Download Free Legislative Presentation Of Veterans Service Organizations Hrg Serial No 109 34 Com On Veterans Affairs Us House Of Reps 109th Congress 2nd Session Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Legislative Presentation Of Veterans Service Organizations Hrg Serial No 109 34 Com On Veterans Affairs Us House Of Reps 109th Congress 2nd Session and write the review.

A Failure of Initiative

United States. Congress. House. Select Bipartisan Committee to Investigate the Preparation for and Response to Hurricane Katrina

Published: 2006

Total Pages: 588


Get eBook

Congress has continued to debate the efficacy and constitutionality of federal regulation of firearms and ammunition, with strong advocates arguing for and against greater gun control. While several dozen gun control-related proposals have been introduced in recent Congresses, only a handful of those bills received significant legislative action. The 109th Congress, for example, passed two bills with firearmsrelated provisions that were enacted into law. P.L. 109-72 prohibits certain types of lawsuits against firearm manufacturers and dealers to recover damages related to the criminal or unlawful use of their products by other persons, and P.L. 109-295 includes a provision that prohibits federal officials from seizing any firearm from private persons during a major disaster or emergency, if possession of that firearm was not already prohibited under federal or state law. Nevertheless, the 110th Congress could possibly reconsider several gun control proposals that were considered as part of appropriations and crime legislation in the previous Congress. During the 109th Congress, the House amended the Children's Safety Act of 2005 (H.R. 3132) to prohibit the transfer or possession of a firearm to or by any person convicted of a sex offense against a minor. The House also amended Secure Access to Justice and Court Protection Act of 2005 (H.R. 1751) to authorize certain federal court judges and officials to carry firearms for personal protection. The Senate passed a different version of H.R. 1751 that included similar provisions, as well as provisions designed to clarify and expand the Law Enforcement Officers Safety Act (P.L. 108-277) -- a law that gives concealed carry privileges to qualified on-duty and retired law enforcement officers. None of those provisions were enacted into law, however. In addition, the House Judiciary considered four gun-related bills: the ATFE Modernization and Reform Act of 2006 (H.R. 5092), the Firearms Corrections and Improvement Act (H.R. 5005), the Firearm Commerce Modernization Act (H.R. 1384), and the NICS Improvement Act of 2005 (H.R. 1415). H.R. 5092 was passed by the House. The 109th Congress, moreover, maintained a fee prohibition for Brady background checks and other funding limitations and conditions related to gun enforcement in the FY2006 DOJ appropriations (P.L. 109-108). Those limitations and conditions have been continued into FY2007 under continuing resolutions. They are often referred to as the "Tiahrt amendment," for their sponsor in the FY2004 appropriations cycle, Representative Todd Tiahrt. Issues addressed in those bills, as well as the Tiahrt funding limitations and conditions, could be reconsidered in the 110th Congress. Senator Charles Schumer, for example, has introduced a bill (S. 77) that would repeal portions of the Tiahrt amendment that limit the sharing of firearm trace data. Other gun control-related issues that may reemerge in the 110th Congress include (1) retaining Brady background check records for approved transactions to enhance terrorist screening, (2) more strictly regulating certain long-range fifty caliber rifles, (3) further regulating certain firearms previously defined in statute as "assault weapons," and (4) requiring background checks for firearm transfers at gun shows. This report will updated to reflect legislative action.
CRS Report for Congress.
This report describes homegrown violent jihadists and the plots and attacks that have occurred since 9/11. For this report, "homegrown" and "domestic" are terms that describe terrorist activity or plots perpetrated within the United States or abroad by American citizens, legal permanent residents, or visitors radicalized largely within the United States. The report also discusses the radicalization process and the forces driving violent extremist activity. It analyzes post-9/11 domestic jihadist terrorism and describes law enforcement and intelligence efforts to combat terrorism and the challenges associated with those efforts. It also outlines actions underway to build trust and partnership between community groups and government agencies and the tensions that may occur between law enforcement and engagement activities.
This intelligence guide was prepared in response to requests from law enforcement executives for guidance in intelligence functions in a post-September 11 world. It will help law enforcement agencies develop or enhance their intelligence capacity and enable them to fight terrorism and other crimes while preserving community policing relationships. The world of law enforcement intelligence has changed dramatically since September 11, 2001. State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have been tasked with a variety of new responsibilities; intelligence is just one. In addition, the intelligence discipline has evolved significantly in recent years. As these various trends have merged, increasing numbers of American law enforcement agencies have begun to explore, and sometimes embrace, the intelligence function. This guide is intended to help them in this process. The guide is directed primarily toward state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies of all sizes that need to develop or reinvigorate their intelligence function. Rather than being a manual to teach a person how to be an intelligence analyst, it is directed toward that manager, supervisor, or officer who is assigned to create an intelligence function. It is intended to provide ideas, definitions, concepts, policies, and resources. It is a primera place to start on a new managerial journey. Every law enforcement agency in the United States, regardless of agency size, must have the capacity to understand the implications of information collection, analysis, and intelligence sharing. Each agency must have an organized mechanism to receive and manage intelligence as well as a mechanism to report and share critical information with other law enforcement agencies. In addition, it is essential that law enforcement agencies develop lines of communication and information-sharing protocols with the private sector, particularly those related to the critical infrastructure, as well as with those private entities that are potential targets of terrorists and criminal enterprises. Not every agency has the staff or resources to create a formal intelligence unit, nor is it necessary in smaller agencies. This document will provide common language and processes to develop and employ an intelligence capacity in SLTLE agencies across the United States as well as articulate a uniform understanding of concepts, issues, and terminology for law enforcement intelligence (LEI). While terrorism issues are currently most pervasive in the current discussion of LEI, the principles of intelligence discussed in this document apply beyond terrorism and include organized crime and entrepreneurial crime of all forms. Drug trafficking and the associated crime of money laundering, for example, continue to be a significant challenge for law enforcement. Transnational computer crime, particularly Internet fraud, identity theft cartels, and global black marketeering of stolen and counterfeit goods, are entrepreneurial crime problems that are increasingly being relegated to SLTLE agencies to investigate simply because of the volume of criminal incidents. Similarly, local law enforcement is being increasingly drawn into human trafficking and illegal immigration enterprises and the often associated crimes related to counterfeiting of official documents, such as passports, visas, driver's licenses, Social Security cards, and credit cards. All require an intelligence capacity for SLTLE, as does the continuation of historical organized crime activities such as auto theft, cargo theft, and virtually any other scheme that can produce profit for an organized criminal entity. To be effective, the law enforcement community must interpret intelligence-related language in a consistent manner. In addition, common standards, policies, and practices will help expedite intelligence sharing while at the same time protecting the privacy of citizens and preserving hard-won community policing relationships.~