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According to Thomas Metzinger, no such things as selves exist in the world: nobody ever had or was a self. All that exists are phenomenal selves, as they appear in conscious experience. The phenomenal self, however, is not a thing but an ongoing process; it is the content of a "transparent self-model." In Being No One, Metzinger, a German philosopher, draws strongly on neuroscientific research to present a representationalist and functional analysis of what a consciously experienced first-person perspective actually is. Building a bridge between the humanities and the empirical sciences of the mind, he develops new conceptual toolkits and metaphors; uses case studies of unusual states of mind such as agnosia, neglect, blindsight, and hallucinations; and offers new sets of multilevel constraints for the concept of consciousness. Metzinger's central question is: How exactly does strong, consciously experienced subjectivity emerge out of objective events in the natural world? His epistemic goal is to determine whether conscious experience, in particular the experience of being someone that results from the emergence of a phenomenal self, can be analyzed on subpersonal levels of description. He also asks if and how our Cartesian intuitions that subjective experiences as such can never be reductively explained are themselves ultimately rooted in the deeper representational structure of our conscious minds.
Emerging from society's most hidden and reviled structures is a poetry of majestic, riveting intensity.
On Being One’s Self emerges from discussions in John Steiner’s Workshop and investigates the meanings of self and identity, including the many ways in which the development of personal identity can be subverted, interrogating what can facilitate the development of a reasonably stable identity. The variety of problems that can arise in relation to the development of a unique identity is reflected in rich clinical material that vividly illustrates ‘identities’ felt to be weak, unformed, fluid or brittle, in many cases demonstrating how the sense of self is held together by pathological defences and organisations. The book examines several long-term adult analytic cases, suggesting that a mature personal identity involves not only ‘knowing who one is’ but also the capacity for empathic identification with the experience of others as separate human beings. The question of ‘having’ an identity, or the fear of losing it, is a central concern of individuals, and this volume, which will be of interest to psychoanalysts and psychotherapists alike, considers these issues by looking at the deepest conflicts around self and identity as they emerge and are relived in the transference relationship.
Well known as a scholar of Asian culture, de Bary examines the concepts of self-understanding and self-cultivation in neo-Confucian thought from the 12th to the 17th centuries, in relation to the social, political, and scholarly roles of educated men in late imperial China. Rejecting the notion that
One Self expresses the truth at the heart of the world's mystical and philosophical traditions in a simple, direct and practical way. It shows us how to find our true self that is ever present and is beyond change and suffering. We are then able to trust the process of life's unfolding, as we are led on a journey to discover a great treasure that we all possess yet are unaware of. It is in doing this that we also prepare ourselves for that ultimate moment of letting go, the death of the physical body.
This volume embodies the state of the art regarding the experimental study of human communication, by bringing together cutting edge findings from psycholinguistics, communication, cognition, neuroscience, language, and identity.
For millennia people have held folk beliefs about the existence of the doppelganger--"double walker" in German--a look-alike second self that is often the antithesis of one's identity and is usually considered an omen of misfortune or death. The theme of the double has inspired works by E.T.A. Hoffmann, Poe, de Maupassant, Dostoevsky and others, and has been the basis for many classic mystery, horror and science fiction movies. This critical survey examines the double in more than 100 films by such acclaimed directors as Alfred Hitchcock, Mario Bava, Roger Corman, David Cronenberg, George Romero, Fritz Lang, James Cameron, Robert Siodmak, Don Siegel, John Frankenheimer, Terry Gilliam, Brian De Palma and Roman Polanski.
One Self is a compilation of satsangs with Nome from May 4, 2003 to January 29, 2012. All the satsangs begin with silence, which reveals the true nature of the One Self-our true nature. Most satsangs then have a discourse on the nature of the One Self and instruction on how to practice Sri Ramana's Self-Inquiry. Each discourse is followed by questions raised by devotees regarding their own practices and Nome's response.
A novel theory of self-consciousness and its development that integrates philosophical considerations with recent findings in the empirical sciences. In this book, Kristina Musholt offers a novel theory of self-consciousness, understood as the ability to think about oneself. Traditionally, self-consciousness has been central to many philosophical theories. More recently, it has become the focus of empirical investigation in psychology and neuroscience. Musholt draws both on philosophical considerations and on insights from the empirical sciences to offer a new account of self-consciousness—the ability to think about ourselves that is at the core of what makes us human. Examining theories of nonconceptual content developed in recent work in the philosophy of cognition, Musholt proposes a model for the gradual transition from self-related information implicit in the nonconceptual content of perception and other forms of experience to the explicit representation of the self in conceptual thought. A crucial part of this model is an analysis of the relationship between self-consciousness and intersubjectivity. Self-consciousness and awareness of others, Musholt argues, are two sides of the same coin. After surveying the philosophical problem of self-consciousness, the notion of nonconceptual content, and various proposals for the existence of nonconceptual self-consciousness, Musholt argues for a non-self-representationalist theory, according to which the self is not part of the representational content of perception and bodily awareness but part of the mode of presentation. She distinguishes between implicitly self-related information and explicit self-representation, and describes the transitions from the former to the latter as arising from a complex process of self–other differentiation. By this account, both self-consciousness and intersubjectivity develop in parallel.