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This edited volume of new essays explores the principles that govern moral responsibility and legal liability for omissive conduct--behavior that did not occur. Many contributors here try to make sense of the possibility of moral responsibility for omissions, including those that occur unwittingly. The disagreements among them concern the grounds of moral responsibility in these cases: the constellation of states and traits that constitute the self, or the quality of one's will, or exercises of evaluative judgment, or the ability and opportunity to avoid the omission, or the tracing back to a time when one had the witting ability to take steps to avoid future omission. Some contributors consider whether omissions need to be under one's control if one is to be morally responsible for them, as well as which sense of "control" is relevant, if it is, to the question of moral responsibility. Yet others consider whether it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for an omission that she could not have avoided. On the legal side, contributors also consider various issues concerning the status of omissions in the law: whether circumstances that are usually described as involving legal liability for omissions are better described as involving legal liability for entire courses of conduct; the conditions (such as creation of the peril) under which one can be legally liable for an omission to rescue; why a defendant's legal guilt for a crime can be predicated on an omission to act only if the defendant was under a legal duty to engage in the omitted act; and whether this "duty requirement" is grounded in the desirability of shielding from legal liability those who are not criminally culpable or in the constraint that one's body and property may not be appropriated for the general good. Included with the essays is an introduction to the topic by the volume editors. The book will be of interest to moral philosophers, philosophers of law, and other legal scholars.
On issues pertaining to women and girls, Stephen Harper’s federal government positioned Canada as a “beacon of light” in the world. Programs were developed in relation to women’s maternal health and the protection of the girl child, but other actions point to an ambiguous and even contradictory approach that failed to address gender inequality. In Obligations and Omissions, contributors examine Canada’s equivocal – and diminished – role in working toward gender equality in the period between 2006 and 2015. Using a critical feminist lens to document, analyze, and challenge Canada’s relations with the Global South, chapters explore the extent to which matters of gender equality have been erased or exploited under the Harper government and the factors that explain these policy shifts. While the contributors document successes in Canada’s approach to some issues facing women and girls around the world, they also show many problems with the ways that agenda was framed and implemented under the Conservative government.. Drawing on rich theoretical investigation, empirical research, and discourse analysis, Obligations and Omissions reveals a complex picture of diverse practices, underscoring the implications of these actions for communities in the Global South, for Canada’s image in the international community, and for future governments in the pursuit of a renewed gender equality strategy.
On issues pertaining to women and girls, Stephen Harper’s federal government positioned Canada as a “beacon of light” in the world. Programs were developed in relation to women’s maternal health and the protection of the girl child, but other actions point to an ambiguous and even contradictory approach that failed to address gender inequality. In Obligations and Omissions, contributors examine Canada’s equivocal – and diminished – role in working toward gender equality in the period between 2006 and 2015. Using a critical feminist lens to document, analyze, and challenge Canada’s relations with the Global South, chapters explore the extent to which matters of gender equality have been erased or exploited under the Harper government and the factors that explain these policy shifts. While the contributors document successes in Canada’s approach to some issues facing women and girls around the world, they also show many problems with the ways that agenda was framed and implemented under the Conservative government.. Drawing on rich theoretical investigation, empirical research, and discourse analysis, Obligations and Omissions reveals a complex picture of diverse practices, underscoring the implications of these actions for communities in the Global South, for Canada’s image in the international community, and for future governments in the pursuit of a renewed gender equality strategy.
Besides acting, we often omit to do or refrain from doing certain things. Omitting and refraining are not simply special cases of action; they require their own distinctive treatment. This book offers the first comprehensive account of these phenomena, addressing questions of metaphysics, agency, and moral responsibility.
This book offers a set of essays, old and new, examining the positive obligations of individuals and the state in matters of criminal law. The centrepiece is a new, extended essay on the criminalisation of omissions-examining the duties to act imposed on individuals and organisations by the criminal law, and assessing their moral and social foundations. Alongside this is another new essay on the state's positive obligations to put in place criminal laws to protect certain individual rights. Introducing the volume is the author's much-cited essay on criminalisation, 'Is the Criminal Law a Lost Cause?'. The book sets out to shed new light on contemporary arguments about the proper boundaries of the criminal law, not least by exploring the justifications for imposing positive duties (reinforced by the criminal law) on individuals and their relation to the positive obligations of the state.
A comparative and collaborative study of the foundational principles and concepts that underpin different domestic systems of criminal law.
This book provides a lucid, critical account of when and why a person is under a legal duty to protect others from harm, and not merely a duty not to harm. It explains the legal principles that determine when both private individuals and public authorities will be subject to liability for failures to protect from harm.
This book is widely regarded as one of the most remarkable achievements in Roman Law and Comparative Law scholarship this century - a fact attested to by the universal acclaim with which it has been received throughout Europe, America, and beyond. As a work of Roman Law scholarship it fusesthe vast volume of 20th century scholarship on the Roman law of obligations into a clear and very readable (and in many ways original) account of the law. As a work of comparative law it traces the transformation of the Roman law of obligations over the centuries into what is now modern German,English and South African law, presenting the reader with a contrast between these legal systems which is unique both in its scope and its depth. As a whole the book is written with a deep understanding of human nature and of many social, economic, and other forces that determine the face of thelaw.
This edited volume of new essays explores the principles that govern moral responsibility and legal liability for omissive conduct--behavior that did not occur. Many contributors here try to make sense of the possibility of moral responsibility for omissions, including those that occur unwittingly. The disagreements among them concern the grounds of moral responsibility in these cases: the constellation of states and traits that constitute the self, or the quality of one's will, or exercises of evaluative judgment, or the ability and opportunity to avoid the omission, or the tracing back to a time when one had the witting ability to take steps to avoid future omission. Some contributors consider whether omissions need to be under one's control if one is to be morally responsible for them, as well as which sense of "control" is relevant, if it is, to the question of moral responsibility. Yet others consider whether it is possible for an agent to be morally responsible for an omission that she could not have avoided. On the legal side, contributors also consider various issues concerning the status of omissions in the law: whether circumstances that are usually described as involving legal liability for omissions are better described as involving legal liability for entire courses of conduct; the conditions (such as creation of the peril) under which one can be legally liable for an omission to rescue; why a defendant's legal guilt for a crime can be predicated on an omission to act only if the defendant was under a legal duty to engage in the omitted act; and whether this "duty requirement" is grounded in the desirability of shielding from legal liability those who are not criminally culpable or in the constraint that one's body and property may not be appropriated for the general good. Included with the essays is an introduction to the topic by the volume editors. The book will be of interest to moral philosophers, philosophers of law, and other legal scholars.