the major causes of the worst financial collapse since the Great Depression and, together, present a comprehensive picture of the factors that led to it. One essay examines the role of government regulation in expanding home ownership through mortgage subsidies for impoverished borrowers, encouraging the subprime housing bubble. Another explores how banks were able to securitize mortgages by manipulating criteria used for bond ratings. How this led to inaccurate risk assessments that could not be covered by sufficient capital reserves mandated under the Basel accords is made clear in a third essay. Other essays identify monetary policy in the United States and Europe, corporate pay structures, credit-default swaps, banks' leverage, and financial deregulation as possible causes of the crisis. With contributions from Richard A. Posner, Vernon L. Smith, Joseph E. Stiglitz, and John B. Taylor, among others, What Caused the Financial Crisis provides a cogent, comprehensive, and credible explanation of why the crisis happened. It will be an essential resource for scholars and students of finance, economics, history, law, political science, and sociology, as well as others interested in the financial crisis and the nature of modern capitalism and regulation.
"The roots of many problems facing Ireland's economy today can be traced to the first two decades following its independence. Opening previously unexplored areas of Irish history, this is the first comprehensive study of industrial development and attitudes coward industrialization during a pivotal period, from the founding of the Irish Free State to the Anglo-Irish Trade Treaty." "As one of the first postcolonial states of the 20th century, Ireland experienced strong tensions between the independence movement and the considerable institutional and economic inertia from the past. Daly explores these tensions and how Irish nationalism, Catholicism, and British political traditions influenced economic development. She thus sheds light on the evolution of economic and social attitudes in the newly independent state." "Drawing on a wide array of primary sources not yet generally accessible, Daly examines such topics as Irish economic thinking before independence; the conservative policies of W. T. Cosgrave's government in the first five years after independence; the growing division between the two major political parties over economic policy; Fianna Fail's controversial attempts to develop an independent - and nationalistic - economic policy; the largely unsuccessful attempt to develop native industries; the development of financial institutions; the political and social implications of economic change; the Anglo-Irish Trade Agreement of 1938; and comparisons with other economically emerging nations."--BOOK JACKET.Title Summary field provided by Blackwell North America, Inc. All Rights Reserved
Financial crises are traditionally analyzed as purely economic phenomena. The political economy of financial booms and busts remains both under-emphasized and limited to isolated episodes. This paper examines the political economy of financial policy during ten of the most infamous financial booms and busts since the 18th century, and presents consistent evidence of pro-cyclical regulatory policies by governments. Financial booms, and risk-taking during these episodes, were often amplified by political regulatory stimuli, credit subsidies, and an increasing light-touch approach to financial supervision. The regulatory backlash that ensues from financial crises can only be understood in the context of the deep political ramifications of these crises. Post-crisis regulations do not always survive the following boom. The interplay between politics and financial policy over these cycles deserves further attention. History suggests that politics can be the undoing of macro-prudential regulations.
Ireland's international reputation changed rapidly from global success story to European problem-case. How did this happen? What are the implications for our view of good governance? This book argues that there is a crisis in the way the Irish state is structured and in the manner in which it relates to the main organized interests in the society. Through a set of linked policy studies, it shows how sectional benefits can be prioritized where public interest considerations are weakly articulated and debated. Policy choices may entail unintended perverse consequences that, once embedded, can be difficult to alter. The book traces these weaknesses to the dominance of parties, the permeability of the political system to sectional interests, and the weakness of democratic accountability. A powerful concluding chapter sets out an agenda for future research on institutional design and political reform. This book sets out a compelling argument that institutional design matters, especially in an increasingly global and interdependent world.