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Innovative young philosophers present new research articles on a variety of contemporary issues including relation between language and thought, normativity of language, prospects for a naturalistic account of language, nature of linguistic understanding, semantics of proper names and expressive terms, a contemporary construal of analytic truth
Papers gathered in the two volumes investigate the complex relations between philosophy of language and linguistics, viewed as independent, but mutually influencing one another, disciplines. They concentrate on the ‘formal’ and ‘philosophical’ turns in the philosophy of language, initiated by Gottlob Frege, with further developments associated with the work of Bertrand Russell, Ludwig Wittgenstein, Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz, W.O.V. Quine, Richard Montague, Pavel Tichý, Richard Rorty. The volumes bring together contributions by philosophers, logicians and linguists, representing different theoretical orientations but united in outlining the common ground, necessary for further research in philosophy of language and linguistics. The papers were submitted and, in most cases, presented at the first International Conference on Philosophy of Language and Linguistics, PhiLang2009, organized by the Chair of English and General Linguistics at the University of Lódz.
Offers a systematic introduction and discussion of all the main solutions to the sorites paradox and its areas of influence.
Among the various conceptions of truth is one according to which 'is true' is a transparent, entirely see-through device introduced for only practical (expressive) reasons. This device, when introduced into the language, brings about truth-theoretic paradoxes (particularly, the notorious Liar and Curry paradoxes). The options for dealing with the paradoxes while preserving the full transparency of 'true' are limited. In Spandrels of Truth, Beall concisely presents and defends a modest, so-called dialetheic theory of transparent truth.
Vagueness is a familiar but deeply puzzling aspect of the relation between language and the world. It is highly controversial what the nature of vagueness is - a feature of the way we represent reality in language, or rather a feature of reality itself? May even relations like identity or parthood be affected by vagueness? Sorites arguments suggest that vague terms are either inconsistent or have a sharp boundary. The account we give of such paradoxes plays a pivotal role for our understanding of natural languages. If our reasoning involves any vague concepts, is it safe from contradiction? Do vague concepts really lack any sharp boundary? If not, why are we reluctant to accept the existence of any sharp boundary for them? And what rules of inference can we validly apply, if we reason in vague terms? Cuts and Clouds presents the latest work towards a clearer understanding of these old puzzles about the nature and logic of vagueness. The collection offers a stimulating series of original essays on these and related issues by some of the world's leading experts.
Stewart Shapiro's aim in Vagueness in Context is to develop both a philosophical and a formal, model-theoretic account of the meaning, function, and logic of vague terms in an idealized version of a natural language like English. It is a commonplace that the extensions of vague terms vary with such contextual factors as the comparison class and paradigm cases. A person can be tall with respect to male accountants and not tall (even short) with respect to professionalbasketball players. The main feature of Shapiro's account is that the extensions (and anti-extensions) of vague terms also vary in the course of a conversation, even after the external contextual features, such as the comparison class, are fixed. A central thesis is that in some cases, a competent speaker ofthe language can go either way in the borderline area of a vague predicate without sinning against the meaning of the words and the non-linguistic facts. Shapiro calls this open texture, borrowing the term from Friedrich Waismann.The formal model theory has a similar structure to the supervaluationist approach, employing the notion of a sharpening of a base interpretation. In line with the philosophical account, however, the notion of super-truth does not play a central role in the development of validity. The ultimate goal of the technical aspects of the work is to delimit a plausible notion of logical consequence, and to explore what happens with the sorites paradox.Later chapters deal with what passes for higher-order vagueness - vagueness in the notions of 'determinacy' and 'borderline' - and with vague singular terms, or objects. In each case, the philosophical picture is developed by extending and modifying the original account. This is followed with modifications to the model theory and the central meta-theorems.As Shapiro sees it, vagueness is a linguistic phenomenon, due to the kinds of languages that humans speak. But vagueness is also due to the world we find ourselves in, as we try to communicate features of it to each other. Vagueness is also due to the kinds of beings we are. There is no need to blame the phenomenon on any one of those aspects.
Fourteen new essays by some of the world's leading experts, together with an extensive introduction, examine the nature of the Liar paradox and its resistance to any attempt to solve it.
This book explores the relationship between Hegel’s dialectics and formal logic. It examines the concept of dialectics, its meaning, and its use in contemporary thought. The volume opens the “old” debate about the formalization of Hegel’s dialectics and is motivated by the idea that asking about the connection between Hegel’s dialectics and formal logic is still relevant, for various reasons: Firstly, a new Hegel is circulating nowadays in the philosophical literature, with specific reference to Hegel’s dialectical logic and its relation to the history and philosophy of logic. Secondly, new research about the connection between contradictory logical systems and Hegel's dialectics is also being developed. Finally, there have been recent confirmations that the concept of dialectics is of general interest, and that the usual perplexities about the Hegelian triadic and fairly mechanic device of ‘yes, not, and not not’ are in remission. The chapters feature philosophically and historically motivated presentations of formal features of Hegel’s dialectics, critical considerations about the very idea of ‘formalizing dialectics’ and presentations of past attempts to formalize Hegel’s dialectics. The Formalization of Dialectics will be a key resource for scholars and researchers of the history and philosophy of logic and Hegel’s dialectics. It will also be of interest to anyone who wants to know more about the concept of dialectics, its meaning and its use in contemporary thought. This book was originally published as a special issue of History and Philosophy of Logic.
This book aims to provide a solution to the semantic paradoxes. It argues for a unified solution to the paradoxes generated by our concepts of denotation, predicate extension, and truth. The solution makes two main claims. The first is that our semantic expressions 'denotes', 'extension' and 'true' are context-sensitive. The second, inspired by a brief, tantalizing remark of Godel's, is that these expressions are significant everywhere except for certain singularities, in analogy with division by zero. A formal theory of singularities is presented and applied to a wide variety of versions of the definability paradoxes, Russell's paradox, and the Liar paradox. Keith Simmons argues that the singularity theory satisfies the following desiderata: it recognizes that the proper setting of the semantic paradoxes is natural language, not regimented formal languages; it minimizes any revision to our semantic concepts; it respects as far as possible Tarski's intuition that natural languages are universal; it responds adequately to the threat of revenge paradoxes; and it preserves classical logic and semantics. Simmons draws out the consequences of the singularity theory for deflationary views of our semantic concepts, and concludes that if we accept the singularity theory, we must reject deflationism.
This book proposes a new solution to the problem of vagueness. There are several different ways of addressing this problem and no clear agreement on which one is correct. The author proposes that it should be understood as the problem of explaining vague predicates in a way that systematizes six intuitions about the phenomenon and satisfies three criteria of adequacy for an ideal theory of vagueness. The third criterion, which is called the “criterion of precisification”, is the most controversial one. It is based on the intuition that a predicate is vague only if it is imprecise. The author considers some different definitions of linguistic imprecision, proposing that a predicate is imprecise if and only if there is no sharp boundary between objects to which its application yields some particular truth-value and objects to which its application does not yield that truth-value. The volume critically reviews the current theories of vagueness and proposes a new one, the Theory of Vagueness as Arbitrariness, which defines a vague predicate as an arbitrary predicate that must be precisified in order to contribute to a sentence that has truth-conditions. The main advantages of this theory over the current alternatives are that it satisfies all three criteria and systematizes the relevant intuitions.