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General Walter Krueger commanded the 6th Army in the Southwest Pacific Theater in World War II. As the Commander, 6th Army, he led the troops that liberated New Guinea and the Philippines and he was designated as the commander of the forces scheduled to invade Japan. Krueger’s wartime accomplishments were simply a continuation of contributions made to the United States Army and Navy over a 47 year career. Yet, despite his achievements, after the war Krueger simply faded away. Krueger’s lack of historical name recognition some 50 years after his greatest achievements deprives current officers and historians not only the knowledge of wartime exploits, but also of significant understanding of the development of joint operations doctrine in the years between World War I and World War II. The current consensus among historians is that the United States Marine Corps was responsible for the development of amphibious operations. While true at the tactical level, this paper demonstrates that the Army and Naval War Colleges and the Army and Navy General Staffs and War Plans Divisions were key players in the development of doctrine at the strategic and operational level. General Walter Krueger attended both war colleges, served on the faculty of both war colleges, and served two tours in the Army War Plans Division, including a two year stint as its Chief. He was on the Joint Board or the Joint Planning Committee for over six years. The intent of this paper is to show Krueger’s personal influence in the development of joint doctrine. The paper considers Krueger’s assignment history, the war plans he developed, his ideas on unity of command and the need for inter-service understanding, and his principles of war planning. It includes a case study of the Lingayen Gulf Landing in January 1945 to demonstrate the acceptance and rejection of his key ideas. The paper focuses on Army and Navy issues and considers air issues only tangentially.
He made his name in the jungles of the Pacific theater, was featured on the cover of Time magazine, was tapped by Douglas MacArthur to lead the invasion of Japan, and made crucial contributions to the army's tactical and operational doctrine. Yet General Walter Krueger is still one of the least-known army commanders of World War II. Kevin Holzimmer's book resurrects the brilliant career of this great military leader while deepening our understanding of the Pacific War. As head of the Sixth U.S. Army, Krueger exemplified the art of command at the operational level of war and played a pivotal role in the defeat of Japan that until now has not been fully recognized. To the public he was a "mystery man," and his abrasive personality may have sometimes caused problems for MacArthur, but his commander credited him as "swift and sure in attack, tenacious and determined in defense, modest and restrained in victory." And although Krueger left no diaries or memoirs-and stubbornly refused to record many of his personal views-Kevin Holzimmer has mined military archives on Krueger and his Sixth Army to produce a compelling biography that finally acknowledges his importance. Holzimmer first analyzes the experiences of Krueger's prewar career: testing the triangular infantry division in the late 1930s, serving in the War Plans Division, and participating in peacetime maneuvers. This training prepared him for the challenges of command in the Pacific, where he successfully forged and led a large combined-arms effort that effectively integrated infantry, armor, artillery, naval, and air forces. Holzimmer then details Krueger's remarkable leadership in the military campaigns against the Japanese. By placing Krueger's philosophy of command within the context of evolving military doctrine, Holzimmer shows how he produced tough victories against a determined enemy in an enormously difficult war zone. Unlike some overly cautious commanders of the war, Krueger was aggressive when the situated dictated, and even MacArthur admitted that "history has not given him due credit for his greatness." By showing how he breathed life into Pacific war strategy and made sure it was executed successfully, this book gives him that credit and fills a glaring gap in American military history.
Sections 1-2. Keyword Index.--Section 3. Personal author index.--Section 4. Corporate author index.-- Section 5. Contract/grant number index, NTIS order/report number index 1-E.--Section 6. NTIS order/report number index F-Z.
Contains the definitive history of the extensive but little known U.S. Army amphibious operations during the Korean War, 1950-1953. Provides insights to modern planners crafting future joint or combined operations in that part of the world.Originally published in 2008. Illustrated.
Military commanders turn tactics into strategic victory by means of "operational art," the knowledge and creative imagination commanders and staff employ in designing, synchronizing, and conducting battles and major operations to achieve strategic goals. Until now, historians of military theory have generally agreed that modern operational art developed between the first and second world wars, not in the United States but in Germany and the Soviet Union, whose armies were supposedly the innovators and greatest practitioners of operational art. Some have even claimed that U.S. forces struggled in World War II because their commanders had no systematic understanding of operational art. Michael R. Matheny believes previous studies have not appreciated the evolution of U.S. military thinking at the operational level. Although they may rightly point to the U.S. Army's failure to modernize or develop a sophisticated combined arms doctrine during the interwar years, they focus too much on technology or tactical doctrine. In his revealing account, Matheny shows that it was at the operational level, particularly in mounting joint and combined operations, that senior American commanders excelled—and laid a foundation for their country's victory in World War II. Matheny draws on archival materials from military educational institutions, planning documents, and operational records of World War II campaigns. Examining in detail the development of American operational art as land, sea, and air power matured in the twentieth century, he shows that, contrary to conventional wisdom, U.S. war colleges educated and trained commanders during the interwar years specifically for the operational art they employed in World War II. After 1945, in the face of nuclear warfare, the American military largely abandoned operational art. But since the Vietnam War, U.S. commanders have found operational art increasingly important as they pursue modern global and expeditionary warfare requiring coordination among multiple service branches and the forces of allied countries.
"Multi-Domain Battle in the Southwest Pacific Theater of World War II" provides a historical account of how US forces used synchronized operations in the air, maritime, information, and land domains to defeat the Japanese Empire. This work offers a historical case that illuminates current thinking about future campaigns in which coordination among all domains will be critical for success.