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The original version of this text was published in 1984 as a textbook on military history for officers in the U.S. Army. The revised version includes an appendix of terms and acronyms, and concepts are explained in nontechnical terms, making it more comprehensible to the general reader. Also incorporated is a description of combined arms warfare from the late-1970s to the end of the 20th century, which takes into account developments that were not obvious in 1984. The main topics are how the major armies of the world fight on the battlefield; what concepts, weapons, and organizations have developed for this purpose; and how the different armies have influenced each other in these developments. House is a former military officer and analyst for the Joint Chiefs of Staff. c. Book News Inc.
Discusses the first Army headquarters in the European theater, from its activation in October 1943 to V-E Day in May 1945. Shows the Army headquarters of World War 2 as a complicated organization with functions ranging from the immediate supervision of tactical operations to long-range operational planning and the sustained support of frontline units. CMH Pub 70-60.
This biography recounts one of the most significant yet unsung military careers of the twentieth century: “a major contribution to the history of World War II” (Foreign Affairs). General Walter Bedell Smith began his public service career of more than forty years at age sixteen, when he joined the Indiana National Guard. His bulldog tenacity earned him an opportunity to work with General George C. Marshall in 1941, playing an essential role in formation of the Combined and Joint Chiefs of Staff. After his appointment as chief of staff to Dwight D. Eisenhower in 1942, Smith took a central part in planning the major Allied operations of World War II in Europe. Among his many duties, Smith negotiated the surrenders of the Italian and German armed forces in 1945. Smith’s postwar career included service as the US ambassador to the Soviet Union, director of the Central Intelligence Agency, and undersecretary of state. In Beetle, D. K. R. Crosswell offers the first full-length biography of the general, including insights into his close relationships with Marshall and Eisenhower. Meticulously researched and long overdue, Beetle sheds new light on Eisenhower as supreme commander, as well as the WWII campaigns in North Africa, Italy, and Europe.
At the end of the Great War, the U.S. Army faced the challenge of integrating what it had learned in the failures and ultimate success of its war effort. During the interwar years the army sought to balance readiness and modernization in a period of limited resources and technological advances with profound implications for the conduct of warfare. In After the Trenches, William O. Odom traces the development of combat doctrine between the world wars through an examination of the army's primary doctrine manuals, the Field Service Regulations. The Field Service Regulations of 1923 successfully assimilated the experiences of the First World War and translated them into viable tactical practice, Odom argues in this unique study. Rapidly developing technologies generated more efficient tools of war and greatly expanded the scale, tempo, and complexity of warfare. Personnel and material shortages led to a decline in the quality of army doctrine evidenced in the 1939 regulations. Examining the development of doctrine and the roles of key personalities such as John Pershing, Hugh Drum, George Lynch, Frank Parker, and Lesley McNair, Odom concludes that the successive revisions of the manual left the army scurrying to modernize its woefully outdated doctrine on the eve of the new war. This impressively researched study of the doctrine of the interwar army fills a significant gap in our understanding of the development of the U.S. Army during the first half of the twentieth century. It will serve scholars and others interested in military history as the standard reference on the subject. Moreover, many of the challenges and conditions that existed seventy years ago resemble those faced bytoday's army. This study of the army's historical responses to a declining military budget and an ever-changing technology will broaden the perspectives of those who must deal with these important contemporary issues.
From the American Revolution to the global war on terror, U.S. Army doctrine has evolved to regulate the chaos of armed conflict by providing an intellectual basis for organizing, training, equipping, and operating the military. Walter E. Kretchik analyzes the service's keystone doctrine over three centuries to reveal that the army's leadership is more forward thinking and adaptive than has been generally believed. The first comprehensive history of Army doctrine, Kretchik's book fully explores the principles that have shaped the Army's approach to warfare. From Regulations For the Order and Discipline of the Troops of the United States in 1779 to modern-day field manuals, it reflects the fashioning of doctrine to incorporate the lessons of past wars and minimize the uncertainty and dangers of battle. Kretchik traces Army doctrine through four distinct eras: 1779-1904, when guidelines were compiled by single authors or a board of officers in tactical drill manuals; 1905-1944, when the Root Reforms fixed doctrinal responsibility with the General Staff; 1944-1962, the era of multiservice doctrine; and, beginning in 1962, coalition warfare with its emphasis on interagency cooperation. He reveals that doctrine has played a significant role in the Army's performance throughout its history-although not always to its advantage, as it has often failed to anticipate accurately the nature of the "next war" and still continues to be locked in a debate between advocates of conventional warfare and those who emphasize counterinsurgency approaches. Each chapter presents individuals who helped define and articulate Army doctrine during each period of its history-including George Washington and Baron von Steuben in the eighteenth century, Emory Upton and Arthur Wagner in the nineteenth, and Elihu Root and William DePuy in the twentieth. Each identifies the "first principles" set down in manuals covering such topics as tactics, operations, and strategy; size, organization, and distribution of forces; and the promise and challenges of technological innovation. Each also presents specific cases that analyze how effectively the Army actually applied a particular era's doctrine. Doctrine remains the basis of instruction in the Army school system, ensuring that all officers and enlisted soldiers share a common intellectual framework. This book elucidates that framework for the first time.