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This paper is a comparative analysis of the British campaign in Mesopotamia during the First World War, 1914-18 and the current campaign in Iraq, 2003-4. The study focuses on an examination of Phase III decisive operations and Phase IV reconstruction operations, including strategic imperatives, operational planning, and the impact of changes during operations. The British had no campaign plan for Mesopotamia upon the outbreak of war in 1914. Deployment to this theater began as a peripheral operation. Overriding politico-strategic requirements spurred further exploitation to reach Baghdad. Failure to match ends and means resulted in the disastrous surrender of a division at Kut on 29 April 1916. Sweeping reorganization and large-scale reinforcements resumed the advance; Baghdad fell on 11 March 1917. The British conducted ad-hoc reconstruction operations throughout this period, beginning in the Basra vilayet and expanding their scope with the capture of Baghdad. The British established viable civil institutions, to include police forces, a functioning legal system, Revenue and Customs Departments, a banking system, and even domestic mail. Conversely, the recent U.S. strategy of pre-emption in Iraq was a policy decision based upon the wider strategic perspective and benefited from exhaustive operational planning. However, the rolling start campaign utilized minimal forces. They had the capability to win the decisive operations phase rapidly, but this same troop level was woefully inadequate to conduct incompletely-planned, sorely under-estimated, post-conflict operations. Both campaigns suffered from a serious mismatch of ends and means at certain stages, especially for post-war reconstruction operations. They achieved significant success due to herculean efforts in theater. The study concludes with recommendations for strategic leaders related to planning and force structure.
This updated edition of Charles Tripp's A History of Iraq covers events since 1998, and looks at present-day developments right up to mid-2002. Since its establishment by the British in the 1920s Iraq has witnessed the rise and fall of successive regimes, culminating in the dictatorship of Saddam Hussein. Tripp traces Iraq's political history from its nineteenth-century roots in the Ottoman empire, to the development of the state, its transformation from monarchy to republic and the rise of the Ba'th party and the ascendancy of Saddam Hussein.
When war broke out between the British and Turkish empires in 1914, the 6th (Poona) Division sailed from India to Basra to bolster Britain's allies, deny the port to enemy shipping, and secure Britain's Persian oil supplies. Further expansion followed: the capture of Al-Amara was the British Army's greatest victory of 1915. When an advance on Baghdad was repulsed, the Siege of Kut became the British Army's longest siege and greatest surrender. Attempts to relieve Kut led to unsuccessful battles that were bloody and muddy even by Western Front standards. Under new leadership, revitalized and reinforced, the British avenged their defeat when Baghdad was captured in March 1917. Thereafter, the British Empire committed, in campaigns of limited value to the overall war effort, huge levels of manpower and materiel desperately needed elsewhere. What was created was modern Iraq and the first Arab government in Baghdad in over 400 years. This detailed history places the campaign in context of Allied operations in the Middle East and sheds light on several unsung heroes of the war, including General Charles Townshend whose spectacular 1915 victories led to humiliating defeat and captivity in 1916; General Frederick Stanley Maude whose March 1917 entry into Baghdad preceded General Allenby's entry into Jerusalem by eight months; and Miss Gertrude Bell, a "female Lawrence of Arabia" who played a central role in the creation of the new Iraqi state.
This thesis discusses the role of airpower in the Mesopotamian Campaign of World War I. Britain conducted military operations against Ottoman forces in Mesopotamia to defend Britain’s oil interests and lines of communication, but also to open an additional front against the Turks. The battles conducted from the commencement of hostilities in November 1914 until the Turkish surrender in October 1918 were carried out with the use of a new technology on the battlefield—the aeroplane. This thesis explores the roles of airpower in the Mesopotamian Campaign, and what affect airpower had on military operations. The thesis also looks at the missions of the Royal Flying Corps in Mesopotamia, how they evolved during the course of the conflict, and what impact they had on post-war Royal Air Force development. The study concludes by determining airpower in the Mesopotamian Campaign influenced the policy of air control in the post-war British Empire, and positively influenced the perception of ground commanders to the value of airpower to ground maneuver.
The Sykes-Picot Agreement was one of the defining moments in the history of the modern Middle East. Yet its co-creator, Sir Mark Sykes, had far more involvement in British Middle East strategy during World War I than the Agreement for which he is now most remembered. Between 1915 and 1916, Sykes was Lord Kitchener's agent at home and abroad, operating out of the War Office until the war secretary's death at sea in 1916. Following that, from 1916 to 1919 he worked at the Imperial War Cabinet, the War Cabinet Secretariat and, finally, as an advisor to the Foreign Office. The full extent of Sykes's work and influence has previously not been told. Moreover, the general impression given of him is at variance with the facts. Sykes led the negotiations with the Zionist leadership in the formulation of the Balfour Declaration, which he helped to write, and promoted their cause to achieve what he sought for a pro-British post-war Middle East peace settlement, although he was not himself a Zionist. Likewise, despite claims he championed the Arab cause, there is little proof of this other than general rhetoric mainly for public consumption. On the contrary, there is much evidence he routinely exhibited a complete lack of empathy with the Arabs. In this book, Michael Berdine examines the life of this impulsive and headstrong young British aristocrat who helped formulate many of Britain's policies in the Middle East that are responsible for much of the instability that has affected the region ever since.