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In this volume we present some o~ the papers that were delivered at FUR-82 - the First International Con~erence on Foundations o~ Utility and Risk Theory in Oslo, June 1982. The purpose o~ the con~erence was to provide a ~orum within which scientists could report on interesting applications o~ modern decision theory and exchange ideas about controversial issues in the ~oundations o~ the theory o~ choice under un certainty. With that purpose in mind we have selected a mixture of applied and theoretical papers that we hope will appeal to a wide spectrum o~ readers ~rom graduate students in social science departments and business schools to people involved in making hardheaded decisions in business and government. In an introductory article Ole Hagen gives an overview o~ various paradoxes in utility and risk theory and discusses these in the light o~ scientific methodology. He concludes the article by calling ~or joint efforts to provide decision makers with warkable theories. Kenneth Arrow takes up the same issue on a broad basis in his paper where he discusses the implications o~ behavior under uncertainty for policy. In the theoretical papers the reader will ~ind attempts at de~initive Statements of the meaning o~ old concepts and suggestions for the adoption o~ new concepts. For instance, Maurice Allais discusses four di~ferent interpretations o~ the axioms o~ probability and explains the need ~or an empirical characterization o~ the concept of chance.
This collection of articles contains contributions from a few of Werner Leinfellner's many friends and colleagues. Some of them are former students of Werner's. Others were colleagues of his at various American and European universities. Further, some have come to know Werner through his research, his long-standing editorship of Theory and Deci sion and his extensive participation in international conferences and congresses. The following articles are new to this volume. The areas covered are those in which Werner continues to play an active professional role. We offer them as a tribute to the many and multi-faceted contributions to the scientific enterprise for which Werner Leinfellner is so widely known. We believe such a festschrift to be fitting and long overdue. Because of the breadth of Werner's professional associations, it was difficult to select representatives from among his many spheres of influence. We apologize to the many scholars who could not be in cluded because of time and space considerations. Finally, we wish to express appreciation to Dean John Guilds of the University of Arkansas for providing financial support early on in the evolution of this project, to Jennifer Bauman for her bravura performance in copy-editing the manuscripts, and to our publisher at Reidel for bringing this volume to press.
1. PROGRESS IN UTILITY AND RISK THEORY At the First International Congress of Utility and Risk Theory in Oslo 1982 (FUR-82) it appeared to be a widespread feeling among the participants that the conference signalled something like a paradigm shift in the field. This does not necessarily mean that old truths were discarded and replaced by new ones, but rather that new theories and new empirical evidence were brought forth, compelling old theories to be critically analyzed from new angels. Some of the papers presented at FUR-82 have been published by Reidel in 1983 in a volume edited by Stigum and Wenst0p. The present volume contains com mentaries on a number of the papers presented at the conference together with broader outlines of current views on the theory. The observation that utility and risk theory now appears to be in a state of rapid change has prompted us to choose the title PROGRESS IN UTILITY AND RISK THEORY for the book, in the belief that science always moves from poorer to more advanced paradigms or from weaker to more forceful theories. In other words, change is usually progress, even though intermediate stages in a para digm shift may be bewildering, to say the least.
In this volume we present some o~ the papers that were delivered at FUR-82 - the First International Con~erence on Foundations o~ Utility and Risk Theory in Oslo, June 1982. The purpose o~ the con~erence was to provide a ~orum within which scientists could report on interesting applications o~ modern decision theory and exchange ideas about controversial issues in the ~oundations o~ the theory o~ choice under un certainty. With that purpose in mind we have selected a mixture of applied and theoretical papers that we hope will appeal to a wide spectrum o~ readers ~rom graduate students in social science departments and business schools to people involved in making hardheaded decisions in business and government. In an introductory article Ole Hagen gives an overview o~ various paradoxes in utility and risk theory and discusses these in the light o~ scientific methodology. He concludes the article by calling ~or joint efforts to provide decision makers with warkable theories. Kenneth Arrow takes up the same issue on a broad basis in his paper where he discusses the implications o~ behavior under uncertainty for policy. In the theoretical papers the reader will ~ind attempts at de~initive Statements of the meaning o~ old concepts and suggestions for the adoption o~ new concepts. For instance, Maurice Allais discusses four di~ferent interpretations o~ the axioms o~ probability and explains the need ~or an empirical characterization o~ the concept of chance.
Philosophy of Probability provides a comprehensive introduction to theoretical issues that occupy a central position in disciplines ranging from philosophy of mind and epistemology to cognitive science, decision theory and artificial intelligence. Some contributions shed new light on the standard conceptions of probability (Bayesianism, logical and computational theories); others offer detailed analyses of two important topics in the field of cognitive science: the meaning and the representation of (partial) belief, and the management of uncertainty. The authors of this well-balanced account are philosophers as well as computer scientists (among them, L.J. Cohen, D. Miller, P. Gärdenfors, J. Vickers, D. Dubois and H. Prade). This multidisciplinary approach to probability is designed to illuminate the intricacies of the problems in the domain of cognitive inquiry. No one interested in epistemology or aritificial intelligence will want to miss it.
Each volume in this series includes a collection of authoritative essays from the New Palgrave: A Dictionary of Economics, selected by the Editors to illustrate the range and diversity of economic thought on a particular topic.
In this volume we present some of the papers delivered at FUR-IV - the Fourth International Conference on Founda tions and Applications of Utility, Risk and Decision Theory in Budapest, June 1988. The FUR Conferences have provided an appreciated forum every two years since 1982 within which scientists can report recent issues and prospective applications of decision theory, and exchange ideas about controversial questions of this field. Focal points of the presented papers are: expected utility versus alterna tive utility models, concepts of risk and uncertainty, developments of game theory, and investigations of real decision making behaviour under uncertainty and/or in risky situations. We hope that this sample of papers will appeal to a wide spectrum of readers who are interested in and fami liar with this interesting and exciting issues of decision theory. A wide range of theoretical and practical questions is considered in papers included in this volume, and many of them closely related to economics. In fact, there were two Nobel-Laureates in economics among the participants: I. Herbert A. Simon (1978) and Maurice Allais (1988), who won the prize just after the conference. His paper deals with problems of cardinal utility. After a concise overview of the history and theory of cardinal utility he gives an estimate of the invariant cardinal utility function for its whole domain of variation (i. e.
The Conference on "Utility: Theories, Measurements, and Applications" met at the Inn at Pasatiempo in Santa Cruz, California, from June II to 15, 1989. The all-star cast of attendees are listed as authors in the Table of Contents of this book (see p. V), except for Soo Hong Chew and Amos Tversky. The purpose of the conference, and of National Science Foundation Grant No. SES-8823012 that supported it, was to confront proponents of new generalized theories of utility with leading decision analysts com mitted to the implementation, in practice, of the more traditional theory that these new theories reject. That traditional model is variously iden tified in this book as expected utility or subjectively expected utility maximization (EU or SEU for short) and variously attributed to von Neumann and Morgenstern or Savage. I had feared that the conference might consist of an acrimonious debate between Olympian normative theorists uninterested in what people actually do and behavioral modelers obsessed with the cognitive illusions and uninterested in helping people to make wise decisions. I was entirely wrong. The conferees, in two dramatic straw votes at the open ing session, unanimously endorsed traditional SEU as the appropriate normative model and unanimously agreed that people don't act as that model requires. (These votes had a profound impact on my thinking; detail about them and about that impact is located in Chapter 10.
This is not "another collection of contributions on a traditional subject." Even more than we dared to expect during the preparatory stages, the papers in this volume prove that our thinking about science has taken a new turn and has reached a new stage. The progressive destruction of the received view has been a fascinating and healthy experience. At present, the period of destruction is over. A richer and more equilibrated analysis of a number of problems is possible and is being cru'ried out. In this sense, this book comes right on time. We owe a lot to the scholars of the Kuhnian period. They not only did away with obstacles, but in several respects instigated a shift in attention that changed history and philosophy of science in a irreversible way. A c1earcut example - we borrow it from the paper by Risto Hilpinen - concerns the study of science as a process, Rnd not only as a result. Moreover, they apparently reached several lasting results, e.g., concerning the tremendous impact of theoretical conceptions on empirical data. Apart from baffling people for several decades, this insight rules out an other return to simple-minded empiricism in the future.
Utility theory or, value theory in general, is certainly the cornerstone of decision theory, game theory, microecon~mics, and all social and political theories which deal with public decisions. Recently the American School of utility, founded by von N eumann Morgenstern, encountered a far-going criticism by the French School of utility represented by its founder Allais. The whole basis of the theory of decisions involving risk has been shaken and put into question. Consequently, basic research in the fundamentals of utility and value theory evolved into a crisis. Like any crisis in basic research, and this one was not an exception, it was very fruitful. One may simply say: Allais versus von Neumann-Morgenstern, or the French School of utility versus the American School, became one of the battlefields of scientific development which proved to be a most creative source of new advances and new developments in all those sciences which are based on evaluation of utilities.