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In this note we consider the non-cooperative linear feedback Nash quadratic differential game with an infinite planning horizon. The performance function is assumed to be indefinite and the underlying system affine. We derive both necessary and sufficient conditions under which this game has a Nash equilibrium.
The book focuses on Pareto optimality in cooperative games. Most of the existing works focus on the Pareto optimality of deterministic continuous-time systems or for the regular convex LQ case. To expand on the available literature, we explore the existence conditions of Pareto solutions in stochastic differential game for more general cases. In addition, the LQ Pareto game for stochastic singular systems, Pareto-based guaranteed cost control for uncertain mean-field stochastic systems, and the existence conditions of Pareto solutions in cooperative difference game are also studied in detail. Addressing Pareto optimality for more general cases and wider systems is one of the major features of the book, making it particularly suitable for readers who are interested in multi-objective optimal control. Accordingly, it offers a valuable asset for researchers, engineers, and graduate students in the fields of control theory and control engineering, economics, management science, mathematics, etc.
This work presents a real-time dynamic pricing framework for future electricity markets. Deduced by first-principles analysis of physical, economic, and communication constraints within the power system, the proposed feedback control mechanism ensures both closed-loop system stability and economic efficiency at any given time. The resulting price signals are able to incentivize competitive market participants to eliminate spatio-temporal shortages in power supply quickly and purposively.
Recent interest in biological games and mathematical finance make this classic 1982 text a necessity once again. Unlike other books in the field, this text provides an overview of the analysis of dynamic/differential zero-sum and nonzero-sum games and simultaneously stresses the role of different information patterns. The first edition was fully revised in 1995, adding new topics such as randomized strategies, finite games with integrated decisions, and refinements of Nash equilibrium. Readers can now look forward to even more recent results in this unabridged, revised SIAM Classics edition. Topics covered include static and dynamic noncooperative game theory, with an emphasis on the interplay between dynamic information patterns and structural properties of several different types of equilibria; Nash and Stackelberg solution concepts; multi-act games; Braess paradox; differential games; the relationship between the existence of solutions of Riccati equations and the existence of Nash equilibrium solutions; and infinite-horizon differential games.
Game theory is the theory of social situations, and the majority of research into the topic focuses on how groups of people interact by developing formulas and algorithms to identify optimal strategies and to predict the outcome of interactions. Only fifty years old, it has already revolutionized economics and finance, and is spreading rapidly to a wide variety of fields. LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games is an assessment of the state of the art in its field and the first modern book on linear-quadratic game theory, one of the most commonly used tools for modelling and analysing strategic decision making problems in economics and management. Linear quadratic dynamic models have a long tradition in economics, operations research and control engineering; and the author begins by describing the one-decision maker LQ dynamic optimization problem before introducing LQ differential games. Covers cooperative and non-cooperative scenarios, and treats the standard information structures (open-loop and feedback). Includes real-life economic examples to illustrate theoretical concepts and results. Presents problem formulations and sound mathematical problem analysis. Includes exercises and solutions, enabling use for self-study or as a course text. Supported by a website featuring solutions to exercises, further examples and computer code for numerical examples. LQ Dynamic Optimization and Differential Games offers a comprehensive introduction to the theory and practice of this extensively used class of economic models, and will appeal to applied mathematicians and econometricians as well as researchers and senior undergraduate/graduate students in economics, mathematics, engineering and management science.
This volume contains papers that were presented at the Symposium on Computation in Economics and Finance organised under the auspices of the International Federation of Automatic Control and the Society for Computational Economics. The Conference was held at Cambridge University, UK, from 29th June to the 1st July 1998. It attracted many members of the international academic and research community in computational economics, finance and econometrics. This volume brings together a number of papers that demonstrate the use of computational methods in a variety of areas in economics and finance. The contributions to the Symposium reflect the various shifts in the profession and the increasing use of computationally intensive techniques for the analysis of economic processes. Papers have been grouped into sections, according to their context rather than in the order in which they were presented. Section 1 groups papers in the area of Finance including both theoretical and empirical studies. Section 2 reflects a fast growing interest in seeking to model economic processes in novel ways drawing on the emerging literature in artificial intelligence and genetic adaptation. Section 3 demonstrates the growing use of computational languages as a tool for the analysis and modelling of economic systems. Subsequent sections range across many areas involving game theory, policy co-ordination, agent based models, time series and econometrics, neural networks, nonlinearities and simulation methods. The preparation and selection of this volume owes much to the assistance and advice of both Berccedil; Rustem and David Kendrick and the steering committee of the Society for Computational Economics.