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"Freund and Özden provide new survey evidence showing that loss aversion and reference dependence are important in shaping people's perception of trade policy. Under the assumption that agents' welfare functions exhibit these behavioral elements, they analyze a model with a welfare-maximizing government and with the lobbying framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994). The policy implications of the augmented models differ in three important ways: There is a region of compensating protection, where a decline in the world price leads to an offsetting increase in protection, such that a constant domestic price is maintained; Protection following a single negative price shock will be persistent; Irrespective of the extent of lobbying, there will be a deviation from free trade that tends to favor loss-making industries. The augmented models are more consistent with the observed structure of protection and, in particular explain why many trade policy instruments are explicitly designed to maintain prices at a given level. This paper-- a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group-- is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze trade policy formulation"-- World Bank web site.
Freund and Ozden provide new survey evidence showing that loss aversion and reference dependence are important in shaping people's perception of trade policy. Under the assumption that agents' welfare functions exhibit these behavioral elements, they analyze a model with a welfare-maximizing government and with the lobbying framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994). The policy implications of the augmented models differ in three important ways:- There is a region of compensating protection, where a decline in the world price leads to an offsetting increase in protection, such that a constant domestic price is maintained.- Protection following a single negative price shock will be persistent.- Irrespective of the extent of lobbying, there will be a deviation from free trade that tends to favor loss-making industries.The augmented models are more consistent with the observed structure of protection and, in particular explain why many trade policy instruments are explicitly designed to maintain prices at a given level.This paper - a product of the Trade Team, Development Research Group - is part of a larger effort in the group to analyze trade policy formulation.
This paper provides new survey evidence showing that loss aversion and reference dependence are important in shaping people's perception of trade policy. Under the assumption that agents' welfare functions exhibit these behavioral elements, we analyze a model with a welfare-maximizing government and with the lobbying framework of Grossman and Helpman (1994). The policy implications of the augmented models differ in three important ways. One, there is a region of compensating protection, where a decline in the world price leads to an offsetting increase in protection, such that a constant domestic price is maintained. Two, protection following a single negative price shock will be persistent. Three, irrespective of the extent of lobbying, there will be a deviation from free trade that tends to favor loss-making industries. The augmented models are more consistent with the observed structure of protection, and in particular, explain why many trade policy instruments are explicitly designed to maintain prices at a given level.
"This paper studies empirically the relationship between trade policy and individual income risk faced by workers, and uses the estimates of this empirical analysis to evaluate the welfare effect of trade reform. The analysis proceeds in three steps. First, longitudinal data on workers are used to estimate time-varying individual income risk parameters in various manufacturing sectors. Second, the estimated income risk parameters and data on trade barriers are used to analyze the relationship between trade policy and income risk. Finally, a simple dynamic incomplete-market model is used to assess the corresponding welfare costs. In the implementation of this methodology using Mexican data, we find that trade policy changes have a significant short run effect on income risk. Further, while the tariff level has an insignificant mean effect, it nevertheless changes the degree to which macroeconomic shocks affect income risk"--NBER website
Prospect theory posits that people do not perceive outcomes as final states of wealth or welfare, but rather as gains or losses in relation to some reference point. People are generally loss averse: the disutility generated by a loss is greater than the utility produced by a commensurate gain. Loss aversion is related to such phenomena as the status quo and omission biases, the endowment effect, and escalation of commitment. The book systematically analyzes the relationships between loss aversion and the law.
Over the past two decades there has been a gradual but fundamental change in the nature of trade protection. Even as international negotiation has succeeded in reducing tariffs to low levels, national governments have resorted to a range of increasingly intricate policies to protect their domestic industries from foreign competition. Direct quantitative restrictions on international trade have become particularly widespread. Such nontariff barriers often have very different effects from tariffs and require careful analysis in their own right. This book presents a systematic overview of the modern theory of trade protection. The material in the book divides naturally into four sections. The first section covers trade restrictions in competitive markets, the second trade restrictions and imperfect competition, the third the political economy of trade protection, and the fourth the theory of policy reform. The presentation makes extensive use of diagrams, with the more difficult mathematics included in six appendixes.
This paper studies the relationship between trade policy and food prices. We show that, when individuals are loss averse, governments may use trade policy to shield the domestic economy from large food price shocks. This creates a complementarity between the price of food in international markets and trade policy. Specifically, unilateral actions give rise to a "multiplier effect": when a shock drives up the price of food, exporters respond by imposing restrictions while importers wind down protection, thus exacerbating the initial shock and soliciting further trade policy activism. We test the key prediction of the theory with a new dataset that comprises monthly information on trade measures across 77 countries and 33 food products for the period 2008-11, finding evidence of a multiplier effect in food trade policy. These findings contribute to inform the broader debate on the proper regulation of food trade policy within the multilateral trading system.