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Duncan Black made a significant contribution to the development of public choice theory during his lifetime. Upon his death it became apparent that much of his scholarship and critique of economics was never published. Formal Contributions to the Theory of Public Choice is a collection of Duncan Black's unpublished works, representing his continuing contribution to economics and political science. It provides an insight into Black's intellectual endeavors and introduces some new ideas and extensions of earlier work.
First published in 1999, this volume is written by seasoned public choice scholars and is intended to make a significant contribution to the debate on peaceful coexistence and sustainable development in developing countries. The book contains a rich mixture of analytical ideas and views on collective choice and macroeconomic performance in developing countries. This book breaks new ground in that it is the first comprehensive application of the theory of public choice to collective decision making in developing societies. It provides both students of Third World studies and policy makers in developing societies an in-depth analysis for institutions for collective choice. For countries undergoing major reform of their political and economic institutions, public choice theory can provide significant and useful insights, and help these societies design and adopt institutional arrangements that enhance peaceful coexistence of groups, the creation of wealth and sustainable development. Specifically, the book successfully shows that: (1) the application of economic theory to the study of public policy in the developing countries can provide important insights into collective decision-making; (2) the application of public choice theory to the study of developing societies can significantly improve the efficiency of bureaucratic and governmental systems, and consequently, promote economic, political and social development; and (3) public choice can help developing societies design and sustain effective laws and institutions for peaceful coexistence of groups and achieve sustainable development.
This book argues that while the US president makes foreign policy decisions based largely on political pressures, it is concentrated interests that shape the incentive structures in which he and other top officials operate. The author identifies three groups most likely to be influential: government contractors, the national security bureaucracy, and foreign governments. This book shows that the public choice perspective is superior to a theory of grand strategy in explaining the most important aspects of American foreign policy, including the war on terror, policy toward China, and the distribution of US forces abroad. Arguing that American leaders are selected to respond to public opinion, not necessarily according to their ability to formulate and execute long-terms plans, the author shows how mass attitudes are easily malleable in the domain of foreign affairs due to ignorance with regard to the topic, the secrecy that surrounds national security issues, the inherent complexity of the issues involved, and most importantly, clear cases of concentrated interests. The book will be of interest to students and scholars of American Studies, Foreign Policy Analysis and Global Governance.
A pioneering effort to integrate ideology with formal political theory
Does civil society depend on the state? Is cooperation behavior possible under anarchy? In the early 1970s, members of the Center for the Study of Public Choice became the first group of economists to engage in a study of these questions. This volume contains essays from this study as well as new responses from 21st century economists.
Elinor Ostrom was the first female winner of the Nobel Prize in economics, and her achievement has generated renewed interest in the Bloomington School research program in institutional economics and political economy. These essays showcase Ostrom's extensive and lasting influence throughout economics and the wider social sciences. Contributors contextualize the Bloomington School within schools of economic thought and show how Ostrom's distinct methodology has been used in policy-making and governance. Case studies illustrate the value of civic involvement within public policy, a method pioneered by Ostrom and the Bloomington School. Elinor Ostrom and the Bloomington School provides a valuable resource for those keen to understand Ostrom's approach, especially when applied to policy-making and wider use in the social sciences. Readers new to the Bloomington School will be introduced to its central areas of research while those already familiar with the school will appreciate its subtle connections to other disciplines and research agendas.
R. H. Coase Duncan Black was a close and dear friend. A man of great simplicity, un worldly, modest, diffident, with no pretensions, he was devoted to scholarship. In his single-minded search for the truth, he is an example to us all. Black's first degree at the University of Glasgow was in mathematics and physics. Mathematics as taught at Glasgow seems to have been designed for engineers and did not excite him and he switched to economics, which he found more congenial. But it was not in a lecture in economics but in one on politics that he found his star. One lecturer, A. K. White, discussed the possibility of constructing a pure science of politics. This question caught his imagination, perhaps because of his earlier training in physics, and it came to absorb his thoughts for the rest of his life. But almost certainly nothing would have come of it were it not for his appointment to the newly formed Dundee School of Economics where the rest of the. teaching staff came from the London School of Economics. At Glasgow, economics, as in the time of Adam Smith, was linked with moral philosophy. At Dundee, Black was introduced to the analytical x The Theory o/Committees and Elections approach dominant at the London School of Economics. This gave him the approach he used in his attempt to construct a pure science of politics.
This is an expanded second edition of Nicholas Mercuro and Steven Medema's influential book Economics and the Law, whose publication in 1998 marked the most comprehensive overview of the various schools of thought in the burgeoning field of Law and Economics. Each of these competing yet complementary traditions has both redefined the study of law and exposed the key economic implications of the legal environment. The book remains true to the scope and aims of the first edition, but also takes account of the field's evolution. At the book's core is an expanded discussion of the Chicago school, Public Choice Theory, Institutional Law and Economics, and New Institutional Economics. A new chapter explores the Law and Economics literature on social norms, today an integral part of each of the schools of thought. The chapter on the New Haven and Modern Civic Republican approaches has likewise been expanded. These chapters are complemented by a discussion of the Austrian school of Law and Economics. Each chapter now includes an "At Work" section presenting applications of that particular school of thought. By providing readers with a concise, noncritical description of the broad contours of each school, this book illuminates the fundamental insights of a field with important implications not only for economics and the law, but also for political science, philosophy, public administration, and sociology.
Public choice has been one of the most important developments in the social sciences in the last twenty years. However there are many people who are frustrated by the uncritical importing of ideas from economics into political science. Public Choice uses both empirical evidence and theoretical analysis to argue that the economic theory of politics is limited in scope and fertility. In order to arrive at a more comprehensive understanding of political life, political scientists must learn from both economists and sociologists.