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This volume contains eight papers written by Adam Brandenburger and his co-authors over a period of 25 years. These papers are part of a program to reconstruct game theory in order to make how players reason about a game a central feature of the theory. The program OCo now called epistemic game theory OCo extends the classical definition of a game model to include not only the game matrix or game tree, but also a description of how the players reason about one another (including their reasoning about other players' reasoning). With this richer mathematical framework, it becomes possible to determine the implications of how players reason for how a game is played. Epistemic game theory includes traditional equilibrium-based theory as a special case, but allows for a wide range of non-equilibrium behavior. Sample Chapter(s). Foreword (39 KB). Introduction (132 KB). Chapter 1: An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (299 KB). Contents: An Impossibility Theorem on Beliefs in Games (Adam Brandenburger and H Jerome Keisler); Hierarchies of Beliefs and Common Knowledge (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel); Rationalizability and Correlated Equilibria (Adam Brandenburger and Eddie Dekel); Intrinsic Correlation in Games (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg); Epistemic Conditions for Nash Equilibrium (Robert Aumann and Adam Brandenburger); Lexicographic Probabilities and Choice Under Uncertainty (Lawrence Blume, Adam Brandenburger, and Eddie Dekel); Admissibility in Games (Adam Brandenburger, Amanda Friedenberg and H Jerome Keisler); Self-Admissible Sets (Adam Brandenburger and Amanda Friedenberg). Readership: Graduate students and researchers in the fields of game theory, theoretical computer science, mathematical logic and social neuroscience."
This volume contains eight papers written by Adam Brandenburger and his co-authors over a period of 25 years. These papers are part of a program to reconstruct game theory in order to make how players reason about a game a central feature of the theory. The program — now called epistemic game theory — extends the classical definition of a game model to include not only the game matrix or game tree, but also a description of how the players reason about one another (including their reasoning about other players' reasoning). With this richer mathematical framework, it becomes possible to determine the implications of how players reason for how a game is played. Epistemic game theory includes traditional equilibrium-based theory as a special case, but allows for a wide range of non-equilibrium behavior.
"This book is refreshing, innovative and important for several reasons. Perhaps most importantly, it attempts to reconcile game theory with one-person decision theory by viewing a game as a collection of one-person decision problems. As natural as this approach may seem, it is hard to find game theory books that really implement this view. This book is a wonderful exception, in which the transition between decision theory and game theory is both smooth and natural. It shows that decision theory and game theory can go—and, in fact, must go—hand in hand. The careful exposition, the many illustrative examples, the critical assessment of traditional game theory concepts, and the enlightening comparison with the subjectivistic approach advocated in this book, make it a pleasure to read and a must have for anyone interested in the foundations of decision theory and game theory." Andrés Perea (Maastricht University) "Gabriel Frahm's relatively nontechnical book is a bold synthesis of decision theory and game theory from a Bayesian or subjectivist perspective. It distinguishes between decisions, or one-person games, and games with two or more players, but Frahm argues that this distinction is not always necessary—the two kinds of games can be analyzed within a common theoretical framework. He models the dynamics of choice in several different settings (e.g., information may be complete or incomplete as well as perfect or imperfect), including one in which players look ahead and make farsighted calculations on which they base their choices. His book contains many provocative examples that illustrate the advantages of a unified theory of rational decision-making." Steven J. Brams (New York University)
This book presents a comprehensive new, multi-objective and integrative view on traditional game and control theories. Consisting of 15 chapters, it is divided into three parts covering noncooperative games; mixtures of simultaneous and sequential multi-objective games; and multi-agent control of Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg-type games respectively. Can multicriteria optimization, game theory and optimal control be integrated into a unique theory? Are there mathematical models and solution concepts that could constitute the basis of a new paradigm? Is there a common approach and method to solve emerging problems? The book addresses these and other related questions and problems to create the foundation for the Pareto-Nash-Stackelberg Game and Control Theory. It considers a series of simultaneous/Nash and sequential/Stackelberg games, single-criterion and multicriteria/Pareto games, combining Nash and Stackelberg game concepts and Pareto optimization, as well as a range of notions related to system control. In addition, it considers the problems of finding and representing the entire set of solutions. Intended for researches, professors, specialists, and students in the areas of game theory, operational research, applied mathematics, economics, computer science and engineering, it also serves as a textbook for various courses in these fields.
This book focuses on the gradual reform of Chinese society since China’s opening up to the world, and gives a unified explanation of the process based on bargaining theory. It studies institutional changes as a non-violent bargaining process in which different parties constantly make adjustments to social contracts by following the tradition of classical economics initiated by Adam Smith. The book has two major conclusions: First, bargaining-driven institutional reform ensures both efficiency and equality. Second, bargaining-driven institutional reform involves the principles of, and is an essential approach to democracy. The book’s interpretation of the economic phenomena and the reform mechanism in China not only reflects China’s 30-year reform experience, but also pays due homage to the academic heritage in the related areas. Yet, as a departure from traditional theories of the Chinese reform, this book lays out a unified and legitimate theoretical framework in order to clarify the international misinterpretations of China’s social change and institutional reform. ​
The first reference on rationality that integrates accounts from psychology and philosophy, covering descriptive and normative theories from both disciplines. Both analytic philosophy and cognitive psychology have made dramatic advances in understanding rationality, but there has been little interaction between the disciplines. This volume offers the first integrated overview of the state of the art in the psychology and philosophy of rationality. Written by leading experts from both disciplines, The Handbook of Rationality covers the main normative and descriptive theories of rationality—how people ought to think, how they actually think, and why we often deviate from what we can call rational. It also offers insights from other fields such as artificial intelligence, economics, the social sciences, and cognitive neuroscience. The Handbook proposes a novel classification system for researchers in human rationality, and it creates new connections between rationality research in philosophy, psychology, and other disciplines. Following the basic distinction between theoretical and practical rationality, the book first considers the theoretical side, including normative and descriptive theories of logical, probabilistic, causal, and defeasible reasoning. It then turns to the practical side, discussing topics such as decision making, bounded rationality, game theory, deontic and legal reasoning, and the relation between rationality and morality. Finally, it covers topics that arise in both theoretical and practical rationality, including visual and spatial thinking, scientific rationality, how children learn to reason rationally, and the connection between intelligence and rationality.
Despite troubled trade negotiations, global trade—and trade policy—will thrive in the twenty-first century, but with a bow to the past. Is the multilateral trading order of the twentieth century a historical artifact? Was the creation of the World Trade Organization in 1995 the high point of multilateral cooperation on trade? This new volume, edited by Bernard M. Hoekman and Ernesto Zedillo, assesses the relevance of the WTO in the context of the rise of China and the United States' turn toward unilateral protectionism. The contributors adopt a historical perspective to discuss changes in global trade policy trends, adducing lessons from the past to help understand current trade tensions. Topics include responses to U.S. protectionism under the Trump administration, the policy dimensions of trade in services and the rise of the digital economy, how to strengthen the WTO to better negotiate new rules of the game and adjudicate disputes, managing China's integration into the global trade system, and the implications of global value chains for economic development policies. By reflecting on past episodes of protectionism and how they were resolved, Trade in the 21st Century provides both context and guidance on how trade challenges can be addressed in the coming decades.
Written by Lars Peter Hansen (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2013) and Thomas Sargent (Nobel Laureate in Economics, 2011), Uncertainty within Economic Models includes articles adapting and applying robust control theory to problems in economics and finance. This book extends rational expectations models by including agents who doubt their models and adopt precautionary decisions designed to protect themselves from adverse consequences of model misspecification. This behavior has consequences for what are ordinarily interpreted as market prices of risk, but big parts of which should actually be interpreted as market prices of model uncertainty. The chapters discuss ways of calibrating agents' fears of model misspecification in quantitative contexts.
This book brings together the authors' joint papers from over a period of more than twenty years. The collection includes seven papers, each of which presents a novel and rigorous model in Economic Theory. All of the models are within the domain of implementation and mechanism design theories. These theories attempt to explain how incentive schemes and organizations can be designed with the goal of inducing agents to behave according to the designer's (principal's) objectives. Most of the literature assumes that agents are fully rational. In contrast, the authors inject into each model an element which conflicts with the standard notion of full rationality, demonstrating how such elements can dramatically change the mechanism design problem. Although all of the models presented in this volume touch on mechanism design issues, it is the formal modeling of bounded rationality that the authors are most interested in. A model of bounded rationality signifies a model that contains a procedural element of reasoning that is not consistent with full rationality. Rather than looking for a canonical model of bounded rationality, the articles introduce a variety of modeling devices that will capture procedural elements not previously considered, and which alter the analysis of the model. The book is a journey into the modeling of bounded rationality. It is a collection of modeling ideas rather than a general alternative theory of implementation.
The first textbook to explain the principles of epistemic game theory.