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This collection of essays examines the British and American experience in the Middle East from 1950 to 1980. The book compares British and American foreign policy in the Far East and the Persian Gulf, explaining that the Anglo-American relationship was far from harmonious. Both powers tried to manipulate the other to its own advantage. While Washington was clearly the stronger power, London was never reduced to subservience. The book looks at the often neglected role of Egypt's King Farouk, arguing that Egypt was forced to contend with Britain's imperial power, which could, at a few hours notice, overwhelm or undermine Egypt's supposed sovereign institutions. At the same time, however, London was unwilling or unable to prevent Gamal Abdul Nasser and his revolutionary officers from seizing power in 1952. While London perhaps mishandled the transfer of power in Egypt, the book points out how the British managed the transition from being the dominant power in Jordan to preserving a substantial influence, by inviting American participation in securing regime legitimacy. In the end, American dollars supported the Hashemite regime while British influence remained, just as British officials had wished. Challenging Retrenchment argues that, by the mid-1970s, there was an Anglo-American understanding that the Northern Gulf was America's responsibility and that the southern Gulf was Britain's. The book also looks at how intelligence and clandestine operations were used and abused by the British in pursuit of their strategic interests, first somewhat unsuccessfully in Yemen in the 1960s, but with more tangible success in Oman in the 1970s. (Series: ROSTRA Books Trondheim Studies in History - No. 4)
Does history provide lessons for foreign policy makers today? Macdonald combines cognitive psychology theories about analogical reasoning, international relations theories about military intervention, and original archival research to analyze the role of historical information in foreign policy decision making. He looks at the role of historical analogies in Anglo-American decision making during foreign policy crises involving the possible use of force in regional contingencies during a crucial period in the 1950s when the West faced an emerging Soviet threat. This study analyzes the influence of situational and individual variables in a comparison of more than ten leaders from two nations facing four different crises. Rolling the Iron Dice describes the often significant effect of historical analogies on perceptions of the adversary and of allies, time constraints, policy options and risks, as well as the justification of policy in four crises: the 1950 Korean invasion; the 1951-53 Iranian oil nationalization incident; the 1956 Suez crisis; and the 1958 crisis in Lebanon and Jordan. Contrary to both the slippery slope and the escalation models of military intervention, Macdonald argues that leaders decide extremely early in a crisis, often on the basis of an historical analogy, but also based on perceptions of the rationality of an adversary, whether to use military force. Their decision does not change unless the adversary capitulates to every demand.
It was Winston Churchill who, in his speech at Fulton, Missouri, advocated a 'special relationship between the British Commonwealth ... and the United States ... the continuance of intimate relationships between our military advisers, leading to the common study of potential dangers'. Through the eyes of Churchill, Roosevelt and their successors, Robin Renwick traces the development of the Anglo-American relationship since the desperate summer of 1940, and the part it played in shaping the post-war world. Detecting once again a whiff of the 1930s in the air, he concludes that, as one of the ties that binds Europe and North America, the relationship remains an important one, and not only to Britain and the United States. There are many on both sides of the Atlantic who will think that the world would have been poorer without it. Its future will depend on learning the lessons of military overstretch in Iraq and Afghanistan and resolving the mismatch between Britain's desire to play a role in world affairs and the resources allocated to doing so.
The emergence of the international oil corporation as a political actor in the twentieth century, seen in BP's infrastructure and information arrangements in Iran. In the early twentieth century, international oil corporations emerged as a new kind of political actor. The development of the world oil industry, argues Katayoun Shafiee, was one of the era's largest political projects of techno-economic development. In this book, Shafiee maps the machinery of oil operations in the Anglo-Iranian oil industry between 1901 and 1954, tracking the organizational work involved in moving oil through a variety of technical, legal, scientific, and administrative networks. She shows that, in a series of disagreements, the British-controlled Anglo-Iranian Oil Company (AIOC, which later became BP) relied on various forms of information management to transform political disputes into techno-economic calculation, guaranteeing the company complete control over profits, labor, and production regimes. She argues that the building of alliances and connections that constituted Anglo-Iranian oil's infrastructure reconfigured local politics of oil regions and examines how these arrangements in turn shaped the emergence of both nation-state and transnational oil corporation. Drawing on her extensive archival and field research in Iran, Shafiee investigates the surprising ways in which nature, technology, and politics came together in battles over mineral rights; standardizing petroleum expertise; formulas for calculating profits, production rates, and labor; the “Persianization” of employees; nationalism and oil nationalization; and the long-distance machinery of an international corporation. Her account shows that the politics of oil cannot be understood in isolation from its technical dimensions. The open access edition of this book was made possible by generous funding from Knowledge Unlatched.
This book examines Conservative backbench debate on European integration and British relations in the Middle East between 1948 and 1957. In seeking to compare the impact of a loose affiliation of Conservative MPs, an organized faction of longstanding and an ad-hoc pressure group, the text concentrates upon the Europeanists, the Suez Group and the Anti-Suez Group and considers their attempts to influence British foreign policy, using interviews with former parliamentarians and contemporary sources, published and unpublished.
Veiled Power conducts a thorough historical study of the relationship between international law and business corporations. It chronicles the emergence of the contemporary legal architecture for corporations in international law between 1886 and 1981. Doreen Lustig traces the relationship between two legal 'veils': the sovereign veil of the state and the corporate veil of the company. The interplay between these two veils constitutes the conceptual framework this book offers for the legal analysis of corporations in international law. By weaving together five in-depth case studies - Firestone in Liberia, the Industrialist Trials at Nuremberg, the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company, Barcelona Traction and the emergence of the international investment law regime - a variety of contexts are covered, including international criminal law, human rights, natural resources, and the multinational corporation as a subject of regulatory concern. Together, these case studies offer a multifaceted account of the history of corporations in international law over time. The book seeks to demonstrate the facilitative role of international law in shaping and limiting the scope of responsibility of the private business corporation from the late-nineteenth century and throughout the twentieth century. Ultimately, Lustig suggests that, contrary to the prevailing belief that international law failed to adequately regulate private corporations, there is a history of close engagement between the two that allowed corporations to exert influence under a variety of legal regimes while obscuring their agency.
In August 1953, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency orchestrated the swift overthrow of Iran's democratically elected leader and installed Muhammad Reza Shah Pahlavi in his place. Over the next twenty-six years, the United States backed the unpopular, authoritarian shah and his secret police; in exchange, it reaped a share of Iran's oil wealth and became a key player in this volatile region. The blowback was almost inevitable, as this new and revealing history of the coup and its consequences shows. When the 1979 Iranian Revolution deposed the shah and replaced his puppet government with a radical Islamic republic under Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the shift reverberated throughout the Middle East and the world, casting a long, dark shadow over U.S.-Iran relations that extends to the present day. In this authoritative new history of the coup and its aftermath, noted Iran scholar Ervand Abrahamian uncovers little-known documents that challenge conventional interpretations and also sheds new light on how the American role in the coup influenced U.S.-Iranian relations, both past and present. Drawing from the hitherto closed archives of British Petroleum, the Foreign Office, and the U.S. State Department, as well as from Iranian memoirs and published interviews, Abrahamian's riveting account of this key historical event will change America's understanding of a crucial turning point in modern U.S.-Iranian relations.
As new nations were formed from the declining British Empire, a murky world of diplomats, oil executives and spies were determined to maintain London's grip on Iran and its strategic oil reserves. Directed from Whitehall by successive governments, this book explores the complexities and ambiguities of British policy in Iran and demonstrates its centrality to post-war imperial reorientation. Situating Iran within Britain's 'informal empire,' Jack Taylor demonstrates that Clement Attlee's Labour Government saw Iranian oil as critical to the construction of a domestic New Jerusalem, and used coercion, propaganda, and espionage to preserve their control over it. In doing so, they were forced to confront not only the emerging Cold War, but local resistance expressed through diverse forms including trade unionism, Soviet-inspired Marxism, and popular nationalism. Oil, Nationalism and British Policy in Iran offers new insight into the scale of British interference in Iran and its ultimate failure. It reveals that as London's policy floundered the United States independently took steps to safeguard their own regional economic and security interests. Although British actors were critical in the operation to depose Prime Minister Mohammad Mossadegh following his government's nationalisation of the oil industry, they were ultimately unable to sustain their informal empire in Iran.
This book breaks new ground as the first full account of the role of amphibious warfare in British strategy between VE Day and the Anglo-French assault on Suez in 1956. Ian Speller analyses the development of postwar strategic planning and the manner in which this influenced the nature of Britain's armed forces in the 1940s and 1950s. By detailing the development of equipment, doctrine and the role of the Royal Marines he sheds new light on the military response to a succession of overseas crises.
Strategically placed on the global chess board, as well as controlling vast oil resources, the Middle East was one of the main theatres of Cold War. In the 1950s the Soviet Union had taken advantage of Arab Nationalists’ disillusion with British and French Imperialism, along with the emerging Arab-Israeli conflict, to establish relations with Egypt, Syria and Iraq. The United States responded by moving in to shore up the Western position. Confrontation was inevitable. Superpower Intervention in the Middle East was written in 1978, when this confrontation was at its height. The book’s main theme focuses on how the superpowers became competitively involved in local Middle East conflicts over which they could exercise only limited control, and the risks of nuclear confrontation of the kind which occurred at the end of the 1973 Arab-Israeli war. The threat to Western oil supplies is also examined. This is a fascinating work, of great relevance to scholars and students of Middle Eastern history and political diplomacy, as well as those with an interest in the relationship between the Western superpowers and this volatile region.