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It is essential for the U.S. Army Combined Arms Center to plan 2-5 years in the future in order to ensure that fully integrated and funded programs are a reality in the future. The author identifies 45 circumstances which, if they exist within an organization, may preclude effective planning. By surveying the principal mid-range planners at the Combined Arms Center (CAC), reviewing organization goal/objective statements, and reviewing formal documented plans, it was determined which of these 45 circumstances exist. The principal conclusions reached with regard to goals/objectives are: (1) All organizations within CAC have goals/objectives; (2) These goals/objectives are not placed in hierarchy by priority; (3) Mission activities require more guidance from higher management in order to develop goals/objectives. The main conclusions reached vis-a-vis actual planning are: (1) There is very little mid-range planning being done; (2) The planning which is being done is primarily mechanical, and too short-ranged; and (3) Better coordination of plans is needed. It was also found that: (1) Planning is not inhibited by the CAC organization structure; and (2) Turnover of personnel is a problem if action is not taken to 'phase' the replacement cycle.
AR 350-50 04/03/2013 COMBAT TRAINING CENTER PROGRAM , Survival Ebooks
This book provides a description and organizational history of the Battle Command Training Program (BCTP) at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. The "capstone" of the U.S. Army's Combat Training Centers, BCTP uses battle simulation to train commanders and their staffs from the echelon above corps through the brigade level. Using a variety of mid- to high-intensity worldwide scenarios, the program seeks to improve battlefield command and control by providing stressful and realistic combined-arms training in a rigorous combat environment. The book describes the program's basic components and methodology, tracing their origins and how they were synthesized in BCTP. The book also traces the significant changes in the program since it became operational in late 1987, as well as its role in various U.S. military operations in the last decade and a half.
Combined Arms training is at the core of an officer's education. The Combined Arms Sufficiency Study was initiated to determine in a systematic fashion which subjects should be identified as combined arms subjects and what constitutes a sufficient level of proficiency in these combined arms subjects for lieutenants and captains in the U.S. Army. For the purposes of this study combined arms sufficiency was defined as the knowledge required by the combat, combat support, and combat service support officer that enables him to work effectively with his fellow officers on the modern battlefield. The study was conducted between May and August 1981 at the direction of the Commander, Combined Arms Center. Participants are listed-at Annex A. Methodology is described at Annex F. The study was designed to systematically assess the status of combined arms training at TRADOC schools by obtaining the collective judgment of the branch school commandants on what subjects should be on a combined arms subject list and what constitutes a sufficient level of instruction for each subject. This approach did not allow the use of rigorous statistical techniques for data analysis; nevertheless, the use of a few simple statistical methods and close inspection of the results allowed us to make several useful, if somewhat subjective, observations about the current state of combined arms training. The data collected are consolidated at Annex B, with the exception of those concerning pre-commissioning. The responses on pre-commissioning are discussed in Annex H.
Transforming an Army at War examines the origins of the modular concept, the reasons for undertaking it, and the process for develop­ing modular unit designs. The Army had been exploring the notion of modularity since shortly after the end of the Cold War. Modularity, at its most basic, was the idea for creating a pool of standardized, self-contained units—combat, support, and headquarters—that could plug into (and unplug from) unit formations as needed with minimal augmentation or reorganization. A modular force would greatly improve the Army’s ability to configure packages of units tailored for specific missions by the regional combatant commands. By the summer of 2003, wars in Iraq and Afghanistan had markedly strained the Army. General Peter J. Schoomaker, chief of staff of the Army as of 1 August 2003, believed that these operations, along with the demands of an open-ended Global War on Terror, called for a major change in how the service organized its forces. In early September 2003, he ordered the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command to begin the process of converting the Army to a modular, brigade-based force. This would be the most far-reaching transformation of the operational forces since World War II and the most radical since the Pentomic reorganization of the late 1950s. The chief of staff identified the 3d Infantry Division, scheduled to return to Iraq in early 2005, as the first formation to change to a modular structure. He also directed that normal force development methods not be used. Instead, an ad hoc group, Task Force Modularity, would draw up the modular force plans. By the time the task force disbanded in February 2005, most of the major design decisions for the modular force had been made and modular brigade combat teams of the 3d Infantry Division had deployed to Iraq. This account of designing the modular force highlights a critical part of the Army’s program to prepare itself for an increasingly turbulent world and illustrates the intellectual and organizational resources the service can call on in that effort.
AR 11-33 10/17/2006 ARMY LESSONS LEARNED PROGRAM (ALLP) , Survival Ebooks