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Abstract:
Ismail Fahmy was Minister of Foreign Affairs and Deputy Premier of Egypt, but resigned in protest against President Sadat’s visit to Jerusalem in 1977. This book, published in 1983, presents the first portrait of Sadat from within the Arab ruling elite, and gives unique coverage of the crucial negotiations that took place between Arab leaders, which determined the key events during this period. Fahmy vividly recounts the years when prospects for a permanent peace in the Middle East seemed a real possibility and presents a damning portrayal of the roles that Kissinger, Nixon and Carter played in events. This is a fascinating account of the struggle for peace in the Middle East, written from the unique perspective of a hugely influential contemporary at the heart of the dialogue.
""In an innovative study, two historians of the Arab-Israeli conflict reflect on what their craft can contribute to peacemaking."" -- Middle East Quarterly ""A fine overview of the troubled Arab-Israeli negotiations since Camp David, filled with sound analysis and a wealth of documentary material. Students and diplomats alike will benefit from this thoughtful study."" -- William B. Quandt, Byrd Professor of Government and Foreign Affairs, University of Virginia ""This timely book... will be invaluable for students of Middle East international relations and for policy makers who seek a mutually acceptable resolution of this protracted conflict."" -- Michael Brecher, McGill University ""No matter where one stands on the issues, this valuable work commends itself to students, peace makers, and anyone concerned about the Arab-Israeli conflict and its peaceful resolution."" -- Philip Mattar, Institute for Palestine Studies .."". Eisenberg and Caplan offer the reader lessons of the past and sound guidance for the present and the future.... a well-researched and well-written book."" -- Itamar Rabinovich, Tel-Aviv University What must change before the Arab-Israeli conflict is resolved diplomatically? By illuminating recurring factors that seem to doom peacemaking, Negotiating Arab-Israeli Peace offers a fresh interpretation of how, when, and why the process does and does not work and points to diplomatic strategies that may produce an enduring peace.
Water is a key issue on the agenda of peace between Israel and its Arab neighbours. The circumstances in which Gaza gained its autonomy leaves it in a disadvantageous position with respect to water, and a deal on the hotly contested issue of the West Bank aquifers will be a protracted process. This book brings together the work of individuals involved directly in the negotiations and experts from various disciplines who have devoted their professional lives to the study of water and its management in the Jordan Basin. It looks at the issue from many different perspectives, offers new ideas and presents a realistic picture for the future.
A perceptive and provocative history of Henry Kissinger's diplomatic negotiations in the Middle East that illuminates the unique challenges and barriers Kissinger and his successors have faced in their attempts to broker peace between Israel and its Arab neighbors. “A wealth of lessons for today, not only about the challenges in that region but also about the art of diplomacy . . . the drama, dazzling maneuvers, and grand strategic vision.”—Walter Isaacson, author of The Code Breaker More than twenty years have elapsed since the United States last brokered a peace agreement between the Israelis and Palestinians. In that time, three presidents have tried and failed. Martin Indyk—a former United States ambassador to Israel and special envoy for the Israeli-Palestinian negotiations in 2013—has experienced these political frustrations and disappointments firsthand. Now, in an attempt to understand the arc of American diplomatic influence in the Middle East, he returns to the origins of American-led peace efforts and to the man who created the Middle East peace process—Henry Kissinger. Based on newly available documents from American and Israeli archives, extensive interviews with Kissinger, and Indyk's own interactions with some of the main players, the author takes readers inside the negotiations. Here is a roster of larger-than-life characters—Anwar Sadat, Golda Meir, Moshe Dayan, Yitzhak Rabin, Hafez al-Assad, and Kissinger himself. Indyk's account is both that of a historian poring over the records of these events, as well as an inside player seeking to glean lessons for Middle East peacemaking. He makes clear that understanding Kissinger's design for Middle East peacemaking is key to comprehending how to—and how not to—make peace.
The “illuminating” (Los Angeles Times) answer to why Israel and Palestine’s attempts at negotiation have failed and a practical, “admirably measured” (The New York Times) roadmap for bringing peace to the Middle East—by an impartial American diplomat experienced in solving international conflicts. George Mitchell knows how to bring peace to troubled regions. He was the primary architect of the 1998 Good Friday Agreement for peace in Northern Ireland. But when he served as US Special Envoy for Middle East Peace from 2009 to 2011—working to end the Israeli-Palestinian conflict—diplomacy did not prevail. Now, for the first time, Mitchell offers his insider account of how the Israelis and the Palestinians have progressed (and regressed) in their negotiations through the years and outlines the specific concessions each side must make to finally achieve lasting peace.
In the past two decades, peace negotiators around the world have increasingly accepted that granting amnesties for human rights violations is no longer an acceptable bargaining tool or incentive, even when the signing of a peace agreement is at stake. While many states that previously saw sweeping amnesties as integral to their peace processes now avoid amnesties for human rights violations, this anti-amnesty turn has been conspicuously absent in Asia. In Negotiating Peace: Amnesties, Justice and Human Rights Renée Jeffery examines why peace negotiators in Asia have resisted global anti-impunity measures more fervently and successfully than their counterparts around the world. Drawing on a new global dataset of 146 peace agreements (1980–2015) and with in-depth analysis of four key cases - Timor-Leste, Aceh Indonesia, Nepal and the Philippines - Jeffery uncovers the legal, political, economic and cultural reasons for the persistent popularity of amnesties in Asian peace processes.
John Limbert steps up with a pragmatic yet positive assessment of how to engage Iran. Through four detailed case studies of past successes and failures, he draws lessons for today's negotiators and outlines 14 principles to guide the American who finds himself in a negotiation--commercial, political, or other--with an Iranian counterpart.
Wanis-St. John takes on the question of whether the complex and often perilous, secret negotiations between mediating parties prove to be an instrumental path to reconciliation or rather one that disrupts the process. Using the Palestinian-Israeli peace process as a frame­work, the author focuses on the uses and misuses of “back channel” negotiations. Wanis-St. John discusses how top level PLO and Israeli government officials often resorted to secret negotiation channels even when they had designated, acknowledged negotiation teams already at work. Intense scrutiny of the media, pressure from con­stituents, and the public’s reaction, all become severe constraints to the process, causing leaders to seek out back channel negotiations. The impact of these secret talks on the peace process over time has largely been unexplored. Through interviews with major negotia­tors and policymakers on both sides and a detailed history of the conflict, the author analyzes the functions and consequences of back channel negotiations. Wanis-St. John reveals the painful irony that these methods for peacemaking have had the unintended effect of inflaming the conflict and sustaining its intractability.
For as long as people have been working to bring peace to areas suffering long-standing, violent conflict, there have also been those working to spoil this peace. These "spoilers" work to disrupt the peace process, and often this disruption takes the form of violence on a catastrophic level. Galia Golan and Gilead Sher offer a broader perspective. They examine this phenomenon by analyzing groups who have spoiled or attempted to spoil peace efforts by political or other nonviolent means. By focusing in particular on the Israeli-Arab conflict, this collection of essays considers the impact of a democratic society operating within a broader context of violence. Contributors bring to light the surprising efforts of negotiators, members of the media, political leaders, and even the courts to disrupt the peace process, and they offer coping strategies for addressing this kind of disruption. Taking into account the multitude of factors that can lead to the breakdown of negotiations, Spoiling and Coping with Spoilers shows how spoilers have been a key factor in Israeli-Arab negotiations in the past and explores how they will likely shape negotiations in the future.