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The 2010 Spending Review required most departments to make cost savings, which would require staff reductions. Departments have reduced their number of employees to around 35,000 in 2011, nearly 18,000 of which have been achieved through early departures. If these staff reductions achieved and planned, are to be sustainable then they will need to be supported by a redesign of the way business is carried out. The Committee is not convinced that all departments are putting in place the fundamental redesign in working practices that is needed to operate permanently with a lower number of staff and this with the pace and scale of reductions means that there is a real risk to departments' ability to deliver services. And there concern about the lack of clear information to track the extent to which this risk is materialising. Without this information it is difficult to know to what extent services are being adversely affected by staff departures. The efficiency of early departures has been hampered by poor management information. Departments are considering individuals' performance when making decisions on staff departures. But the quality of data in performance appraisals has not been detailed enough to support this decision-making. The Committee considers that improving the quality and consistency of performance appraisal arrangements would bring both efficiency savings and better decision-making about the management of the workforce. The Treasury is responsible for signing off any individual exit payments that exceed the terms of the compensation scheme. It was discovered that the Treasury does not keep proper records of such requests and the Committee expects to see this rectified. The Cabinet Office estimates that around half of the required headcount reduction is yet to come and this is likely to be more challenging as the more achievable cuts have already been made and future cuts are likely to involve more compulsory redundancies.
This report finds that central government departments have spent around £600 million gross on the early departures of 17,800 staff in the year from December 2010. These costs are around 45 per cent lower than they would have been under the previous Scheme. After meeting the initial costs, departments will save an estimated £400m a year on the paybill. The time it takes departments to start seeing these savings depends on how quickly they can eliminate headcount-related costs, such as on IT and property. The net present value of the early departures to the taxpayer will be between £750 and £1,400 million over the spending review period, depending on the ability of departments to eliminate costs. This figure will also be affected by whether those leaving find comparable work and pay tax, or claim benefits. Of those departments that are reducing staff numbers, the proportion of staff released ranges from less than 1 per cent at the Department of Energy and Climate Change to around 16 per cent at the Department for Communities and Local Government. Departments used large-scale open voluntary exit schemes to release staff as quickly as possible, though this meant departments could not predict accurately which staff would leave. Older, more senior staff are leaving in the first tranches. This is partly because of deliberate restructuring, but also because those staff who have worked in the civil service for longer, or who are over 50, gain more financially from taking voluntary exit or voluntary redundancy.
There is a lack of transparency, consistency and accountability in the use of compromise agreements in the public sector and little is being done to change this situation. Public sector workers are sometimes offered a financial payment in return for terminating their employment contract and agreeing to keep the facts surrounding the payment confidential. Contracts are often terminated through the use of a compromise agreement and the associated payments are referred to as special severance payments. This report highlights the lack of central or coordinated controls over the use of compromise agreements. The NAO was not able to gauge accurately the prevalence of such agreements or the associated severance payments, due to decentralised decision-making, limited recording and the inclusion of confidentiality clauses which mean that they are not openly discussed. No individual body has shown leadership to address these issues. Compromise agreements can be used for legitimate reasons and it is normal that some information be kept confidential which can benefit both parties. But the practice of including a clause to ensure the employer gives the employee a good reference could help poorly performing staff members gain employment elsewhere in the public sector. Neither the Cabinet Office nor the Treasury provide formal guidance to departments or keep records of the use of compromise agreements across government or the content of confidentiality clauses. Treasury has issued guidance on the associated severance payments. Despite the NAO's statutory access rights, it received only 60 per cent of the compromise agreements requested from departments.
The Government needs strong budgetary systems to be able to control and manage public spending and to provide high quality public services that offer value for money to the taxpayer. The 2010 Spending Review set a four-year spending total for each department and focused on reducing public spending and delivering the coalition Government's programme. The Treasury managed the Spending Review by collating bids from departments and challenging submissions. The process built on the experience of previous CSRs and was better managed, however concerns remain. Departments and the Treasury failed to take a longer term view on spending, making cuts in those budgets that were easiest to cut. For instance, whilst Treasury improved assessment processes to be able to rank capital projects, the overall level of capital investment was cut. Resource expenditure as a whole will increase in nominal terms, albeit at a much slower rate. There were gaps in data which made it difficult to compare options or benchmark spending proposals. There were no incentives for departments to collaborate on cross-government issues. There was no evidence of clear thinking on how one decision to save money in one budget area might lead to an increase in expenditure elsewhere. Decisions on where to spend or cut rest with Ministers and cannot be divorced from the political process. But these decisions need to be informed by rational analysis. Officials must do more to provide Ministers with reliable and comparable information to help them weigh up the effect of different spending options
The government published its Civil Service Reform Plan (the Plan) in June 2012 (www.civilservice.gov.uk/reform). It followed the publication of the 2011 Open Public Services White Paper (Cm.8145, ISBN 9780101814522) which called for a smaller, more strategic civil service that does less centrally, and commissions more from outside. The Plan has many themes in common with previous initiatives that attempted to reform the civil service, and adapt it to the changing needs of governments and public service users, but is arguably the broadest such reform programme since 1968. This Memorandum is intended primarily to inform the Committee's discussions with the leadership of the civil service about the Plan. Given that the Plan is less than a year old, it is not an evaluation of the reforms in the Plan, the progress made against them, or the implementation arrangements in place. It is designed to support the Committee to engage with the breadth of the Plan, so that they can use their influence to help ensure that its implementation improves efficiency, reinforces Parliamentary accountability and protects value for taxpayers and citizens. The Civil Service, in its present form as of 2012, employs 459,000 people across 106 departments and other bodies. The annual spend on Civil Service pay is £16 billion. The projected cost reduction for the Civil Service, between 2010 to 2015 is £80 billion and the projected reduction in the number of full-time equivalent civil servants over the same period is 110,000 representing about 23% of total staff.
The National Offender Management Service directly manages 117 public prisons, manages the contracts of 14 private prisons, and is responsible for a prisoner population of around 86,000. It commissions and funds services from 35 probation trusts, which oversee approximately 165,000 offenders serving community sentences. For 2012-13, the Agency's budget is £3,401 million. The Agency achieved its savings targets of £230 million in 2011-12 and maintained its overall performance, despite an increase in the prison population. However, the Agency's savings targets of £246 million in 2012-13, £262 million in 2013-14 and £145 million in 2014-15 are challenging. The Agency believes it has scope to make the prison estate more efficient by closing older, more expensive prisons and investing in new ones. These plans, however, assume the prison population will stay at its current level. Furthermore, the Agency has not yet secured the up-front funding for the voluntary redundancies needed to bring down prison staffing costs. Unless overcrowding is addressed and staff continue to carry out offender management work it is increasingly likely that rehabilitation work needed to reduce the risk of prisoners reoffending will not be provided. The Agency has not done enough to address the risks to safety, decency and standards in prisons and in community services arising from staffing cuts implemented to meet financial targets. The Agency plans to increase the role of private firms and the third sector in probation but the probation trusts don't appear to have the infrastructure and skills they need to commission probation services from these providers effectively
The Department for Transport competition to let the Intercity West Coast franchise lacked management oversight and the governance of the project was confused, according to the National Audit Office. The full cost to the taxpayer is unknown but likely to be significant, with at least £1.9 million in staff and adviser costs, £2.7 million in legal costs and £4.3 million on external advisers for the reviews that it has commissioned. The refranchising process was a major endeavour, with considerable complexity and uncertainty. The objectives of the Department for Transport were insufficiently clear during the franchise competition. The Department delayed the issuing of the invitation to tender by eight months because it had not finalized how it would implement recent policy changes. There was also confusion among Department staff about some aspects of the process. The subordinated loan facility was a particular area of confusion. A subordinated loan is capital provided by the parent company which guarantees franchise payments will be made to the Department should the franchisee get less passenger revenue than expected. However, there were significant errors in the tool the Department used to calculate how big a loan it would require bidders to have. The competition lacked strong project management and there was no clear route for the project team to get approval for major issues. No one person oversaw the whole process or could see patterns of emerging problems.
This report recognises that, now more than ever, it is essential that central government communicates and engages well with local government. Responsibilities such as public health are moving to local government, local authorities are playing a vital role in the Government's decentralisation agenda, and substantial reductions in staff are causing pressure. It is clear that there is goodwill on both sides, however, the organisational differences between central and local government make communication very challenging. Where departments are designing services for local delivery, the operational experience of local authorities is important to the effective design and implementation of programmes. The NAO's work across government has also demonstrated that not consulting local delivery partners early brings a high risk of waste and 'optimism bias' that can result in the failure of programmes. Some policy consultations are rushed. Departments also issue a disproportionate number of consultations just before parliamentary recess and holiday periods making it difficult to co-ordinate their work on them. Though most individual communications between central and local government are of good quality, there are so many that poor ones can still have a significant impact. Departments' standards for, and oversight of, their communications with local government are not systematic enough to eliminate the risk of some poor communications slipping through. Local authorities are also exasperated by the poor targeting of emails to relevant audiences, wasting the time of the hundreds of people who receive each one. This is of particular concern to local authority managers working with fewer staff following cost reductions.
The National Audit Office report on this topic published as HC 190, session 2012-13 (ISBN 9780102975529)
The National Audit Office has played an important role in the checks and balances of the UK parliamentary and political system over the last 40 years. This new book, more than just a history of the UK’s supreme audit institution, examines the very definition of accountability through both an historic and an academic lens, critically exploring questions about the role of audit in a democracy and how well it is working. Holding Government to Account draws on several unique sources of evidence, including interviews with senior officials from the National Audit Office and the civil service, as well as senior parliamentarians with experience of the NAO’s relationships with government and legislature. These interviews are supplemented by an analysis of previously unpublished manuscript material in the National Archives, examination of NAO reports and parliamentary and other reports focused on accountability. The book begins with a history of the National Audit Office in the context of the UK’s wider history. It then offers an overview of the constitutional, political and human legacies of the Exchequer and Audit Department, followed by a close examination of the National Audit Office’s leadership and decision-making from inception in 1984 through to the present. The authors conclude with an exploration of the way in which the meaning of public sector audit has evolved over time, in accordance with its wider political, ideological and material context. In doing so, they demonstrate that any question about the National Audit Office’s future and organisation is really a question about what democracy and good government mean in a modern bureaucratic state. Holding Government to Account will be of keen interest to students enrolled in courses on accounting, public administration, law and politics as well as to politicians, civil servants and Supreme Audit Institutions internationally.