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In the study of human thinking, two main research questions can be asked: “Descriptive Q: What is human thinking like? Normative Q: What ought human thinking be like?” For decades, these two questions have dominated the field, and the relationship between them generated many a controversy. Empirical normativist approaches regard the answers to these questions as positively correlated – in essence, human thinking is what it ought to be (although what counts as the ‘ought’ standard is moot). In contemporary theories of reasoning and decision making, this is often associated with a Panglossian framework, an adaptationist approach which regards human thinking as a priori rational. In contrast, prescriptive normativism sees the answers to these two questions as negatively correlated. Normative models are still relevant to human thought, but human behaviour deviates from them quite markedly (with the invited conclusion that humans are often irrational). Prescriptive normativism often results in a Meliorist agenda, which sees rationality as amenable to education. Both empirical and prescriptive normativism can be contrasted with a descriptivist framework for psychology of human thinking. Following Hume’s strict divide between the ‘is’ and the ‘ought’, descriptivism regards the descriptive and normative research questions as uncorrelated, or dissociated, with only the former question suitable for psychological study of human behaviour. This basic division carries over to the relation between normative (‘ought’) rationality, based on conforming to normative standards; and instrumental (‘is’) rationality, based on achieving one’s goals. Descriptivist approaches regard the two as dissociated, whereas normativist approaches tend to see them as closely linked, with normative arguments defining and justifying instrumental rationality. This research topic brings together diverse contributions to the continuing debate. Featuring contributions from leading researchers in the field, the e-book covers a wide range of subjects, arranged by six sections: The standard picture: Normativist perspectives In defence of soft normativism Exploring normative models Descriptivist perspectives Evolutionary and ecological accounts Empirical reports With a total of some 24 articles from 55 authors, this comprehensive treatment includes theoretical analyses, meta-theoretical critiques, commentaries, and a range of empirical reports. The contents of the Research Topic should appeal to psychologists, linguists, philosophers and cognitive scientists, with research interests in a wide range of domains, from language, through reasoning, judgment and decision making, and moral judgment, to epistemology and theory of mind, philosophical logic, and meta-ethics.
The first reference on rationality that integrates accounts from psychology and philosophy, covering descriptive and normative theories from both disciplines. Both analytic philosophy and cognitive psychology have made dramatic advances in understanding rationality, but there has been little interaction between the disciplines. This volume offers the first integrated overview of the state of the art in the psychology and philosophy of rationality. Written by leading experts from both disciplines, The Handbook of Rationality covers the main normative and descriptive theories of rationality—how people ought to think, how they actually think, and why we often deviate from what we can call rational. It also offers insights from other fields such as artificial intelligence, economics, the social sciences, and cognitive neuroscience. The Handbook proposes a novel classification system for researchers in human rationality, and it creates new connections between rationality research in philosophy, psychology, and other disciplines. Following the basic distinction between theoretical and practical rationality, the book first considers the theoretical side, including normative and descriptive theories of logical, probabilistic, causal, and defeasible reasoning. It then turns to the practical side, discussing topics such as decision making, bounded rationality, game theory, deontic and legal reasoning, and the relation between rationality and morality. Finally, it covers topics that arise in both theoretical and practical rationality, including visual and spatial thinking, scientific rationality, how children learn to reason rationally, and the connection between intelligence and rationality.
Problems of Living: Perspectives from Philosophy, Psychiatry, and Cognitive-Affective Science addresses philosophical questions related to problems of living, including questions about the nature of the brain-mind, reason and emotion, happiness and suffering, goodness and truth, and the meaning of life. It draws on critical, pragmatic, and embodied realism as well as moral naturalism, and brings arguments from metaphysics, epistemology, and ethics together with data from cognitive-affective science. This multidisciplinary integrated approach provides a novel framework for considering not only the nature of mental disorders, but also broader issues in mental health, such as finding pleasure and purpose in life. - Draws on the strongest aspects of polar positions in philosophy and psychiatry to help resolve important perennial debates in these fields - Explores continuities between early philosophical work and current cognitive-affective sciences, including neuroscience and psychology - Employs findings from modern cognitive-affective science to rethink key long-standing debates in philosophy and psychiatry - Builds on work showing how mind is embodied in the brain, and embedded in society, to provide an integrated conceptual framework - Assesses both the insights and the limitations of cognitive-affective science for addressing the big questions and hard problems of living
The leading idea of epistemology in the Enlightenment tradition was foundation-theoretic: to reach knowledge, we must not legitimize our beliefs by external authorities, but instead justify them by rational arguments. Recently, the foundation-theoretic ideal of justification has come under attack, the chief criticism being that universal standards of justification are illusory because the problem of a regress of justification is unsolvable. Alternatives to foundation theory (coherentism, externalism, or dogmatism) have been developed that give up central claims of Enlightenment epistemology such as empirical support, cognitive accessibility, or rational justifiability. Optimality Justifications develops a new account of foundation-theoretic epistemology based on the method of optimality justifications. Optimality justifications offer a solution to the regress problem. Rather than striving for a priori demonstrations of reliability, which are impossible, they show that certain epistemic methods are optimal with regard to all accessible alternatives, which is more modestly but provably possible. In particular, optimality justifications can achieve a non-circular justification of deductive, inductive, and abductive reasoning. This volume pursues two goals: a general renewal of foundation-theoretic epistemology based on the account of optimality justifications, and the advancement of methods of optimality justification in important domains of epistemology and the philosophy of science, logic, and cognition. Connected with these goals is the aspiration to develop new ideas for mainstream epistemology, as well as for formal epistemology, philosophy of science, and cognitive science, which are intended to attract researchers, students, and all other readers interested in these fields.
This volume brings together leading scholars in the study of practical rationality and human action – namely, Alfred Mele, Hugh McCann, Michael Bratman, George Ainslie, Daniel Hausman and Joshua Knobe. They were interviewed by the editors in a project based at the Institute of Philosophy of the University of Porto structured around the questions: 1) In your view, what are the most central (or important) problems in the philosophy of action? 2) For some or all of the following – action, agency, agent – what do they contrast with most significantly? 3) Which of these are liable to be rational/irrational? 4) In what sense is the thing to do to be decided by what is rational? Are there limits of rationality? 5) What explains action, and how? What is the role of deliberation in rationality? 6) How is akrasia possible (if you think it is)? 7) How do you think your own work has contributed to the field? What are your plans for future research? The outcome is of great interest, not only for philosophers, but also for economists, psychologists, political scientists and sociologists.
Colburn (computer science, U. of Minnesota-Duluth) has a doctorate in philosophy and an advanced degree in computer science; he's worked as a philosophy professor, a computer programmer, and a research scientist in artificial intelligence. Here he discusses the philosophical foundations of artificial intelligence; the new encounter of science and philosophy (logic, models of the mind and of reasoning, epistemology); and the philosophy of computer science (touching on math, abstraction, software, and ontology).
The Probabilistic Mind is a follow-up to the influential and highly cited Rational Models of Cognition (OUP, 1998). It brings together developmetns in understanding how, and how far, high-level cognitive processes can be understood in rational terms, and particularly using probabilistic Bayesian methods.
The Routledge Encyclopedia of Translation Studies has been the standard reference in the field since it first appeared in 1998. The second, extensively revised and extended edition brings this unique resource up to date and offers a thorough, critical and authoritative account of one of the fastest growing disciplines in the humanities. The Encyclopedia is divided into two parts and alphabetically ordered for ease of reference:Part I (General) covers the conceptual framework and core concerns of the discipline. Categories of entries include:* c.
Integrating the latest developments in cognitive neuroscience, neuroimaging, emotion and cognitive development, author Ronald T. Kellogg provides a clear view of what is happening at the cutting edge of the field today. Written in an accessible style, the book explores applications of cognitive psychology underscoring the practical side of the field. New to the Second Edition: * new neuroimaging graphics provide state of the art view of neuroscience in cognitive psychology * includes the latest research on the default network of the brain integrating autobiographical memory, envisioning the future, theory of mind, and moral decision making * expanded and updated coverage of research on attention applies the research on inattentional blindness and divided attention to real-life situations * explanation of the three networks of attention provides definitive evidence of independent networks for alerting, orienting, and executive attention and illustrates how neuroscience has clarified understanding of attention * problem solving in fluid intelligence tasks explains relation of working memory and executive attention to problem solving in the applied context of intelligence testing. Key Features of Fundamentals of Cognitive Science: * focuses on the 'essentials' of cognitive psychology: Covers core concepts and does not bog students down in topics more suitable for discussion in advanced follow-up courses * integrates coverage of neuroscience: A four-color insert of cognitive tasks that students can replicate and related brain images (PET and fMRI) helps students develop a deeper understanding of the neuroscience behind cognitive processes * emphasizes practical applications: Concrete implications of cognitive research are woven into the narrative of the text * highlights important concepts: Margin notes summarise important concepts, providing further clarification when needed and giving students previewing and reviewing guideposts.
The distinction between norms and facts is long-standing in providing a challenge for psychology. Norms exist as directives, commands, rules, customs and ideals, playing a constitutive role in human action and thought. Norms lay down 'what has to be' (the necessary, possible or impossible) and 'what has to be done' (the obligatory, the permitted or the forbidden) and so go beyond the 'is' of causality. During two millennia, norms made an essential contribution to accounts of the mind, yet the twentieth century witnessed an abrupt change in the science of psychology where norms were typically either excluded altogether or reduced to causes. The central argument in this book is twofold. Firstly, the approach in twentieth-century psychology is flawed. Secondly, norms operating interdependently with causes can be investigated empirically and theoretically in cognition, culture and morality. Human development is a norm-laden process.