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When Gunboat Diplomacy was first published in 1971, it broke new ground with its study of how, in peacetime and in the twentieth century, governments used their naval forces in international disputes. Now fully revised and brought up to date after the collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the cold war, this third edition of a book that was already a modern classic has a foreword by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald.
`James Cable's book...has deservedly remained the classic work' - Geoffrey Till, International Relations`...a classic work in the modern literature on naval power...This third edition is to be welcomed, not only because it increases the book's availability but because Cable's revisions highlight the increased relevance of the topic.' - Michael Pugh, Journal of Strategic Studies When Gunboat Diplomacy was first published in 1971, it broke new ground with its study of how, in peacetime and in the twentieth century, governments used their naval forces in international disputes. Now fully revised and brought up to date after the collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the cold war, this third edition of a book that was already a modern classic has a foreword by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald.
`James Cable's book...has deservedly remained the classic work' - Geoffrey Till, International Relations `...a classic work in the modern literature on naval power...This third edition is to be welcomed, not only because it increases the book's availability but because Cable's revisions highlight the increased relevance of the topic.' - Michael Pugh, Journal of Strategic Studies When Gunboat Diplomacy was first published in 1971, it broke new ground with its study of how, in peacetime and in the twentieth century, governments used their naval forces in international disputes. Now fully revised and brought up to date after the collapse of the Soviet empire and the end of the cold war, this third edition of a book that was already a modern classic has a foreword by Admiral of the Fleet Sir Julian Oswald.
For five centuries, since Vasco de Gama's ships began making the Indian Ocean a Portuguese lake, many governments used naval force to serve their political purposes. The sceptre of the seas passed from one nation to another, but political success did not always reward the strongest navy. This selective, international history of naval force as a political instrument, whether in peace or war, ranges from Calicut, navally cannonaded in 1501, to Baghdad, assailed by sea launched missiles in 1991.
In this book, contributors from both sides of the Atlantic examine several key themes in the increasingly important subject of counter-insurgency. It assesses the lessons that contemporary policy makers and military practitioners can draw from historical and more recent experience.
This book adopts an innovative new approach to examine the role of maritime power and the utility of navies. It uses a number of case studies based upon key Royal Navy operations in the twentieth century to draw out enduring principles about maritime power and to examine the strengths and limitations of maritime forces as instruments of national policy. Individual chapters focus on campaigns and operations from both World Wars and a series of post-1945 crises and conflicts from the Palestine Patrol in the 1940s to Royal Navy operations in support of British policy in the 1990s. Each case study demonstrates critical features of maritime power including: operations during the transition to war; fleet operations in narrow seas; logistics; submarine operations; the impact of air power on maritime operations; blockade; maritime power projection; amphibious warfare; jurisdictional disputes and the law of the sea; and, peace support operations. The contributors to this book all have considerable experience lecturing on these issues at the United Kingdom Joint Services Command and Staff College, where maritime campaign analysis is used to teach the principles of maritime power to officers of the Royal Navy. The book combines an authoritative examination of critical Royal Navy operations during the twentieth century with a sophisticated analysis of the nature of maritime power. As such it is of both historical interest and contemporary relevance and will prove equally valuable to academic historians, military professionals and the general reader.
A Brief Guide to Maritime Strategy is a deliberately compact introductory work aimed at junior seafarers, those who make decisions affecting the sea services, and those who educate seafarers and decision-makers. It introduces readers to the main theoretical ideas that shape how statesmen and commanders make and execute maritime strategy in times of peace and war. Following in the spirit of Bernard Brodie's Layman's Guide to Naval Strategy, a World War II-era book whose title makes its purpose plain, it will be a companion volume to such works as Geoffrey Till's Seapower and Wayne Hughes's Fleet Tactics and Coastal Combat, the classic treatise that explains how to handle navies in fleet actions. It takes the mystery out of maritime strategy, which should not be an arcane art for practitioners or policy-makers, and will help the next generation think about strategy.
Throughout US history, presidents have had vastly different reactions to naval incidents. Though some incidents have been resolved diplomatically, others have escalated to outright war. What factors influence the outcome of a naval incident, especially when calls for retribution mingle with recommendations for restraint? Given the rise of long range anti-ship and anti-air missile systems, coupled with tensions in East Asia, the Persian Gulf, and the Black and Baltic Seas, the question is more relevant than ever for US naval diplomacy. In Choosing War, Douglas Carl Peifer compares the ways in which different presidential administrations have responded when American lives were lost at sea. He examines in depth three cases: the Maine incident (1898), which led to war in the short term; the Lusitania crisis (1915), which set the trajectory for intervention; and the Panay incident (1937), which was settled diplomatically. While evaluating Presidents William McKinley, Woodrow Wilson, and Franklin Delano Roosevelt's responses to these incidents, Peifer lucidly reflects on the options they had available and the policies they ultimately selected. The case studies illuminate how leadership, memory, and shifting domestic policy shape presidential decisions, providing significant insights into the connections between naval incidents, war, and their historical contexts. Rich in dramatic narrative and historical perspective, Choosing War offers an essential tool for confronting future naval crises.
The Falklands Saga presents abundant evidence from hundreds of pages of documents in archives and libraries in Buenos Aires, La Plata, Montevideo, London, Cambridge, Stanley, Paris, Munich and Washington DC, some never printed before, many printed here for the first time, in English and, where different, in their original languages, Spanish, French, German, Italian, Latin or Dutch. It provides the facts to correct the fallacies and distortions in accounts by earlier authors. It reveals persuasive evidence that the Falklands were discovered by a Portuguese expedition at the latest around 1518-19, and not by Vespucci or Magellan. It demonstrates conclusively that the Anglo-Spanish agreement of 1771 did not contain a reservation of Spanish rights, that Britain did not make a secret promise to abandon the islands, and that the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790 did not restrict Britain's rights in the Falklands, but greatly extended them at the expense of Spain. For the first time ever, the despairing letters from the Falklands written in German in 1824 to Louis Vernet by his brother Emilio are printed here in full, in both the original German and in English translation, revealing the total chaos of the abortive 1824 Argentine expedition to the islands. This book reveals how tiny the Argentine settlement in the islands was in 1826-33. In April 1829 there were only 52 people, and there was a constant turnover of population; many people stayed only a few months, and the population reached its maximum of 128 only for a few weeks in mid-1831 before declining to 37 people at the beginning of 1833. This work also refutes the falsehood that Britain expelled an Argentine population from the Falklands in 1833. That myth has been Argentina's principal propaganda weapon since the 1960s in its attempts to undermine Falkland Islanders' right to self-determination. In fact Britain encouraged the residents to stay, and only a handful left the islands. A crucial document printed here is the 1850 Convention of Peace between Argentina and Britain. At Argentina's insistence, this was a comprehensive peace treaty which restored "perfect friendship" between the two countries. Critical exchanges between the Argentine and British negotiators are printed here in detail, which show that Argentina dropped its claim to the Falklands and accepted that the islands are British. That, and the many later acts by Argentina described here, definitively ended any Argentine title to the islands. The islands' history is placed in its world context, with detailed accounts of the First Falklands Crisis of 1764-71, the Second Falklands Crisis of 1831-3, the Years of Confusion (1811-1850), and the Third Falklands Crisis of 1982 (the Falklands War), as well as a Falklands perspective on the First and Second World Wars, including the Battle of the Falklands (1914) and the Battle of the River Plate (1939), with extensive details and texts from German sources. The legal status of the Falklands is analysed by reference to legal works, to United Nations resolutions on decolonisation, and to rulings by the International Court of Justice, which together demonstrate conclusively that the islands are British territory in international law and that the Falkland Islanders, who have now (2024) lived in their country for over 180 years and for nine generations, are a unique people who are holders of territorial sovereignty with the full right of external self-determination.