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The purpose of the present note is to explore the structure of optimal income taxation/redistribution in an economy where the welfare of individuals depends in part on relative after-tax consumption, i.e., we specify individual welfare as a function of absolute and relative after-tax consumption, with diminishing marginal utility to each. With such a specification, of course, an additional incentive for income redistribution from wealthy to poor citizens is created and the logical impossibility of increasing tax rates to the point where disincentive effects actually reduce tax revenues is potentially removed. The analysis highlights the importance of the marginal valuation placed on upward social mobility in various ranges of the income distribution and its interaction with the elasticity of the marginal utility of consumption; of course, "labor supply" elasticities, the form of the social welfare function, and the skill distribution continue to play an important role.
Tax systems raise large amounts of revenue for funding public sector's activities, and tax/transfer policy, together with public provision of education, health care, and social services, play a crucial role in treating the symptoms and the causes of poverty. The normative analysis is crucial for tax/transfer design because it makes it possible to assess separately how changes in the redistributive criterion of the government, and changes in the size of the behavioural responses to taxes and transfers, affect the optimal tax/transfer system. Optimal tax theory provides a way of thinking rigorously about these trade-offs. Written primarily for graduate students and researchers, this volume is intended as a textbook and research monograph, connecting optimal tax theory to tax policy. It comments on some policy recommendations of the Mirrlees Review, and builds on the authors work on public economics, optimal tax theory, behavioural public economics, and income inequality. The book explains in depth the Mirrlees model and presents various extensions of it. The first set of extensions considers changing the preferences for consumption and work: behavioural-economic modifications (such as positional externalities, prospect theory, paternalism, myopic behaviour and habit formation) but also heterogeneous work preferences (besides differences in earnings ability). The second set of modifications concerns the objective of the government. The book explains the differences in optimal redistributive tax systems when governments - instead of maximising social welfare - minimise poverty or maximise social welfare based on rank order or charitable conservatism social welfare functions. The third set of extensions considers extending the Mirrlees income tax framework to allow for differential commodity taxes, capital income taxation, public goods provision, public provision of private goods, and taxation commodities that generate externalities. The fourth set of extensions considers incorporating a number of important real-word extensions such as tagging of tax schedules to certain groups of tax payers. In all extensions, the book illustrates the main mechanisms using advanced numerical simulations.
This paper explores the revenue-raising aspect of progressive taxation and derives, on the basis of a simple model, the optimal degree of tax progressivity where the tax revenue is used exclusively to finance (perfectly) targeted transfers to the poor. The paper shows that not only would it be optimal to finance the targeted transfers with progressive taxation, but that the optimal progressivity increases unambiguously with growing income inequality. This conclusion holds up under different assumptions about the efficiency cost of taxation and society’s aversion to inequality.
"From adjusted gross income to zoning and property taxes, the second edition of The Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy offers the best and most complete guide to taxes and tax-related issues. More than 150 tax practitioners and administrators, policymakers, and academics have contributed. The result is a unique and authoritative reference that examines virtually all tax instruments used by governments (individual income, corporate income, sales and value-added, property, estate and gift, franchise, poll, and many variants of these taxes), as well as characteristics of a good tax system, budgetary issues, and many current federal, state, local, and international tax policy issues. The new edition has been completely revised, with 40 new topics and 200 articles reflecting six years of legislative changes. Each essay provides the generalist with a quick and reliable introduction to many topics but also gives tax specialists the benefit of other experts' best thinking, in a manner that makes the complex understandable. Reference lists point the reader to additional sources of information for each topic. The first edition of The Encyclopedia of Taxation and Tax Policy was selected as an Outstanding Academic Book of the Year (1999) by Choice magazine."--Publisher's website.
"Income redistribution is one of the primary concerns for policy makers and economists. Among the countries in the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the degree of income redistribution (measured by the percentage decrease in the income Gini coefficients between the before and after taxes/transfers) ranges from 5% (Chile) to 49% (Ireland). Understanding and comparing redistribution policies across countries in a unified framework is not an easy task. However, recent developments in quantitative general equilibrium heterogeneous-agents models allow us to address several issues. In this dissertation I study three issues about the redistribution polices using a state-of-the-art quantitative general equilibrium model. Chapter 1 uncovers Pareto weights that justify the current progressivity of income taxes in 32 OECD countries. Chapter 2 shows that the current tax rate in the U.S. can be close to political equilibrium under an ex-ante differences in earnings ability and income-dependent voting behaviors. Chapter 3 finds and explains the negative relationship between economic outlook and income redistribution. In Chapter 1, we develop a model that reproduces income distribution and redistribution policies in 32 OECD countries. The individual income tax schedule is assumed to follow a log-linear tax function, which is widely used in the literature (Heathcote et al., 2016). According to our model, the optimal tax progressivity under the equal-weight utilitarian social welfare function varies from 0.21 (South Korea) to 0.41 (Ireland), and the corresponding optimal redistribution ranges between 20% (South Korea) and 37% (Ireland). For 22 countries, mostly European countries, the current progressivity is higher than optimal. In the other 10 countries, including the U.S., the optimal progressivity is higher than the current one. In our model the optimal tax progressivity is favored by the majority of the population in almost all OECD countries. Then, why does the current (suboptimal) tax rate prevail? The society's choice for redistribution may differ from the equal-weight utilitarian welfare function (Weinzierl, 2014; Heathcote and Tsujiyama, 2016), or can be affected by various factors such as the externality of public expenditure (Heathcote et al., 2016), and the preference heterogeneity (Lockwood and Weinzierl, 2015). In this chapter we ask a rather simple positive question within the utilitarian framework: what are the weights in the social welfare function that justify the current tax progressivity as optimal? We interpret these relative weights in the social welfare function as broadly representing each society's preferences for redistribution and political arrangement. According to our calculations, in Sweden, the average Pareto weight on the richest 20% of the population is only 0.53, whereas that on the poorest 20% is 1.74. By contrast, in Chile, the Pareto weight on the richest 20% is 2.65, whereas that on the poorest 20% is a mere 0.15. In the U.S. that on the richest 20% is 1.45 and that on the poorest 20% is 0.60. We also compare our social weights to those from Lockwood and Weinzierl (2016), who extend Mirrleesian (1971) framework to uncover weights. To our knowledge, this is the first study that compares how societies aggregate individual preferences over redistributive policies, and does so across a large set of countries. The utilitarian social welfare function often predicts that the optimal income tax rate in the U.S. is much higher than the current rate (e.g., Piketty and Saez, 2013). In Chapter 2, we focus on the interaction of ex-ante heterogeneity in household earnings and income-dependent turnout rates. While the relationship between each factor and income redistribution has been reported by many studies (Benabou and Ok, 2001; Charite et al., 2015, Mahler, 2008), quantitatively neither effect alone is large enough to explain the current tax rate. However, the interaction of the two magnifies the effect on redistribution, political equilibrium can be close to the current tax rate. More specifically, we construct three model economies: no ex-ante heterogeneity (NH), small ex-ante heterogeneity (SH), and large ex-ante heterogeneity (LH). All three economies match the overall income dispersion (Gini coefficient) in the data, but the share of ex-ante productivity (ability) and ex-post productivity (shocks) is different. According to our estimates following Guvenen (2009), 31% (SH) and 57% (LH) of wage dispersions are driven by ex-ante productivity. In the NH, by design, all wage dispersions are from ex-post productivity. For tractability, a flat tax rate and a lump-sum transfer are assumed in this chapter. The current tax rates in the three economies are set to 24% from the U.S. data. According to our model, the optimal tax rates under an equal-weight utilitarian social welfare criterion are similar in all three economies: 37% (NH), 38% (SH) and 37%. These high optimal tax rates are consistent with a majority of literature based on a utilitarian social welfare function (e.g., Piketty and Saez, 2013; Heathcote and Tsujiyama, 2016). The tax rates chosen by a simple majority rule are 37% (NH), 37%(SH), and 34% (LH), still much higher than the current rate. However, once we introduce increasing voter turnout rates with income, as in the data (Mahler, 2008), the political equilibrium vastly differs across the three economies. The tax rates chosen by effective voting are 35% (NH), 33% (SH), and 27% (LH). In LH, where income dispersion is driven mainly by ex-ante productivity, the insurance benefit from a heavy tax-and-transfer policy diminishes, and high-ability households are more against strong redistribution. If their turnout rates are higher, a relatively low tax rate can become a political equilibrium, which is close to the current tax rate. In Chapter 3, I find a new relationship between the economic outlook and redistribution among 33 OECD countries between 1996 and 2010, using the historical forecasts in the World Economic Outlook and the Standardized World Income Inequality Database. A one percentage point decrease in expected growth is associated with a 0.005 point and 0.9% increase in the income Gini before taxes and transfers. To examine this relationship I introduce labor-augmenting technology into my model at the cost of assuming a simple tax structure (linear tax and lump-sum transfer). The current tax rate (21.8%) and labor-augmenting productivity growth (3%) are chosen to match the U.S. economy before the Great Recession. Then, after an unanticipated productivity slowdown, the productivity growth decreases to 1%. Once productivity slows down, households save more to prepare for lost consumption in the future. As the capital-to-output ratio increases, the interest rate goes down from 4% to 1.7%. As seen in previous chapters, explaining the current tax rate is still disputed. Leaving this question to other studies, this chapter focuses on the effect of a productivity slowdown. More specifically, social weights that justify the current tax rates are derived, and, given these weights, the optimal tax rate under the low-growth regime is calculated. While all households save more against productivity slowdown, poor households, who are close to borrowing constraints, have more difficulty in increasing their savings. Hence, higher tax rates (23.6%) and more transfers can enhance social welfare under the low-growth regime. This relationship between expected growth and redistribution is similar to my empirical estimates. A general equilibrium effect from increased capital plays an important role. If interest rates are fixed, private savings are more effective against a productivity slowdown, since households can continue to save at the same rate. In this economy the optimal tax rate under the low-growth regime is much lower than the current rate."--Pages v-viii.
An approach to taxation that goes beyond an emphasis on tax rates to consider such aspects as administration, compliance, and remittance. Despite its theoretical elegance, the standard optimal tax model has significant limitations. In this book, Joel Slemrod and Christian Gillitzer argue that tax analysis must move beyond the emphasis on optimal tax rates and bases to consider such aspects of taxation as administration, compliance, and remittance. Slemrod and Gillitzer explore what they term a tax-systems approach, which takes tax evasion seriously; revisits the issue of remittance, or who writes the check to cover tax liability (employer or employee, retailer or consumer); incorporates administrative and compliance costs; recognizes a range of behavioral responses to tax rates; considers nonstandard instruments, including tax base breadth and enforcement effort; and acknowledges that tighter enforcement is sometimes a more socially desirable way to raise revenue than an increase in statutory tax rates. Policy makers, Slemrod and Gillitzer argue, would be well advised to recognize the interrelationship of tax rates, bases, enforcement, and administration, and acknowledge that tax policy is really tax-systems policy.
This thesis consists of three chapters on optimal tax theory with endogenous wages. Chapter 1 studies optimal linear and nonlinear income taxation when firms do not know workers' abilities, and competitively screen them through nonlinear compensation contracts, unobservable to the government, in a Miyazaki-Wilson-Spence equilibrium. Adverse selection changes the optimal tax formulas because of the use of work hours as a screening tool, which for higher talent workers results in a "rat race," and for lower talent workers in informational rents and cross-subsidies. If the government has sufficiently strong redistributive goals, welfare is higher when there is adverse selection than when there is not. The model has practical implications for the interpretation, estimation, and use of taxable income elasticities, central to optimal tax design. Chapter 2 derives optimal income tax and human capital policies in a dynamic life cycle model with risky human capital formation through monetary expenses and training time. The government faces asymmetric information regarding the stochastic ability of agents and labor supply. When the wage elasticity with respect to ability is increasing in human capital, the optimal subsidy involves less than full deductibility of human capital expenses on the tax base, and falls with age. The optimal tax treatment of training time also depends on its interactions with contemporaneous and future labor supply. Income contingent loans, and a tax scheme with deferred deductibility of human capital expenses can implement the optimum. Numerical results suggest that full dynamic risk-adjusted deductibility of expenses is close to optimal, and that simple linear age-dependent policies can achieve most of the welfare gain from the second best. Chapter 3 considers dynamic optimal income, education, and bequest taxes in a Barro- Becker dynastic setup. Each generation is subject to idiosyncratic preference and productivity shocks. Parents can transfer resources to their children either through education investments, which improve the child's wage, or through financial bequests. I derive optimal linear tax formulas as functions of estimable sufficient statistics, robust to underlying heterogeneities in preferences. It is in general not optimal to make education expenses fully tax deductible. I also show how to derive equivalent formulas using reform-specific elasticities that can be targeted to already available estimates from existing reforms.
Optimal tax design attempts to resolve a well-known trade-off: namely, that high taxes are bad insofar as they discourage people from working, but good to the degree that, by redistributing wealth, they help insure people against productivity shocks. Until recently, however, economic research on this question either ignored people's uncertainty about their future productivities or imposed strong and unrealistic functional form restrictions on taxes. In response to these problems, the new dynamic public finance was developed to study the design of optimal taxes given only minimal restrictions on the set of possible tax instruments, and on the nature of shocks affecting people in the economy. In this book, Narayana Kocherlakota surveys and discusses this exciting new approach to public finance. An important book for advanced PhD courses in public finance and macroeconomics, The New Dynamic Public Finance provides a formal connection between the problem of dynamic optimal taxation and dynamic principal-agent contracting theory. This connection means that the properties of solutions to principal-agent problems can be used to determine the properties of optimal tax systems. The book shows that such optimal tax systems necessarily involve asset income taxes, which may depend in sophisticated ways on current and past labor incomes. It also addresses the implications of this new approach for qualitative properties of optimal monetary policy, optimal government debt policy, and optimal bequest taxes. In addition, the book describes computational methods for approximate calculation of optimal taxes, and discusses possible paths for future research.