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Biosecurity and Bioterrorism, Second Edition, takes a holistic approach to biosecurity, with coverage of pathogens, prevention, and response methodology. It addresses these hazards in the context of vulnerability assessments and the planning strategies government and industry can use to prepare for and respond to such events. The book is organized into four thematic sections: Part I provides a conceptual understanding of biowarfare, bioterrorism and the laws we have to counteract this; Part II investigates known bioagents and the threat from emerging diseases; Part III focuses on agricultural terrorism and food security; and Part IV outlines international, US, and local initiatives for biodefense and biosecurity. Case studies illustrate biodefense against both intentional terrorism and natural outbreaks. - Covers emerging threats of pandemic influenza, antibiotic resistant strains of bacterial pathogens, and severe respiratory diseases caused by novel viruses - Offers increased international coverage, including initiatives to counter biological weapons and threats, and food security - Updated throughout with latest protocols for dealing with biological threats and new case studies - Includes online instructor ancillaries - PowerPoint lecture slides, test questions, and an instructor manual, for increased classroom functionality
Natural and man-made biothreats to our nation will continue to plague us. In this timely Center for Security Policy volume, 11 experts look at the 2020 coronavirus pandemic and beyond to provide an in-depth analysis of this threat and assess what the U.S. government must do to defend the American people.National Review's Jim Geraghty, China expert Gordon Chang, and national security expert Claudia Rosett lead off with sobering looks at the spread of the coronavirus, the Chinese government's criminal negligence that caused it to become a pandemic and how the World Health Organization's collaboration with Beijing covered up the danger and denied the world crucial time that could have saved hundreds of thousands of lives. Rosemary Gibson contributed a related chapter on why the pandemic should lead U.S. officials to end America's dependency on China for essential medical supplies and drugs.Most of Defending Against Biothreats discusses the growing danger from man-made and natural biothreats and how to defend against them. This includes chapters from former Soviet biological weapons scientist Dr. Ken Alibek, Albina Tskhay, Shoshana Bryen, and Stephen Bryen. Former CIA operations officer Charles Faddis discusses the lessons terrorists will draw from the 2020 pandemic. Former national security officials Paula DeSutter, Stephen Elliott and John Lauder discuss U.S. and international policies to defend against biothreats and why much more needs to be done.A must-read for anyone looking to understand the lessons from the 2020 coronavirus pandemic that our leaders must act on to defend against a dire security threat that could kill millions or billions, and possibly wipe out the human race.
"The renewed threat of biological weapons highlights the importance of crafting policy responses informed by the rule of law. This book explores patterns in recent governance initiatives and advocates building a "global biosecurity concert" as a way to address the threats presented by biological weapons and infectious diseases in the early 21st century."--BOOK JACKET.
Mass Casualty events may occur as a result of natural or human-caused disasters or after an act of terrorism. The planning and response to disasters and catastrophes needs to take into consideration the distinction between progressive and sudden events. Insidious or slowly progressive disasters produce a large number of victims but over a prolonged time period, with different peaks in the severity of patients presenting to the hospital. For example, radiation events will produce a large number of victims who will present days, weeks, months, or years after exposure, depending on the dose of radiation received. The spread of a biological agent or a pandemic will produce an extremely high number of victims who will present to hospitals during days to weeks after the initial event, depending on the agent and progression of symptoms. On the other hand, in a sudden disaster, there is an abrupt surge of victims resulting from an event such as an explosion or a chemical release. After the sarin gas attack in a Tokyo subway in 1995, a total of 5500 victims were injured and required medical attention at local hospitals immediately after the attack. The car bomb that exploded near the American Embassy in Nairobi, Kenya, killed 213 people and simultaneously produced 4044 injured patients, many requiring medical care at local hospitals. The Madrid train bombing in March 2004 produced more than 2000 injured victims in minutes, overwhelming the city’s healthcare facilities. More than 500 injured patients were treated at local hospital after the mass shooting in Las Vegas. Finally, earthquakes may produce a large number of victims in areas in which the medical facilities are partially or completely destroyed. Sudden events bring an immediate operational challenge to community healthcare systems, many of which are already operating at or above capacity. The pre-hospital as well as hospital planning and response to sudden mass casualty incidents (SMCI’s) is extremely challenging and requires a standard and protocol driven approach. Many textbooks have been published on Disaster Medicine; although they may serve as an excellent reference, they do not provide a rapid, practical approach for management of SMCI’s. The first edition of “Mass Casualty Incidents: The Nuts and Bolts of Preparedness and Response for Acute Disasters” dealt exclusively with sudden mass casualty incidents. The second edition will expand its focus and include planning and response for insidious and protracted disasters as well. This new book is designed to provide a practical and operational approach to planning, response and medical management of sudden as well as slow progressive events. The target audience of the second edition will be health care professionals and institutions, as well as allied organizations, which respond to disasters and mass casualty incidents. Parts I and II are essentially the first edition of the book and consist of planning of personnel, logistic support, transport of patients and equipment and response algorithms. These 2 parts will be revised and updated and include lessons learned from major mass shootings that occurred recently in the United States and other parts of the world Part III will describe the planning process for progressive disasters and include response algorithms and checklists. Part IV will handle humanitarian and mental health problems commonly encountered in disaster areas. Part V will deal with team work and communication both critical topics when handling catastrophes and mass casualty incidents. This new book will be a comprehensive tool for healthcare professionals and managers and should perform demonstrably better in sales and downloads. It will be of value at the pre-hospital as well as the hospital level, to plan and respond to the majority of catastrophes and mass casualty incidents.
While much progress has been made on achieving the Millenium Development Goals over the last decade, the number and complexity of global health challenges has persisted. Growing forces for globalization have increased the interconnectedness of the world and our interdependency on other countries, economies, and cultures. Monumental growth in international travel and trade have brought improved access to goods and services for many, but also carry ongoing and ever-present threats of zoonotic spillover and infectious disease outbreaks that threaten all. Global Health and the Future Role of the United States identifies global health priorities in light of current and emerging world threats. This report assesses the current global health landscape and how challenges, actions, and players have evolved over the last decade across a wide range of issues, and provides recommendations on how to increase responsiveness, coordination, and efficiency â€" both within the U.S. government and across the global health field.
Encapsulating security : pharmaceutical defenses against biological danger -- Discovering a virus's achilles heel : flu fighting at molecular scale -- The pill always wins: Gilead Sciences, Roche and the birth of Tamiflu -- What a difference a day makes : the margin call for regulatory agencies -- Virtual blockbuster : bird flu and the pandemic of preparedness planning -- In the eye of the storm : global access, generics and intellectual property -- 'Ode to Tamiflu' : side effects, teenage 'suicides' and corporate liabilities -- Data backlash : Roche and Cochrane square up over clinical trial data -- 'To boldly go ... ' : pharmaceutical enterprises and global health security -- Epilogue : pharmaceuticals, security and molecular life
Pandemics. The word conjures up images of horrific diseases sweeping the globe and killing everyone in their path. But such highly lethal illnesses almost never create pandemics. The reality is deadly serious but far more subtle. In Pandemics: What Everyone Needs to Know®, Peter Doherty, who won the Nobel Prize for his work on how the immune system recognizes virus-infected cells, offers an essential guide to one of the truly life-or-death issues of our age. In concise, question-and-answer format, he explains the causes of pandemics, how they can be counteracted with vaccines and drugs, and how we can better prepare for them in the future. Doherty notes that the term "pandemic" refers not to a disease's severity but to its ability to spread rapidly over a wide geographical area. Extremely lethal pathogens are usually quickly identified and confined. Nevertheless, the rise of high-speed transportation networks and the globalization of trade and travel have radically accelerated the spread of diseases. A traveler from Africa arrived in New York in 1999 carrying the West Nile virus; one mosquito bite later, it was loose in the ecosystem. Doherty explains how the main threat of a pandemic comes from respiratory viruses, such as influenza and SARS, which disseminate with incredible speed through air travel. The climate disruptions of global warming, rising population density, and growing antibiotic resistance all complicate efforts to control pandemics. But Doherty stresses that pandemics can be fought effectively. Often simple health practices, especially in hospitals, can help enormously. And research into the animal reservoirs of pathogens, from SARS in bats to HIV in chimpanzees, show promise for our prevention efforts. Calm, clear, and authoritative, Peter Doherty's Pandemics is one of the most critically important additions to the What Everyone Needs to Know® series. What Everyone Needs to Know® is a registered trademark of Oxford University Press.
This book explores the crucial relationships between political leaders, public health officials, journalists, and others to see why leadership confusion develops. It begins by looking at the overarching issues of leadership, public health administration, and the threats of bioterrorism. It then examines five recent emergencies--the 2001 anthrax attacks and 1993 cryptosporidium outbreak in the United States, the 2003 SARS outbreak in Toronto, the 2001 foot-and-mouth disease crisis, and the decade-long battle against Mad Cow Disease in the U.K.
This volume is based on a multidisciplinary approach towards biological and chemical threats that can, and have been previously used in bioterrorism attacks around the globe. Current knowledge and evidence-based principles from the fields of synthetic biology, microbiology, plant biology, chemistry, food science, forensics, tactics, infective medicine, psychology and others are compiled to address numerous aspects and the complexity of bioterrorism attacks. The main focus is on biological threats, especially in the context of synthetic biology and its emerging findings that can be observed as possible threat and tool. The book examines microorganisms and their possible use in forensics, i.e. as possible detection tool that could enable fast and precise detection of possible treats. A number of plant derived components are also discussed as possible agents in bioterrorism attacks, and in relation to infectious disease pathology. Another integral part is food safety, especially in terms of large food supply chains, like airline caterings, institutionalized kitchens etc. Food can be observed as a possible mean of delivery of various agents (biological and chemical) for bioterrorism attacks. Steps on how to recognize specific critical points in a food supply chain, along with proposed corrective activities are discussed. Examples from around the globe, along with the methodological approach on how to differentiate bioterrorism attacks from other epidemics are provided. However, epidemics are also discussed in the context of migrations, with the special emphasis on the current refugee migrations that affect not only Europe, but also the United States. The book will be of interest to experts from various fields of science as well as professionals working in the field. The book encompasses examples and tools developed for easier, more specific, and faster detection of possible bioterrorism treats, along with proposed actions for some aspects of a bioterrorism attack.
Following the attacks of September 11, 2001 and the anthrax letters, the ability to detect biological threats as quickly as possible became a top priority. In 2003 the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) introduced the BioWatch program-a federal monitoring system intended to speed detection of specific biological agents that could be released in aerosolized form during a biological attack. The present volume evaluates the costs and merits of both the current BioWatch program and the plans for a new generation of BioWatch devices. BioWatch and Public Health Surveillance also examines infectious disease surveillance through hospitals and public health agencies in the United States, and considers whether BioWatch and traditional infectious disease surveillance are redundant or complementary.