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In view of their crucial importance to military success, mobilization and logistics deserve thorough attention from historians. Although the Army's ability to mobilize has improved in recent years, much remains to be done, and the Korean War experience can provide valuable insights. Planners involved in the attempt to perfect current automated manpower mobilization systems need to prepare for possible strains and even collapse of those systems. In an emergency, we may have to rely on manual methods such as those that saw us through the Korean War. Industrial preparedness also has received increased emphasis and support in the last decade. But in this area, as well, there is much to be learned from the Korean War's partial mobilization. Finally, we can study with profit the problems encountered in supplying the large forces that we fielded in Korea. Planners who deal with theater logistics could benefit from detailed analysis, solidly grounded in original sources, of those problems and the solutions devised for them during the war. This monograph should provide impetus to examine Korean War mobilization and logistics. Through a discussion of the available literature, the author presents an overview of the most pertinent issues addressed thus far. He then suggests how future investigators might elaborate on particular points, and offers topics that warrant further research. WILLIAM A. STOFFT Brigadier General, USA Chief of Military History
AR 570-4 02/08/2006 MANPOWER MANAGEMENT , Survival Ebooks
On Sept. 14, 2001, Pres. Bush proclaimed that a national emergency existed by reason of the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Under Sect. 12302 of title 10, U.S. Code, the Pres. is allowed to call up to 1 million Nat. Guard and Reserve members to active duty for up to 2 years. The GAO was asked to review issues related to the call-up of reservists following 9/11. GAO examined (1) whether the DoD followed existing operation plans when mobilizing forces; (2) the extent to which responsible officials had visibility over the mobilization process; and (3) approaches the services have taken to provide predictability to reservists. Also determined the extent to which the Ready Reserve forces, which make up over 98% of non-retired reservists, were available. Makes recommendations.