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Economics has much to do with incentives--not least, incentives to work hard, to produce quality products, to study, to invest, and to save. Although Adam Smith amply confirmed this more than two hundred years ago in his analysis of sharecropping contracts, only in recent decades has a theory begun to emerge to place the topic at the heart of economic thinking. In this book, Jean-Jacques Laffont and David Martimort present the most thorough yet accessible introduction to incentives theory to date. Central to this theory is a simple question as pivotal to modern-day management as it is to economics research: What makes people act in a particular way in an economic or business situation? In seeking an answer, the authors provide the methodological tools to design institutions that can ensure good incentives for economic agents. This book focuses on the principal-agent model, the "simple" situation where a principal, or company, delegates a task to a single agent through a contract--the essence of management and contract theory. How does the owner or manager of a firm align the objectives of its various members to maximize profits? Following a brief historical overview showing how the problem of incentives has come to the fore in the past two centuries, the authors devote the bulk of their work to exploring principal-agent models and various extensions thereof in light of three types of information problems: adverse selection, moral hazard, and non-verifiability. Offering an unprecedented look at a subject vital to industrial organization, labor economics, and behavioral economics, this book is set to become the definitive resource for students, researchers, and others who might find themselves pondering what contracts, and the incentives they embody, are really all about.
This book constitutes the refereed proceedings of the 23rd International Conference on Principles and Practice of Multi-Agent Systems, PRIMA 2020, held in hybrid mode in Valencia, Spain, in November 2022. The 31 full papers presented together with 15 short papers and 1 demo paper were carefully reviewed and selected from 100 submissions. The conference covers a wide range of ranging from foundations of agent theory and engineering aspects of agent systems, to emerging interdisciplinary areas of agent-based research.
This book constitutes the revised post-conference proceedings of the 18th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2021. The conference was held online in June, 2021. 16 full papers are presented in this volume, each of which carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 51 submissions. The papers report on both early and mature research and cover a wide range of topics in the field of multi-agent systems.
The role of the accountant is changing, as developments in technology alter the ways in which information is prepared and analysed. This Research Handbook addresses the use of both financial and non-financial information for planning, decision-making and control in organisations. Written by experts in the field, the book uses comprehensive literature reviews, empirical fieldwork and theoretical developments to provide an overview of research in this important area.
Annotation. This book constitutes the proceedings of the 8th German Conference on Multiagent System Technologies held in Leipzig, Germany, in September 2010.
Mainstream economics has recognized only recently the necessity to incorporate political constraints into economic analysis intended for policy advisors. Incentives and Political Economy uses recent advances in contract theory to build a normative approach to constitutional design in economic environments.The first part of the book remains in the tradition of benevolent constitutional design with complete contracting. It treats politicians as informed supervisors and studies how the Constitution should control them, in particular to avoid capture by interest groups. Incentive theories for the separation of powers or systems of checks and balances are developed.The second part of the book recognises the incompleteness of the constitutional contract which leaves discretion to the politicans selected by the electoral process. Asymmetric information associates information rents with economic policies and the political game becomes a game of costly redistribution of those rents. Professor Laffont investigates the trade-offs between an inflexible constitution which leaves little discretion to politicians but sacrifices ex post efficiency and a constitutionweighted towards ex post efficiency but also giving considerable discretion to politicians to pursue private agendas.The final part of the book reconsiders the modeling of collusion given asymmetric information. It proposes a new approach to characterizing incentives constraints for group behaviour when asymmetric information is non-verifiable. This provides a methodology to characterise the optimal constitutional response to activities of interest groups and to study the design of any institution in which group behavior is important.
Intelligent systems often depend on data provided by information agents, for example, sensor data or crowdsourced human computation. Providing accurate and relevant data requires costly effort that agents may not always be willing to provide. Thus, it becomes important not only to verify the correctness of data, but also to provide incentives so that agents that provide high-quality data are rewarded while those that do not are discouraged by low rewards. We cover different settings and the assumptions they admit, including sensing, human computation, peer grading, reviews, and predictions. We survey different incentive mechanisms, including proper scoring rules, prediction markets and peer prediction, Bayesian Truth Serum, Peer Truth Serum, Correlated Agreement, and the settings where each of them would be suitable. As an alternative, we also consider reputation mechanisms. We complement the game-theoretic analysis with practical examples of applications in prediction platforms, community sensing, and peer grading.
This book constitutes the revised post-conference proceedings of the 17th European Conference on Multi-Agent Systems, EUMAS 2020, and the 7th International Conference on Agreement Technologies, AT 2020, which were originally planned to be held as a joint event in Thessaloniki, Greece, in April 2020. Due to COVID-19 pandemic the conference was postponed to September 2020 and finally became a fully virtual conference. The 38 full papers presented in this volume were carefully reviewed and selected from a total of 53 submissions. The papers report on both early and mature research and cover a wide range of topics in the field of autonomous agents and multi-agent systems.
This paper concerns moral hazard problems in multi-agent situations where cooperation is an issue. Each agent chooses his own effort, which improves stochastically the outcome of his own job. Agents also choose the amount of 'help' to extend to other agents, which improves the performance of other agents. By selecting appropriate compensation schemes, the principal can design the task structure of the firm: The principal may prefer an unambiguous division labor, where each agent is inclined not to help other agents and specializes in his own job. Or the principal may prefer teamwork where each agent is motivated to help other agents. The analysis identifies two important determinants in choosing the optimal task structure; the effect of 'interpersonal interaction' and the attitude of the agents in providing 'small' amounts of help.