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The Army announced in the 2006 Army Posture Statement that it had to operationalize the Army National Guard. The decision to operationalize the National Guard was necessary because the Army did not have enough active units to meet requirements for the War on Terrorism. Operationalization of the Army National Guard was a departure from the Cold War force structure. It was not, however, a revolutionary change for the nation's National Guard forces. The research initially focused on determining what was meant by the term “strategic reserve.” That research revealed that numerous military commanders, both active and reserve, have used the term in reference to U.S. Army force structure. However, military policy documents and statutes do not define that term. The search for a clear definition of strategic reserve and its meaning for U.S. National Guard structure led to the discovery that the National Guard had only recently been constituted as a strategic reserve. The National Guard did not begin as a strategic reserve. The Guard also has experience as an operational force. The view that the National Guard was only a strategic reserve developed during the Cold War. After the end of the draft, the Department of Defense implemented the “Total Force Policy”. That policy started the National Guard's movement back toward operational capability. The research explores the history of the National Guard as the nation's constitutional defense force and its subsequent development into a Federal Reserve. The history reveals that operationalization of the National Guard is not a radical venture for state controlled units. Rather, the Army's use of the National Guard as an operational force is a return to the tradition of state militias participating in the nation's defense. The National Guard serving in an operational role is not unique in the nation's history. The Cold War practice of maintaining separate strategic and operational reserve forces does not meet today's force demands. Security planners have yet to refine post Cold War force and mission definitions. Until the missions are redefined, it was only natural for the Army to use its reserves to reduce stress on active component forces. It is also a mistake to assume the Army suddenly made the reserves operational or that the National Guard has never served in an operational manner. While at times the Army resisted using the Guard, the Guard has a history of serving in an operational role. The Constitution specified that state based militias would serve as part of the country's main defense force. Operationalization of the National Guard is an extension of the policies Congress started under the National Militia Act of 1903. The Army is only continuing these practices with its 2006 Army Posture Statement announcement. Finally, the United States has historically been unprepared for major long-term conflicts. The nation also tends to decrease active component strength following hostilities. These precedents foretell the same once significant combat operations in Iraq and Afghanistan end. As such, equipping and training the National Guard for operational force capability potentially enhances its ability to perform both strategic and operational force functions in the future.
This report reviews the implementation of the Army's Total Force Policy. The Army has made progress in integrating the Regular Army, Army National Guard, and U.S. Army Reserve, but budget constraints have limited implementation.
This book offers a scientific interpretation of the field of military knowledge situated between strategy and tactics, better known as operational art', and traces the evolution of operational awareness and its culmination in a full-fledged theory. The author, a Brigadier General (ret.) in the Israeli Defence Forces and Doctor of History, King's College, London, clarifies the substance of operational art' and constructs a cognitive framework for its critical analysis. He chronicles the stages in the evolution of operational theory from the emergence of 19th-century military thought to Blitzkrieg. For the first time the Soviet theories of Deep Operations' and Strike Manoeuvre' that emerged in the 1920s and 1930 are discussed. The author argues that it is these doctrines that eventually led to the crystallization of the American Airland Battle theory, successfully implemented in the Gulf War.
This report identifies emerging policy lessons regarding the use of, and reforms to, the U.S. Army's Reserve Components (RCs) as an operational reserve derived from analyses of their contributions to Operations Enduring Freedom, Iraqi Freedom, New Dawn, and other recent contingency operations. These lessons can be applied to sustain the readiness of the U.S. Army Reserve and Army National Guard in future contingencies.
The Vaisnava-sahajiya cult that arose in Bengal in the sixteenth century was an intensely emotional attempt to reconcile the sensual and the ascetic. Exploring the history and doctrine of this cult, Edward C. Dimock, Jr., examines the works of numerous poets who are the source of knowledge about this sect. Dimock examines the life of the saint Caitanya, the mad Baul singers, the doctrines of Tantrism, the origins of the figure of Radha, and the worship of Krishna. His study will appeal to students of the history of religion as well as of Indian culture. This edition includes a new Foreword by Wendy Doniger. "This is a magnificent book—painstakingly researched and gracefully written. . . . Professor Dimock's book is one of the most rewarding and stimulating studies to appear in recent years."—G. Richard Weldon, Journal of Asian Studies
As U.S. military forces appear overcommitted and some ponder a possible return to the draft, the timing is ideal for a review of how the American military transformed itself over the past five decades, from a poorly disciplined force of conscripts and draft-motivated "volunteers" to a force of professionals revered throughout the world. Starting in the early 1960s, this account runs through the current war in Iraq, with alternating chapters on the history of the all-volunteer force and the analytic background that supported decisionmaking. The author participated as an analyst and government policymaker in many of the events covered in this book. His insider status and access offer a behind-the-scenes look at decisionmaking within the Pentagon and White House. The book includes a foreword by former Secretary of Defense Melvin R. Laird. The accompanying DVD contains more than 1,700 primary-source documents-government memoranda, Presidential memos and letters, staff papers, and reports-linked directly from citations in the electronic version of the book. This unique technology presents a treasure trove of materials for specialists, researchers, and students of military history, public administration, and government affairs to draw upon.
The report examines the cultural characteristics, primary institutional goals, and competitive strategies exhibited by the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and U.S. Special Operations Command.