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Judicial control of public administration is essential for the realisation of the rule of law and democracy. To date, there is virtually no effective judicial protection in Afghanistan. However, a study of Afghan legal history suggests that the country has certain - currently underdeveloped - institutions that could be used as the basis for the creation of judicial control. Based on a historical study, the book elaborates the pluralist legal culture of Afghanistan, rooted in tribal and Islamic legal conceptions alongside a State legal system. The author proposes practical solutions for the development of judicial control of public administration in Afghanistan. Dr. Mirwais Ayobi has more than a decade of experience as an assistant professor of law and political science in Afghanistan. His work focuses on administrative law, constitutional law, public administration and judicial review.
The 2004 Constitution of Afghanistan vaguely describes the powers of the Supreme Court (the Court) to interpret the constitution and exercise judicial review. It also describes an independent commission for the supervision of the implementation of the constitution (the Commission), whose powers are ambiguous and seem to overlap with those of the Court. The political branches of the government have taken advantage of these constitutional ambiguities and adopted legislation that vested judicial review and constitutional interpretation powers in two rival institutions, the Court and the Commission, thereby containing the power of the regular judiciary. This Article explores the implications of this fragmented system of judicial review in Afghanistan. It argues that this fractured system of judicial review has severely undermined the powers of the Court, and it has impeded the ability of both the Court and the Commission to issue binding judicial review opinions. Both entities have instead developed a practice of advising the political branches of the government, and, in the process, they have issued a large number of advisory opinions, letting the executive and the legislature treat the Court and the Commission as consultative bodies rather than co-equal and independent branches of the government. This Article offers the first detailed examination of Afghanistan's judicial review system. In addition, it adds a critical and timely case study to the scholarship on the politics of courts in authoritarian regimes. Specifically, this history and analysis provide evidence to support claims made by Tom Ginsburg and Tamir Moustafa that authoritarian presidents try to restrain the power and authority of the regular judiciary by setting up competing institutions with overlapping jurisdiction over constitutional matters instead of creating a unified hierarchical institutional mechanism. This Article further illustrates that Ginsburg and Moustafa's theory might be extended to powerful, not necessarily authoritarian, executives who may also contain the power of the regular judiciary by intentionally engineering competing institutions to resolve constitutional disputes.
The prosecution plays a crucial part in any international war crimes trial, but its role is rarely analysed. This book will assess the work of the prosecutor in a dozen international criminal courts and tribunals, setting out the applicable rules and analysing his or her independence, accountability, and political impact.
How, despite the enormous investment of blood and treasure, has the West's ten-year intervention left Afghanistan so lawless and insecure? The answer is more insidious than any conspiracy, for it begins with a profound lack of understanding of the rule of law, the very thing that most dramatically separates Western societies from the benighted ones in which they increasingly intervene. This volume of essays argues that the rule of law is not a set of institutions that can be exported lock, stock and barrel to lawless lands, but a state of affairs under which ordinary people and officials of the state itself feel it makes sense to act within the law. Where such a state of affairs is absent, as in Afghanistan today, brute force, not law, will continue to rule.
Debunking conventional narratives of Afghanistan as a perennial war zone and the rule of law as a secular-liberal monopoly, Faiz Ahmed presents a vibrant account of the first Muslim-majority country to gain independence, codify its own laws, and ratify a constitution after the fall of the Ottoman Empire. Afghanistan Rising illustrates how turn-of-the-twentieth-century Kabul--far from being a landlocked wilderness or remote frontier--became a magnet for itinerant scholars and statesmen shuttling between Ottoman and British imperial domains. Tracing the country's longstanding but often ignored scholarly and educational ties to Baghdad, Damascus, and Istanbul as well as greater Delhi and Lahore, Ahmed explains how the court of Kabul attracted thinkers eager to craft a modern state within the interpretive traditions of Islamic law and ethics, or shariʿa, and international norms of legality. From Turkish lawyers and Arab officers to Pashtun clerics and Indian bureaucrats, this rich narrative focuses on encounters between divergent streams of modern Muslim thought and politics, beginning with the Sublime Porte's first mission to Afghanistan in 1877 and concluding with the collapse of Ottoman rule after World War I. By unearthing a lost history behind Afghanistan's founding national charter, Ahmed shows how debates today on Islam, governance, and the rule of law have deep roots in a beleaguered land. Based on archival research in six countries and as many languages, Afghanistan Rising rediscovers a time when Kabul stood proudly as a center of constitutional politics, Muslim cosmopolitanism, and contested visions of reform in the greater Islamicate world.
Developing effective Afghan justice sector institutions is considered by many observers to be essential in winning the support of the Afghan population, improving the Afghan government's credibility and legitimacy, and reducing support for insurgent factions. Such sentiments are reinforced in the face of growing awareness of the pervasiveness of Afghan corruption. To this end, establishing the rule of law (ROL) in Afghanistan has become a priority in U.S. strategy for Afghanistan and an issue of interest to Congress. Numerous U.S. programs to promote ROL are in various stages of implementation and receive ongoing funding and oversight from Congress.
A Washington Post Best Book of 2021 ​The #1 New York Times bestselling investigative story of how three successive presidents and their military commanders deceived the public year after year about America’s longest war, foreshadowing the Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, by Washington Post reporter and three-time Pulitzer Prize finalist Craig Whitlock. Unlike the wars in Vietnam and Iraq, the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001 had near-unanimous public support. At first, the goals were straightforward and clear: defeat al-Qaeda and prevent a repeat of 9/11. Yet soon after the United States and its allies removed the Taliban from power, the mission veered off course and US officials lost sight of their original objectives. Distracted by the war in Iraq, the US military become mired in an unwinnable guerrilla conflict in a country it did not understand. But no president wanted to admit failure, especially in a war that began as a just cause. Instead, the Bush, Obama, and Trump administrations sent more and more troops to Afghanistan and repeatedly said they were making progress, even though they knew there was no realistic prospect for an outright victory. Just as the Pentagon Papers changed the public’s understanding of Vietnam, The Afghanistan Papers contains “fast-paced and vivid” (The New York Times Book Review) revelation after revelation from people who played a direct role in the war from leaders in the White House and the Pentagon to soldiers and aid workers on the front lines. In unvarnished language, they admit that the US government’s strategies were a mess, that the nation-building project was a colossal failure, and that drugs and corruption gained a stranglehold over their allies in the Afghan government. All told, the account is based on interviews with more than 1,000 people who knew that the US government was presenting a distorted, and sometimes entirely fabricated, version of the facts on the ground. Documents unearthed by The Washington Post reveal that President Bush didn’t know the name of his Afghanistan war commander—and didn’t want to meet with him. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld admitted that he had “no visibility into who the bad guys are.” His successor, Robert Gates, said: “We didn’t know jack shit about al-Qaeda.” The Afghanistan Papers is a “searing indictment of the deceit, blunders, and hubris of senior military and civilian officials” (Tom Bowman, NRP Pentagon Correspondent) that will supercharge a long-overdue reckoning over what went wrong and forever change the way the conflict is remembered.