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Specifically structured around research questions and avenues for further study, and providing the historical context to enable this further research, Modern Naval History is a key historiographical guide for students wishing to gain a deeper understanding of naval history and its contemporary relevance. Navies play an important role in the modern world, and the globalisation of economies, cultures and societies has placed a premium on maritime communications. Modern Naval History demonstrates the importance of naval history today, showing its relevance to a number of disciplines and its role in understanding how navies relate to their host societies. Richard Harding explains why naval history is still important, despite slipping from the attention of policy makers and the public since 1945, and how it can illuminate answers to questions relating to economic, diplomatic, political, social and cultural history. The book explores how naval history has informed these fields and how it can produce a richer and more informed historical understanding of navies and sea power.
Examines a variety of events and developments in twentieth-century British history - from the Boer war to the demise of the GLC. The historical perspective provides an illuminating understanding of the interaction between the media and evolving social and political processes. Together the chapters provide an original picture of the ways in which press, cinema, radio and television can be seen as having wielded power in the course of this century.
The true story of how Britain's maritime power helped gain this country unparalleled dominance of the world's economy, Admirals celebrates the rare talents of the men who shaped the most successful fighting force in world history. Told through the lives and battles of eleven of our most remarkable admirals - men such as James II and Robert Blake - Andrew Lambert's book stretches from the Spanish Armada to the Second World War, culminating with the spirit which led Andrew Browne Cunningham famously to declare, when the army feared he would lose too many ships, 'it takes three years to build a ship; it takes three centuries to build a tradition.'
A collection of military history essays examining the philosophical side of war and the meaning of “victory.” What does it mean to win a war? How does this differ from a simple military victory? How have different cultures and societies answered these questions through history, and how can we apply these lessons? When considering how a war might be “won,” there are three big ideas that underpin how success can be measured: ownership, intervention for effect, and fighting for ideas. These three main themes also contain a series of sub-themes: internal and external, short-term and long-term, military success versus political success, and tactical outcomes versus campaign effects versus strategic success. This book examines the constituent parts of what may comprise “victory” or “winning” in war and then travels, chronologically, through a wide variety of historical case studies, further exploring these philosophical components and weaving them into a factual discussion. The authors of each chapter will explore the three big ideas within the context of their individual case studies, offering pointers as to where, within that framework, their case study may sit. The message of this book is not just an academic exploration for its own sake, but a vital aspect (both morally and practically) of the political and military business of the application of force. In short, know in advance how you wish to end before you start. “Comprising sixteen excellent and thought-provoking essays by eighteen noted military historians and former warriors, the book comprehensively examines the realities of war and the wide-ranging concepts of victory. At the same time, it offers a very good general history of warfare.” —Baird Maritime “[This book] can provide useful insights to anyone; students and subject matter experts alike can find something to gain from this book. Most importantly, its emphasis on contemporary warfare can provide consequential information for our current military and civilian leadership, if they are willing to hear it.” —Air & Space Power Journal
This is the first biography of Sir Robert Brooke-Popham, a key figure in the early development of airpower, whose significant and varied achievements have been overlooked because of his subsequent involvement in the fall of Singapore. It highlights Brooke-Popham’s role in developing the first modern military logistic system, the creation of the Royal Air Force Staff College and the organizational arrangements that underpinned Fighter Command’s success in the Battle of Britain. Peter Dye challenges longstanding views about performance as Commander-in-Chief Far East and, based on new evidence, offers a more nuanced narrative that sheds light on British and Allied preparations for the Pacific War, inter-service relations and the reasons for the disastrous loss of air and naval superiority that followed the Japanese attack. “The Man Who Took the Rap” highlights the misguided attempts at deterrence, in the absence of a coordinated information campaign, and the unprecedented security lapse that betrayed the parlous state of the Allied defenses.
Britain's strategic position east of Suez in the twentieth century was a dominant area of interest and had an enormous impact in the overall construction of Great Britain's naval strategic posture.
Based on twenty years of research in formerly secret archives, this book reveals for the first time the full significance of War Plan Orange—the U.S. Navy's strategy to defeat Japan, formulated over the forty years prior to World War II.
This book’s contribution to the discussion on the origin’s of the First World War is a pioneering study of both the British General Staff and the evolution of military strategy in the period immediately prior to the war. It describes the development of the General Staff, Britain’s agency for strategic planning, and goes on to give an account of its role in devising strategy. Problems are examined as they arose at grass-roots level in the War Office and progressed upward towards the Cabinet. The complex cross-currents involving the Admiralty, Foreign Office, Treasury and individuals from Edward VII downwards are charted. The account covers British military policy up to 1916, interpreting the Gallipoli campaign and explanation for its failure.