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As with the post-Cold War downsizing during the Clinton administration in the late 1990s, one critical challenge for the U.S. Army centers on the qualitative, institutional character of the Army after the reductions-will it manifest the essential characteristics and behavior of a military profession with soldiers and civilians who see themselves sacrificially called to vocation and its service to country within a motivating professional culture that sustains a meritocratic ethic, or will the Army's character be more like any other government occupation in which its members view themselves as filing a job, motivated mostly by the extrinsic factors of pay, location, and work hours? In mid-2010, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff directed the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command, then General Martin Dempsey, to undertake a broad campaign of learning, involving the entire Department. The intent was to think through just it means for the Army to be a profession...
As with the post-Cold War downsizing during the Clinton administration in the late 1990s, one critical challenge for the U.S. Army centers on the qualitative, institutional character of the Army after the reductions -- will the U.S. Army manifest the essential characteristics and behavior of a military profession with Soldiers and civilians who see themselves sacrificially called to a vocation of service to country within a motivating professional culture that sustains a meritocratic ethic, or will the Army's character be more like any other government occupation in which its members view themselves as filing a job, motivated mostly by the extrinsic factors of pay, location, and work hours? In mid-2010, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff directed the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command, then General Martin Dempsey, to undertake a broad campaign of learning, involving the entire Department. The intent was to think through what it means for the Army to be a profession of arms and for its Soldiers and civilians to be professionals as the Army largely returns stateside after a decade of war and then quickly transitions to the new era of Defense reductions. Several new conceptions of the Army as a military profession have been produced, along with numerous initiatives that are currently being staffed to strengthen the professional character of the Army as it simultaneously recovers from a decade of war and transitions through reductions in force. They form the descriptive content of this monograph.
This monograph places the Army's 2011 campaign of learning about the Army as profession after a decade of war into the context of the just-initiated Department of Defense (DoD) reductions. The exact shape of those reductions and the defense strategy our down-sized land forces are to execute in the future are only now becoming clear as this monograph goes to press in early 2012. But what is already clear is that the U.S. Army will undergo a severely resource-con-strained transition to a significantly smaller force than it sustained during the past decade of war. As with the post-Cold War downsizing during the Bill Clinton administration in the late 1990s, one critical challenge for the Army centers on the qualitative and institutional character of the Army after the reductions. Will the Army manifest the essential characteristics and behavior of a military profession comprised of Soldiers and civilians who see themselves sacrificially called to vocation? Will the Army perceive its service to country within a motivating professional culture that sustains a meritocratic ethic, or will the Army's character be more like any other government occupation in which its members view themselves as filling a job, motivated mostly by the extrinsic factors of pay, location, and work hours? Strategic Studies Institute.
As with the post-Cold War downsizing during the Clinton administration in the late 1990s, one critical challenge for the U.S. Army centers on the qualitative, institutional character of the Army after the reductions -- will the U.S. Army manifest the essential characteristics and behavior of a military profession with soldiers and civilians who see themselves sacrificially called to a vocation of service to country within a motivating professional culture that sustains a meritocratic ethic, or will the Army's character be more like any other government occupation in which its members view themselves as filing a job, motivated mostly by the extrinsic factors of pay, location, and work hours? In mid-2010, the Secretary of the Army and the Chief of Staff directed the Commanding General, Training and Doctrine Command, then General Martin Dempsey, to undertake a broad campaign of learning, involving the entire Department. The intent was to think through what it means for the Army to be a profession of arms and for its soldiers and civilians to be professionals as the Army largely returns stateside after a decade of war and then quickly transitions to the new era of Defense reductions. Several new preceptions of the Army as a military profession have been produced, along with numerous initiatives that are currently being staffed to strengthen the professional character of the Army as it simultaneously recovers from a decade of war and transitions through reductions in force. They form the descriptive content of this monograph.
Who are the future members of the Army profession and how is their competence to be certified to their client, the American people? This is a contemporary analysis of the Army profession, its knowledge and expertise, with conclusions and policy recommendations.
This book will make a first contribution to identify the gaps in current practices and provide alternative mechanisms to conceptualize professionalism that is reflective of changing requirements, culture, and demographics of the contemporary military force.The military profession promotes the development, sustainment, and embodiment of ethos, which guides conduct across operational contexts, from times of national and international crises and security challenges (e.g., war, natural disasters, and peace support operations). It is imperative for military leaders to understand how ethos and doctrine shape professional frameworks, which guide the conduct of military members.
A vital text for understanding the twenty-first-century battlefield and the shifting force structure, this book prepares students to think critically about the rapidly changing world they'll inherit. American Defense Policy, first published in 1965 under the leadership of Brent Scowcroft, has been a mainstay in courses on political science, international relations, military affairs, and American national security for more than 50 years. This updated and thoroughly revised ninth edition, which contains about 30% all-new content, considers questions of continuity and change in America's defense policy in the face of a global climate beset by geopolitical tensions, rapid technological change, and terrorist violence. The book is organized into three parts. Part I examines the theories and strategies that shape America's approach to security policy. Part II dives inside the defense policy process, exploring the evolution of contemporary civil-military relations, the changing character of the profession of arms, and the issues and debates in the budgeting, organizing, and equipping process. Part III examines how purpose and process translate into American defense policy. This invaluable and prudent text remains a classic introduction to the vital security issues the United States has faced throughout its history. It breaks new ground as a thoughtful and comprehensive starting point to understand American defense policy and its role in the world today. Contributors: Gordon Adams, John R. Allen, Will Atkins, Deborah D. Avant, Michael Barnett, Sally Baron, Jeff J.S. Black, Jessica Blankshain, Hal Brands, Ben Buchanan, Dale C. Copeland, Everett Carl Dolman, Jeffrey Donnithorne, Daniel W. Drezner, Colin Dueck, Eric Edelman, Martha Finnemore, Lawrence Freedman, Francis Fukuyama, Michael D. Gambone, Lynne Chandler Garcia, Bishop Garrison, Erik Gartzke, Mauro Gilli, Robert Gilpin, T.X. Hammes, Michael C. Horowitz, G. John Ikenberry, Bruce D. Jones, Tim Kane, Cheryl A. Kearney, David Kilcullen, Michael P. Kreuzer, Miriam Krieger, Seth Lazar, Keir A. Lieber, Conway Lin, Jon R. Lindsay, Austin Long, Joseph S. Lupa Jr., Megan H. MacKenzie, Mike J. Mazarr, Senator John McCain, Daniel H. McCauley, Michael E. McInerney, Christopher D. Miller, James N. Miller, John A. Nagl, Henry R. Nau, Renée de Nevers, Joseph S. Nye Jr., Michael E. O'Hanlon, Mancur Olson Jr., Sue Payton, Daryl G. Press, Thomas Rid, John Riley, David Sacko, Brandon D. Smith, James M. Smith, Don M. Snider, Sir Hew Strachan, Michael Wesley, Richard Zeckhauser
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.