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To provide readers with insights into how naval officers think about how to conduct naval warfare, retired naval officer and Naval War College professor Emeritus Roger Barnett opens the oceangoing service for inspection. He attributes the unstructured, at-sea environment with powerfully conditioning an officer's way of thinking, explaining that the watery setting forces them to be constantly alert, self-reliant, and willing to take risks. In characterizing the culture, he describes an expeditionary mindset, underwritten by history and nourished by experience that sets naval officers apart from the other branches of the military. Barnett shows how officers think about the theory and the practice of warfare in oceanic and littoral contexts. In his examination, he clearly demonstrates the unequivocal successes wrought by the culture over the centuries as naval officers met the challenges posed by the conduct of warfare on, under, over, and from the seas
Italy, although it considers itself to be a middle-sized power on par with France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, has been incapable of playing an international role comparable to theirs, instead keeping a low-profile foreign policy. This has not been due to any material constraints—Italy’s profile has remained consistently low, through economic times both good and bad—but rather to the country’s strategic culture, a mixture of realpolitik and pacifist tendencies. This book sets out to analyze the influence of Italy’s strategic culture on its foreign policy. It conducts an exploratory case-study to show if hypotheses generated by the strategic culture approach can shed some light on the puzzling Italian behavior in the international arena (puzzling because Italy shows a less assertive foreign policy vis-à-vis other middle powers in the same rank). The first chapter considers the main interpretations of Italian foreign policy and their limitations. The second and third chapters review the literature on strategic culture, stressing its utility for the Italian case. The fourth chapter describes the country’s strategic culture through the Liberal, Fascist, and Republican periods, and the fifth chapter analyzes the influence of ideational factors on Italy’s behavior abroad. Conclusions sum up the various emerging evidences. Scholars of political science, international relations, strategic studies, and comparative politics will find this work to be of interest.
A major contribution to our understanding of contemporary warfare and strategy by one of the world's leading military historians.
Examines how military culture forms and changes, as well as its impact on the effectiveness of military organizations.
Mufti argues that Turkey's security policy is dominated by an insular and risk-averse 'Republican' strategic culture paradigm, that this paradigm has fallen into crisis, bringing some of its core elements in conflict with others, and that this crisis has permitted the reassertion of a more cosmopolitan and risk-taking 'Imperial' counter-paradigm.
This book describes strategic culture and its value as a methodological approach to the study of International Relations. In particular, the book uses strategic culture to illuminate a number of case studies on countries that have made decisions regarding the acquisition, proliferation or use of weapons of mass destruction.
“A fascinating geopolitical chronicle . . . A superb survey of the perennial opportunities and risks in what Herman Melville called ‘the watery part of the world.’” —The Wall Street Journal In this volume, one of the most eminent historians of our age investigates the extraordinary success of five small maritime states. Andrew Lambert, author of The Challenge: Britain Against America in the Naval War of 1812—winner of the prestigious Anderson Medal—turns his attention to Athens, Carthage, Venice, the Dutch Republic, and Britain, examining how their identities as “seapowers” informed their actions and enabled them to achieve success disproportionate to their size. Lambert demonstrates how creating maritime identities made these states more dynamic, open, and inclusive than their lumbering continental rivals. Only when they forgot this aspect of their identity did these nations begin to decline. Recognizing that the United States and China are modern naval powers—rather than seapowers—is essential to understanding current affairs, as well as the long-term trends in world history. This volume is a highly original “big think” analysis of five states whose success—and eventual failure—is a subject of enduring interest, by a scholar at the top of his game. “An intriguing series of stories of communities thinking seriously about how to stand their own ground when outpowered, how to do so in ways that are consistent with their values, and sometimes how to negotiate the descent from being a great power when the cards just aren’t in their favor any more. These are timely questions.” —Times Higher Education Supplement “Lambert is, without a doubt, the most insightful naval historian writing today.” —The Times
"This book addresses applied strategic culture and investigates the usefulness of the concept to better understand how internal state dynamics form unique institutions, behaviors, and perspectives that impact their external interactions with other states. The strategic culture literature successfully provides the necessary intellectual underpinnings; this volume is more concerned with its practical application for policy makers and analysts. This is accomplished by comparing a diverse set of case studies, including Afghanistan, Brazil, China, and Kosovo, to see if they use strategic culture consistently, which provides useful insights despite differences in state size and degree of political and social order"--
This book explores and compares the contemporary military cultures of the United States and the United Kingdom. The last decade has witnessed astonishing global events, from 9/11 and military operations in Afghanistan in the same year, to the military intervention in Libya in 2011. Western military forces have been involved in all of these campaigns and have been engaged in continuous military operations for over ten years. It is therefore now apt to focus a spotlight on the military cultures of these state-based armed forces. This book examines how contemporary American and British military culture is formed, focusing explicitly on the six major military institutions. The author dedicates a chapter to each of these institutions with each one sharing a unifying analytical framework. These chapters explore the formation and sustenance of US/UK military culture under the rubric of common themes that include social origins, transformative events, leaders, approaches to war, technology and contemporary identity. To conclude, the book considers the impact of the War on Terror on the military cultures of the US and UK, as well as likely directions for the future. This book will be of much interest to students of military studies, strategic studies, security studies and comparative politics.
Always at War is the story of Strategic Air Command (SAC) during the early decades of the Cold War. More than a simple history, it describes how an organization dominated by experienced World War II airmen developed a unique culture that thrives to this day. Strategic Air Command was created because of the Air Force’s internal beliefs, but the organization evolved as it responded to the external environment created by the Cold War. In the aftermath of World War II and the creation of an independent air service, the Air Force formed SAC because of a belief in the military potential of strategic bombing centralized under one commander. As the Cold War intensified, so did SAC’s mission. In order to prepare SAC’s “warriors” to daily fight an enemy they did not see, as well as to handle the world’s most dangerous arsenal, the command, led by General Curtis LeMay, emphasized security, personal responsibility, and competition among the command. Its resources, political influence, and manning grew as did its “culture” until reaching its peak during the Cuban Missile Crisis. SAC became synonymous with the Cold War and its culture forever changed the Air Force as well as those who served.