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The most comprehensive account to date of the 9/11 attack on the Pentagon and aftermath, this volume includes unprecedented details on the impact on the Pentagon building and personnel and the scope of the rescue, recovery, and caregiving effort. It features 32 pages of photographs and more than a dozen diagrams and illustrations not previously available.
In May 1980, the Joint Chiefs of Staff commissioned a Special Operations Review Group to conduct a broad examination of the planning, organization, coordination, direction, and control of the Iranian hostage rescue mission, as a basis for recommending improvement in these areas for the future. The Review Group consisted of six senior military officers three who had retired after distinguished careers, and three still on active duty. The broad military experience of the group gave it an appropriate perspective from which to conduct an appraisal. Details on the participants, the Terms of Reference they operated under, and their approach to the subject are contained in this document. The Review Group has made its final report to the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Copies have been forwarded to the Secretary of Defense, as have the related, early recommendations of the Joint Chiefs. A highly classified report also has been transmitted to appropriate committees in the Congress. Because it is important that as much detail as possible be made available to the American public, the Organization of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has conducted a declassification review to produce this version. The issues and findings have been retained in as close a form as possible to the original, classified version. In particular, the Executive Summary, Conclusions, and Recommendations remain virtually the same as in the original.
Preface -- Abbreviations -- Key figures in the Mayaguez Crisis -- Introduction -- Day one: Monday, May 12 -- Day two: Tuesday, May 13 -- Day three: Wednesday, May 14 -- Day four: Thursday, May 15 -- Critical crisis decisions -- Explaining decisions, behaviors and outcomes -- Refining the explanation: rationality, bureaucracy and beliefs -- Findings, issues, prescriptions -- Conclusion.
This is a print on demand edition of a hard to find publication. Explores whether sufficient data exists to examine the temporal and spatial relationships that existed in terrorist group planning, and if so, could patterns of preparatory conduct be identified? About one-half of the terrorists resided, planned, and prepared for terrorism relatively close to their eventual target. The terrorist groups existed for 1,205 days from the first planning meeting to the date of the actual/planned terrorist incident. The planning process for specific acts began 2-3 months prior to the terrorist incident. This study examined selected terrorist groups/incidents in the U.S. from 1980-2002. It provides for the potential to identify patterns of conduct that might lead to intervention prior to the commission of the actual terrorist incidents. Illustrations.
Includes numerous maps and illustrations. This monograph provides first-hand accounts of Destroyer Squadron 18 during this critical battle upon which so much of the success of our campaign in Europe would depend. Their experience at Omaha Beach can be looked upon as typical of most U.S. warships engaged at Normandy. On the other hand, from the author’s research it appears evident that this destroyer squadron, with their British counterparts, may have had a more pivotal influence on the breakout from the beachhead and the success of the subsequent campaign than was heretofore realized. Its contributions certainly provide a basis for discussion among veterans and research by historians, as well as a solid, professional account of naval action in support of the Normandy landings.
Pearl Harbor will long stand out in mens minds as an example of the results of basic unpreparedness of a peace loving nation, of highly efficient treacherous surprise attack and of the resulting unification of America into a single tidal wave of purpose to victory. Therefore, all will be interested in this unique narrative by Admiral Wallin. The Navy has long needed a succinct account of the salvage operations at Pearl Harbor that miraculously resurrected what appeared to be a forever shattered fleet. Admiral Wallin agreed to undertake the job. He was exactly the right man for it _ in talent, in perception, and in experience. He had served intimately with Admiral Nimitz and with Admiral Halsey in the South Pacific, has commanded three different Navy Yards, and was a highly successful Chief of the Bureau of Ships. On 7 December 1941 the then Captain Wallin was serving at Pearl Harbor. He witnessed the events of that shattering and unifying "Day of Infamy." His mind began to race at high speeds at once on the problems and means of getting the broken fleet back into service for its giant task. Unless the United States regained control of the sea, even greater disaster loomed. Without victory at sea, tyranny soon would surely rule all Asia and Europe. In a matter of time it would surely rule the Americas. Captain Wallin salvaged most of the broken Pearl Harbor fleet that went on to figure prominently in the United States Navys victory. So the account he masterfully tells covers what he masterfully accomplished. The United States owes him an unpayable debt for this high service among many others in his long career.