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Posits that an examination of Burns' tenure as the Chairman of the powerful Federal Reserve Board during most of the 1970s helps to explain the U.S. economy today.
This book reconsiders the role of the Phillips curve in macroeconomic analysis in the first twenty years following the famous work by A. W. H. Phillips, after whom it is named. It argues that the story conventionally told is entirely misleading. In that story, Phillips made a great breakthrough but his work led to a view that inflationary policy could be used systematically to maintain low unemployment, and that it was only after the work of Milton Friedman and Edmund Phelps about a decade after Phillips' that this view was rejected. On the contrary, a detailed analysis of the literature of the times shows that the idea of a negative relation between wage change and unemployment - supposedly Phillips' discovery - was commonplace in the 1950s, as were the arguments attributed to Friedman and Phelps by the conventional story. And, perhaps most importantly, there is scarcely any sign of the idea of the inflation-unemployment tradeoff promoting inflationary policy, either in the theoretical literature or in actual policymaking. The book demonstrates and identifies a number of main strands of the actual thinking of the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s on the question of the determination of inflation and its relation to other variables. The result is not only a rejection of the Phillips curve story as it has been told, and a reassessment of the understanding of the economists of those years of macroeconomics, but also the construction of an alternative, and historically more authentic account, of the economic theory of those times. A notable outcome is that the economic theory of the time was not nearly so naive as it has been portrayed.
Historian Allen J. Matusow now presents the first comprehensive history of Nixon's political economy. He depicts a president who disliked the subject but was forced to pay attention or lose his dream of effecting a historic realignment of the political parties in America. The study derives its authority from extensive archival research in Nixon's presidential papers, including notes by Haldeman and Ehrlichman of crucial conversations in the Oval Office. Matusow shows the poverty of contemporary economic theory, Nixon's willingness to sacrifice the world economy for his domestic political purposes, and his desperate attempts to find something, anything, that might work. Lurching from one set of policies to another, Matusow argues, Nixon achieved only illusory successes that ultimately brought on a decade of economic disaster.