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It has always proved difficult to achieve trade liberalization for agricultural products.This book shows how a new Agriculture Agreement in the WTO led to CAP reform, which in turn allowed for greater flexibility in subsequent international trade negotiations.
Agriculture has a small, and declining, importance in employment and income generation within the EU, but a political importance well beyond its economic impact. The EU's common agricultural policy (CAP) has often been the source of conflict between the EU and its trade partners within first the GATT, and then the WTO. In the Doha Round agriculture was again a sticking point, resulting in setbacks and delays. The position of the EU is pivotal. Due to the comparatively limited competitiveness of the EU's agricultural sector, and the EU's institutionally constrained ability to undertake CAP reform, the CAP sets limits for agricultural trade liberalization blocking progress across the full compass of the WTO agenda. Therefore, the farm trade negotiation, with the CAP at its core, is the key to understanding the dynamics of trade rounds in the WTO. The book, written by a political scientist and an agricultural economist, applies theory on ideas to explain how the agricultural sector came to be included in the Single Undertaking that resulted in the Uruguay Round agreements, and how this led to a dynamic interplay between CAP reform and the possibility of further agricultural trade liberalization within the WTO, thereby providing useful insights into international trade relations.
To citizens and political analysts alike, United States trade law is an incoherent conglomeration of policies, both liberal and protectionist. Seeking to understand the contradictions in American policy, Judith Goldstein offers the first book to demonstrate the impact of the political past on today's trade decisions. As she traces the history of trade agreements from the antebellum era through the 1980s, she addresses a fundamental question: What effects do shared ideas about economics—as opposed to national power or individual self-interest—have on the institutions that make and enforce trade law? Goldstein argues that successful ideas become embedded in institutions and typically outlive the time during which they served social interests. She sets the stage with a discussion of the shifting commercial policy of the first half of the nineteenth century. After examining the consequences of the Republican party's decision to promote high tariffs between 1870 and 1930, she then considers in detail the political aftermath of the Great Depression, when the Democratic party settled on a reciprocal trade platform. Because the Democrats did not completely dismantle the existing system, however, the combined legacies of protection and openness help explain the intricacies in the forms of protectionism that political leaders have advocated since World War II. Readers in such fields as political science, political economy, policy studies and law, international relations, and American history will welcome Ideas, Interests, and American Trade Policy.
'In International Trade and Political Institutions, four leading young scholars of comparative and international political economy come together to analyse aspects of trade policy from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. Combining theoretical sophistication with empirical depth, they provide cogent arguments about the interaction of interests, institutions, and ideas in a period of crucial importance to those who would like to understand the sources and implications of global economic integration. This exciting volume will be of great interest for scholars concerned with international trade, political economy, and the history of the nineteenth-century world economy.' - Jeffry A. Frieden, Harvard University, US 'This fascinating volume should be read by political scientists, economists, and historians interested in the political formation of trade policy. The papers consider a rich set of historical examples and never fail to be provocative and interesting.' - Douglas Irwin, Dartmouth College, US It is a widely held view that politics plays an important role in determining international trade policy. Defining precisely why, and how, politics matters is more difficult. Despite the benefits of trade, few nations have wholeheartedly adopted free trade policies, and when they do so it is by managing trade through international institutions and multi- or bilateral trade treaties. International Trade and Political Institutions broadens the public choice theory of trade politics to allow for the study of ideas and institutions within a longer time horizon. The authors use theoretically rigorous historical analysis of international political economy and four important case studies to help untangle the role of ideology, institutions and interests. This illuminating book connects the fields of economics, political economy and history to shed new light on trade theory.
East Asian countries are now pursuing greater formal economic institutionalization, weaving a web of bilateral and minilateral preferential trade agreements. Scholarly analysis of “formal” East Asian regionalism focuses on international political and economic factors such as the end of the Cold War, the Asian financial crisis, or the rising Sino-Japanese rivalry. Yet this work pays inadequate attention to the strategies of individual government agencies, business groups, labor unions, and NGOs across the region. Moreover, most studies also fail to adequately characterize different types of trade arrangements, often lumping together bilateral accords with minilateral ones, and transregional agreements with those within the region. To fully understand this cross-national variance, this book argues that researchers must give greater attention to the domestic politics within East Asian countries and the U.S., involving the interplay of these subnational players. With contributions from leading country and regional trade specialists, this book examines East Asian and American trade strategies through the lens of a domestic bargaining game approach with a focus on the interplay of interests, ideas, and domestic institutions within the context of broader international shifts. With respect to domestic politics, the chapters show how subnational actors engage in lobbying, both of their own governments and through their links to others in the region. They also trace the evolution of interests and ideas over time, helping us to generate a better understanding of historical trends in the region. In addition to scholars of East Asian and comparative regionalism, this book will be of interest to policy-makers concerned with international trade and U.S.-Asia relations, and those interested in understanding the rich trade institutional landscape that we see emerging in the Asia-Pacific.
Brilliant and engagingly written, Why Nations Fail answers the question that has stumped the experts for centuries: Why are some nations rich and others poor, divided by wealth and poverty, health and sickness, food and famine? Is it culture, the weather, geography? Perhaps ignorance of what the right policies are? Simply, no. None of these factors is either definitive or destiny. Otherwise, how to explain why Botswana has become one of the fastest growing countries in the world, while other African nations, such as Zimbabwe, the Congo, and Sierra Leone, are mired in poverty and violence? Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson conclusively show that it is man-made political and economic institutions that underlie economic success (or lack of it). Korea, to take just one of their fascinating examples, is a remarkably homogeneous nation, yet the people of North Korea are among the poorest on earth while their brothers and sisters in South Korea are among the richest. The south forged a society that created incentives, rewarded innovation, and allowed everyone to participate in economic opportunities. The economic success thus spurred was sustained because the government became accountable and responsive to citizens and the great mass of people. Sadly, the people of the north have endured decades of famine, political repression, and very different economic institutions—with no end in sight. The differences between the Koreas is due to the politics that created these completely different institutional trajectories. Based on fifteen years of original research Acemoglu and Robinson marshall extraordinary historical evidence from the Roman Empire, the Mayan city-states, medieval Venice, the Soviet Union, Latin America, England, Europe, the United States, and Africa to build a new theory of political economy with great relevance for the big questions of today, including: - China has built an authoritarian growth machine. Will it continue to grow at such high speed and overwhelm the West? - Are America’s best days behind it? Are we moving from a virtuous circle in which efforts by elites to aggrandize power are resisted to a vicious one that enriches and empowers a small minority? - What is the most effective way to help move billions of people from the rut of poverty to prosperity? More philanthropy from the wealthy nations of the West? Or learning the hard-won lessons of Acemoglu and Robinson’s breakthrough ideas on the interplay between inclusive political and economic institutions? Why Nations Fail will change the way you look at—and understand—the world.
The repeal of Britain's Corn Laws in 1846, one of the most important economic policy decisions of the 19th century, has long intrigued and puzzled political scientists, historians, and economists. This book examines the interacting forces that brought about the abrupt beginning of Britain's free-trade empire.
Approaches the question of whether ideas--world views, principled beliefs, and causal beliefs--have an impact on political outcomes, and if so, under what conditions. Contributions address such topics as the weight of ideas in decolonization; human rights policies in the US and western Europe; change in Parliament in early Stuart England; and coping with terrorism--norms and internal security in Germany and Japan. Annotation copyright by Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
This book evaluates the institutional environments of China and the United States, and the West more broadly, and how they affect their trading relationship, with specific emphasis on intellectual property theft and other allegations of unfair competition. The economic and political characteristics of the two countries affect the balance of power in their trading relationship, with ramifications far beyond jobs and output. The major theme is China’s ability to free ride on Western institutions through intellectual property theft and extortion. This free riding is far more than just infringing patents and reaping profits; it creates a combination of incentives for political pressures in the West that diminish the free market and liberal Western values. The result is the classic result of free riding – underprovision, or degeneration, of the Western institutions that made the West prosperous and free. At the same time, China’s economic might, military prowess, and global soft power increase, often with deleterious effects for freedom and free markets. This book is distinctive because it integrates public choice ideas about economic institutions, state action, and strategic behavior into international trade. It also takes account of the economic characteristics of China and the West and explains why they present a situation that is fundamentally different from other trade disputes. Institutions and political influence are central to this book’s analysis of trade, which can be more dangerous and more disguised than the welfare gains from trade. Providing a concise and lucid distillation of pressing issues, this book is critical reading for scholars studying trade with China and its effects on both global and Western innovation, economic output, soft power, and freedom more broadly.
This book is a survey of the field of development studies from a political economy perspective. It first reviews the academic literature on development and highlights the fundamental importance of institutions and social values, over and above other alternative theories, as determinants in long-run development. In this context, the book draws from the works of Nobel Laureates Douglass North, F.A. Hayek and Elinor Ostrom, and argues that the ingredients of property rights, the rule of law, and market freedoms are essential in generating socio-economic progress. Successful reforms however are not simply a function of constructing formal institutions, but must cohere with the social values, norms, and cultural commitments of local communities. It is in this spirit that the book theorises on the oft-neglected role that political entrepreneurs play in driving endogenous institutional change. Specifically, this book integrates the theoretical discussion on market-driven development with a range of case studies from around the world, featuring the bottom-up efforts of local change agents to pursue institutional reforms and changes in social opinion.