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A strong and effective centre of government is vital for the effective operation of government as a whole and for ensuring a focus on improved value for money for the taxpayer. However, there is a lack of clarity about the centre's precise role, particularly the respective responsibilities of the Cabinet Office, HM Treasury and the Prime Minister's Office (Number 10), and how they work together as a coherent centre. The centre sometimes intervenes to address issues with high-priority government programmes, but has too often failed to do so effectively or at an early enough stage. In part, this is because the centre does not have a joined-up single view of strategic risks across government, meaning it is often reactive in its response rather than able to anticipate potentially serious problems. There are gaps in key skills at the centre and across departments, such as financial management capability and contracting expertise, which are compounded because government repeatedly fails to learn lessons and share good practice from past experience. The Government announced that the roles of Cabinet Secretary and Head of the Civil Service will be combined, and there will be a new Chief Executive post at the centre of government. Implementing these changes may provide an opportunity to make progress on the role of the centre
This is the fourth WGA to be published and it remains the most comprehensive picture of the government's income, expenditures, assets and liabilities that is available. Parliament lacks real visibility over the government's delivery of its deficit reduction measures under the current Spending Review. The government has currently delivered only half of its planned measures to balance public sector income and expenditure (fiscal consolidation measures). The experience in the delivery of consolidation measures to date, where for example the planned increases in tax revenues have not been realised, also show that the government will face a significant challenge in delivering the next phase of the consolidation. In assessing the government's performance in its management of public finances, the WGA is now an essential tool in supporting Parliamentary accountability. The Treasury has been slow in ensuring that all parts of the public sector comply with the government's expectations on pay restraint, particularly in setting the pay of senior staff. The Committee welcomes the steps the Treasury has taken to ensure that 'off payroll' arrangements within central government are made more transparent and that the Treasury is sanctioning government bodies when they fail to comply with the guidance.
It is eight years since the Committee last looked at this issue and they are dismayed to find so little progress has been made in removing foreign national offenders from the UK. This is despite firm commitments to improve and a ten-fold increase in resources devoted to this work. The public bodies involved are missing too many opportunities to remove foreign national offenders early and are wasting resources, through a combination of a lack of focus on early action at the border and police stations, poor joint working in prisons, and inefficient caseworking in the Home Office. This, combined with very poor management information and non-existent cost data, results in a system that appears to be dysfunctional. Our concerns about the system were not allayed by the evidence we received. The Home Office will need to act with urgency on the recommendations we make in this report if it is to secure public confidence in its ability to tackle effectively these and the wider immigration system issues on which the Committee has previously reported.
The Department for Work and Pensions is responsible for the Work Programme, which aims to help people who have been out of work for long periods to find and keep jobs. Specifically the Work Programme aims to increase employment, reduce the time that people spend on benefit, and to improve support for the hardest-to-help - those participants whose barriers to employment are, relatively, greater than others on the programme. The Department assigns people to one of nine payment groups depending on characteristics such as age and the benefit each person is claiming. The Department pays prime contractors to provide support to people to get them into long-term employment using a payment-by-results approach. The amount the Department pays a prime contractor depends on its success in getting people into sustained work and the payment group of the individual. The Department has 40 contracts with 18 prime contractors. Either two or three prime contractors operate in 18 different geographic areas across England, Scotland, and Wales. Prime contractors may subcontract some or all of the support they provide. The Department will stop referring people to the Work Programme in March 2016, although payments to prime contractors will continue until March 2020. Between June 2011 and March 2016, the Department expects to refer 2.1 million people to the Work Programme and forecasts total payments to prime contractors of £2.8 billion.
This report summarises the key areas of the Committee's work over the past five years. It draws out the areas where progress has been made and where their successors might wish to press in future. The Committee has assiduously followed the taxpayer's pound wherever it was spent. Since 2010 they held 276 evidence sessions and published 244 unanimous reports to hold government to account for its performance. 88% of their recommendations were accepted by departments. In many cases they successfully secured substantial changes, for example with the once secret tax avoidance industry. They secured consensus from government and from industry that private providers of public services do have a duty of care to the taxpayer, and in pushing the protection of whistleblowers further up the agenda of all government departments. By drawing attention to mistakes in the Department for Transport's procurement of the West Coast Mainline, more recent procurements for Crossrail, Thameslink and Intercity Express have all benefited from more expert advice and a more appropriate level of challenge from senior staff. After discovery in 2012-13 that 63% of calls to government call centres were to higher rate telephone numbers, the Government accepted our recommendation that telephone lines serving vulnerable and low income groups never be charged above the geographic rate and that 03 numbers should be available for all government telephone lines. They also secured a commitment to close large mental health hospitals.
Tax and tax reliefs are plainly different and require different accountability arrangements. Put simply tax is where you get money in through taxation and a tax relief is where you make a conscious decision to forgo that income. Some reliefs are structural parts of the system to ensure a more progressive system or avoid double taxation. But other reliefs, costing some £100 billion a year, are designed to deliver a policy objective that could be met instead through spending programmes. HM Treasury and HM Revenue and Customs (HMRC) do not keep track of those tax reliefs intended to influence behaviour. They do not adequately report to Parliament or the public on whether reliefs are working as intended and what they cost and whether they represent good value for money. While HMRC is accountable for implementing and monitoring all tax reliefs, its statements about the extent of its responsibilities are inconsistent with its actual practices. HMRC accepts it has a role to assess, evaluate and monitor reliefs, but is unable or unwilling to define or to categorise reliefs by their purpose. While HMRC accepts the need for reporting the costs of tax reliefs, it does not see the merit in assessing the economy, efficiency and effectiveness of reliefs, or considering their cost effectiveness alongside that of alternative policy instruments such as spending programmes. HMRC does not generally assess the effectiveness of reliefs with specific objectives although in a few instances it does consider their impact on taxpayer behaviour. HMRC's failure to articulate a set of principles to guide its management and reporting of tax reliefs is a serious omission which it now needs to rectify.
The financial health of NHS bodies has worsened in the last two financial years. The overall net surplus achieved by NHS bodies in 2012-13 of £2.1 billion fell to £722 million in 2013-14. The percentage of NHS trusts and foundation trusts in deficit increased from 10% in 2012-13 to 26% in 2013-14. Monitor found that 80% of foundation trusts that provide acute hospital services were reporting a deficit by the second quarter of 2014-15. NHS England, Monitor and the NHS Trust Development Authority recognise that radical change is needed to the way services are provided and that extra resources are required if the NHS is to become financially sustainable. The necessary changes will require further upfront investment. Present incentives to reduce A&E attendance and increase community based care services have not had the impact expected. New incentives and strong relationships are needed to promote the more effective collaboration necessary for delivering new models of care.
The Department for Transport is responsible for a number of ambitious, expensive transport infrastructure programmes including the planned High Speed 2 programme. The Committee though is not convinced that these programmes are part of a clear strategic approach to investment in the rail network. In particular, recent proposals for a railway connecting cities in the north of England - a possible High Speed 3 - suggest that the Department takes a piecemeal approach to its rail investment, rather than considering what would benefit the system as a whole and prioritising its investment accordingly. The Department told us it will deliver the full High Speed 2 programme within its overall funding envelope of £50 billion. However, this funding includes a generous contingency and the Committee is concerned that, without appropriate controls, it could be used to mask cost increases. When it comes to the wider regeneration benefits, insufficient planning meant that regeneration benefits in Ebbsfleet did not flow from High Speed 1 as expected. Although the Department told the Committee that it has learned and is applying these lessons on High Speed 2, it needs to set out clearly who is responsible for ensuring that benefits are realised, and how that work will be coordinated.
The Department for International Development is the main funder of the Private Infrastructure Development Group, a multilateral agency which invests in infrastructure projects in developing countries. The Department has not used its position as by far the dominant funder of PIDG to influence the direction of its operations and improve its performance. The Department's oversight of PIDG has not been sufficiently 'hands on'. The Committee is concerned that the Department has insufficient assurance over the integrity of PIDG's investments and the companies with which it works and the Department has not done enough to put a stop to PIDG's wasteful travel policies and poor financial management.
The Winterbourne View scandal in 2011 exposed the horrific abuse of people with learning difficulties and challenging behaviour in a private mental health hospital. Concerns were also raised about a number of other institutions. As a result, the Government committed to discharging those individuals for whom it was appropriate back into their homes and communities. However, since then, too many children and adults have continued to go into mental health hospitals, and to stay there unnecessarily, because of the lack of community alternatives. The number of people with learning disabilities remaining in hospital has not fallen, and has remained broadly the same at around 3,200. It was refreshing that NHS England took responsibility for this lack of progress and has now committed to develop a closure programme for large NHS mental health hospitals, along with a transition plan for the people with learning disabilities within these hospitals, from 2016-17. Discharges from hospital are being delayed because funding does not follow the individual when they are discharged into the community. This acts as a financial disincentive for local commissioners who have to bear the costs and responsibility for planning and commissioning community services. Delaying discharge has the effect of institutionalising people, making their reintegration into the community more difficult. Some local authorities' reluctance to accept and fund individuals in the community will be exacerbated by current financial constraints. The Department should set out its proposals for 'dowry-type' payments from NHS England to meet the costs of supporting people discharged from hospital.