Download Free Global Imbalances And The Lessons Of Bretton Woods Book in PDF and EPUB Free Download. You can read online Global Imbalances And The Lessons Of Bretton Woods and write the review.

Why the current Bretton Woods-like international financial system, featuring large current account deficits in the center country, the United States, and massive reserve accumulation by the periphery, is not sustainable. In Global Imbalances and the Lessons of Bretton Woods, Barry Eichengreen takes issue with the argument that today's international financial system is largely analogous to the Bretton Woods System of the period 1958 to 1973. Then, as now, it has been argued, the United States ran balance of payment deficits, provided international reserves to other countries, and acted as export market of last resort for the rest of the world. Then, as now, the story continues, other countries were reluctant to revalue their currencies for fear of seeing their export-led growth slow and suffering capital losses on their foreign reserves. Eichengreen argues in response that the power of historical analogy lies not just in finding parallels but in highlighting differences, and he finds important differences in the structure of the world economy today. Such differences, he concludes, mean that the current constellation of exchange rates and payments imbalances is unlikely to last as long as the original Bretton Woods System. Two of the most salient differences are the twin deficits and low savings rate of the United States, which do not augur well for the sustainability of the country's international position. Such differences, he concludes, mean that the current constellation of exchange rates and payments imbalances is unlikely to last as long as the original Bretton Woods System. After identifying these differences, Eichengreen looks in detail at the Gold Pool, the mechanism through which European central banks sought to support the dollar in the 1960s. He shows that the Pool was fragile and short lived, which does not bode well for collective efforts on the part of Asian central banks to restrain reserve diversification and support the dollar today. He studies Japan's exit from its dollar peg in 1971, drawing lessons for China's transition to greater exchange rate flexibility. And he considers the history of reserve currency competition, asking if it has lessons for whether the dollar is destined to lose its standing as preeminent international currency to the euro or even the Chinese renminbi.
Why the current Bretton Woods-like international financial system, featuring large current account deficits in the center country, the United States, and massive reserve accumulation by the periphery, is not sustainable. In Global Imbalances and the Lessons of Bretton Woods, Barry Eichengreen takes issue with the argument that today's international financial system is largely analogous to the Bretton Woods System of the period 1958 to 1973. Then, as now, it has been argued, the United States ran balance of payment deficits, provided international reserves to other countries, and acted as export market of last resort for the rest of the world. Then, as now, the story continues, other countries were reluctant to revalue their currencies for fear of seeing their export-led growth slow and suffering capital losses on their foreign reserves. Eichengreen argues in response that the power of historical analogy lies not just in finding parallels but in highlighting differences, and he finds important differences in the structure of the world economy today. Such differences, he concludes, mean that the current constellation of exchange rates and payments imbalances is unlikely to last as long as the original Bretton Woods System. Two of the most salient differences are the twin deficits and low savings rate of the United States, which do not augur well for the sustainability of the country's international position. Such differences, he concludes, mean that the current constellation of exchange rates and payments imbalances is unlikely to last as long as the original Bretton Woods System. After identifying these differences, Eichengreen looks in detail at the Gold Pool, the mechanism through which European central banks sought to support the dollar in the 1960s. He shows that the Pool was fragile and short lived, which does not bode well for collective efforts on the part of Asian central banks to restrain reserve diversification and support the dollar today. He studies Japan's exit from its dollar peg in 1971, drawing lessons for China's transition to greater exchange rate flexibility. And he considers the history of reserve currency competition, asking if it has lessons for whether the dollar is destined to lose its standing as preeminent international currency to the euro or even the Chinese renminbi.
The Bretton Woods Transcripts is the verbatim record of meetings of the conference that established the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. The Bretton Woods conference, named after the New Hampshire town where the conference was held in July 1944, began a new era in international economic cooperation that continues today. Delegates from 44 countries attended the conference. They were a high-powered group: many would later become top officials of the IMF and World Bank, finance ministers, central bank governors, even presidents and prime ministers. Among them, the best known then and now was John Maynard Keynes, the most influential economist of the 20th century, who chaired the meetings that established the World Bank. The conference transcripts were never intended for publication, and give a rare word-for-word record of what participants at a major international gathering said behind closed doors. -- The Related material on the Publisher's website contain photographs of documents circulated at the 1944 conference, from daily news bulletins to the telephone directory at the Mount Washington Hotel. These documents were not published in the 1948 publication of the conference proceedings because they were considered to be of low interest.--Book Jacket.
Recent events have reignited the debate over the future of the international monetary system. This book, part of the Integrating National Economic series, examines international monetary options of the twenty-first century. Barry Eichengreen argues that it will not be possible for governments to prevent exchange rates from exceeding prespecified limits. Changes in technology, market structure, and politics will force countries that have traditionally pegged their exchange rates to choose between floating rates and monetary unification. Eichengreen describes the various international monetary arrangements with which policymakers have experimented in the past. He introduces the requirements that an international monetary system must satisfy and illustrates how these requirements have been met over time. He analyzes which preconditions for the smooth operation of international monetary systems in the past will be impossible to achieve in the next century and creates a list of feasible options for future policymakers. These feasible options, he concludes, will be limited to some form of floating exchange rates and monetary unions. In which direction countries should move is not obvious. The choice between floating and monetary unification depends on a host of economic and political factors. The book provides an in-depth analysis of Western Europe's experience and the dramatic international monetary initiatives currently under way, and compares options for Asia, Africa, the former Soviet Union, and the Western Hemisphere. A volume of Brookings' Integrating National Economies Series
At the close of the Second World War, when industrialized nations faced serious trade and financial imbalances, delegates from forty-four countries met in Bretton Woods, New Hampshire, in order to reconstruct the international monetary system. In this volume, three generations of scholars and policy makers, some of whom participated in the 1944 conference, consider how the Bretton Woods System contributed to unprecedented economic stability and rapid growth for 25 years and discuss the problems that plagued the system and led to its eventual collapse in 1971. The contributors explore adjustment, liquidity, and transmission under the System; the way it affected developing countries; and the role of the International Monetary Fund in maintaining a stable rate. The authors examine the reasons for the System's success and eventual collapse, compare it to subsequent monetary regimes, such as the European Monetary System, and address the possibility of a new fixed exchange rate for today's world.
Crafting stimulus packages and financial bailouts to address immediate problems has for many reasons been a priority for policymakers. In this Council Special Report, however, Steven Dunaway argues that policymakers must go beyond these steps and tackle one of the root causes of today's crisis: imbalances between savings and investment in major countries. The report analyzes the nature of these imbalances, which occur when some countries, such as the United States, run large current account (essentially trade) deficits while others, such as China, maintain large surpluses. Dunaway identifies three features of the international financial system that have allowed the imbalances to persist, features that involve both floating and managed exchange rates as well as the issuance of reserve assets. In particular, he notes that the United States' status as an issuer of such assets has enabled it to finance a current account deficit. The report then prescribes a variety of steps to address global imbalances. Beyond stimulus packages around the world, it urges measures to raise savings (principally government savings) in the United States, reform labor and product markets in Europe and Japan to increase competition and flexibility, and boost domestic consumption in China. Finally, the report advocates improving International Monetary Fund (IMF) surveillance of member states' economic policies by reducing the role of the Fund's executive board and depoliticizing the selection of its senior management.
Recounts the events of the Bretton Woods accords, presents portaits of the two men at the center of the drama, and reveals Harry White's admiration for Soviet economic planning and communications with intelligence officers.
"Gross stocks of foreign assets have increased rapidly relative to national outputs since 1990, and the short-run capital gains and losses on those assets can amount to significant fractions of GDP. These fluctuations in asset values render the national income and product account measure of the current account balance increasingly inadequate as a summary of the change in a country's net foreign assets. Nonetheless, unusually large current account imbalances, especially deficits, should remain high on policymakers' list of concerns, even for the richer and less credit-constrained countries. Extreme imbalances signal the need for large and perhaps abrupt real exchange rate changes in the future, changes that might have undesired political and financial consequences given the incompleteness of domestic and international asset markets. Furthermore, of the two sources of the change in net foreign assets -- the current account and the capital gain on the net foreign asset position -- the former is better understood and more amenable to policy influence. Systematic government attempts to manipulate international asset values in order to change the net foreign asset position could have a destabilizing effect on market expectations"--NBER website
Why did monetary authorities hold large gold reserves under Bretton Woods (1944–1971) when only the US had to? We argue that gold holdings were driven by institutional memory and persistent habits of central bankers. Countries continued to back currency in circulation with gold reserves, following rules of the pre-WWII gold standard. The longer an institution spent in the gold standard (and the older the policymakers), the stronger the correlation between gold reserves and currency. Since dollars and gold were not perfect substitutes, the Bretton Woods system never worked as expected. Even after radical institutional change, history still shapes the decisions of policymakers.