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Emory Upton believed that politicians should leave war to professionals. This led to two assumptions that became conventional wisdom: first, an apolitical army represented a more professional force; and second, the problems at the tactical and operational level were similar enough to be useful in developing strategic thinking. These assumptions resulted in what Samuel P. Huntington described as the "normal-theory" relationship between policy-makers and generals. The assumption made sense for the United States but had one unfortunate result. The Army as an institution misread the nature of an apolitical force. The essence of an apolitical force should be non-partisan -Army professionals above political interference or interest. There is a difference, however, between policy and politics. While not involving itself in the political life of the nation, the Army is vitally concerned with the policies of the nation. The discussion strategists must prepare for are political, but in the nature of policy as the object of war. A historical survey of strategists from General Winfield Scott to General Creighton Abrams suggests that the most successful strategists are life-long learners. They build holistic understanding of the interdependent and infinite connections of the whole problem. Once they develop a hypothesis about the whole problem, they reshape those connections to create a better peace for the United States. Strategists that take time to understand the whole problem encourage discourse. Retaining the Functional Area 59 Strategist program will continue to benefit the force because they do not follow a traditional route to generalship. After all, few have earned stars by arguing, debating, and taking intellectual risk.
This manual is a dual-Service US Army and US Marine Corps publication introducing new terms and definitions and updating existing definitions as reflected in the latest editions of Army field manuals and Marine Corps doctrinal, warfighting, and reference publications. It complies with DOD Military Standard 2525. When communicating instructions to subordinate units, commanders and staffs from company through corps should use this manual as a dictionary of operational terms and military graphics.
The Army embraced knowledge management (KM) as a discipline in 2003. How the Army manages information and facilitates the movement of knowledge has changed dramatically in recent years. This includes the growth of KM within the Army and refinement of associated technology-both hardware and software. Recognizing that the ability to efficiently manage knowledge is essential to effective mission command, the Army authorized the Army Knowledge Management Qualification Course (AKMQ-C), with additional skill identifier (ASI) to prepare Soldiers for KM's complex challenges. KM sections at brigade through theater army headquarters now work with commanders and staffs to help manage knowledge within their organizations; bridging the art of command and the science of control through KM. KM can be summarized in the phrase "Know, Show, Grow!" Know = tacit "head knowledge"; Show = knowledge that is written down and documented (explicit knowledge) to be shared with others; Grow = collaboration toward innovation which sparks new knowledge. What individuals and small elements know that could help others cannot be widely shared without the means to share it. The sheer volume of available information makes it difficult to identify and use that which is relevant. Knowledge management provides the means to efficiently share knowledge, thus enabling shared understanding and learning within organizations. To do this, KM creates, organizes, applies, and transfers knowledge and information between authorized people. It seeks to align people, processes, and tools-to include information technology-within the organization to continuously capture, maintain, and re-use key information and lessons learned to help units learn and adapt and improve mission performance. KM enhances an organization's ability to detect and remove obstacles to knowledge flow, thereby fostering mission success. Because collaboration is the key contributor to KM, it is imperative that everyone be involved in the process, from the generating force that trains and sustains the Soldier to the operating force, which ensures Soldiers survive and thrive every day in every circumstance or location. The contributions of everyone are important because anyone may be the source of an idea that may become the catalyst for a solution that accomplishes missions and saves lives. Though the focus of this document is operations, KM can be used by organizations and individuals to accomplish many tasks. This manual and its successors are intended to provide the guidance on how to use KM successfully to benefit Soldiers at the tip of the spear as well as commanders and staff, in present and future operational environments, in an era of persistent conflict. This manual, "Knowledge Management Operations," provides doctrinal knowledge management (KM) guidance. It provides doctrine for the organization and operations of the KM section, and establishes the doctrinal principles, tactics, techniques, and procedures necessary to effectively integrate KM into the operations of brigades and higher. FM 6-01.1 applies to KM activities in Army headquarters from brigade through Army service component command. ("Brigade" includes brigade combat teams, support brigades, functional brigades, and multifunctional brigades.) It applies to the KM section as well as to commanders, staffs, and Army leaders who will have a role in improving KM effectiveness or implementing KM procedures in their organizations. FM 6-01.1 applies to the Active Army, Army National Guard/Army National Guard of the United States, and U.S. Army Reserve unless otherwise stated. The Army currently leads the effort to develop doctrine for KM; thus Army headquarters serving as the headquarters of a joint force land component command or joint task force may adapt this field manual with appropriate modifications until joint doctrine or guidance is provided.
This field manual establishes doctrine for military operations in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment. It is based on lessons learned from previous counterinsurgencies and contemporary operations. It is also based on existing interim doctrine and doctrine recently developed. Counterinsurgency operations generally have been neglected in broader American military doctrine and national security policies since the end of the Vietnam War over 40 years ago. This manual is designed to reverse that trend. It is also designed to merge traditional approaches to COIN with the realities of a new international arena shaped by technological advances, globalization, and the spread of extremist ideologies--some of them claiming the authority of a religious faith. This is a comprehensive manual that details every aspect of a successful COIN operation from intelligence to leadership to diplomacy. It also includes several useful appendices that provide important supplementary material.
ADP 5-0 provides doctrine on the operations process. It describes fundamentals for effective planning, preparing, executing, and assessing operations. It describes how commanders, supported by their staffs, employ the operations process to understand situations, make decisions, direct action, and lead forces to mission accomplishment. To comprehend doctrine contained in ADP 5-0, readers should first understand the fundamentals of unified land operations described in ADP 3-0. As the operations process is the framework for the exercise of command and control, readers should also understand the fundamentals of command and control and mission command described in ADP 6-0. Readers must also understand how the Army ethic guides decision making throughout the operations process (see Army doctrine on the Army profession).
Force Structure, Tactics, and Modernization of the Russian Ground Forces The mighty Soviet Army is no more. The feckless Russian Army that stumbled into Chechnya is no more. Today's Russian Army is modern, better manned, better equipped and designed for maneuver combat under nuclear-threatened conditions. This is your source for the tactics, equipment, force structure and theoretical underpinnings of a major Eurasian power. Here's what the experts are saying: "A superb baseline study for understanding how and why the modern Russian Army functions as it does. Essential for specialist and generalist alike." -Colonel (Ret) David M. Glantz, foremost Western author on the Soviet Union in World War II and Editor of The Journal of Slavic Military Studies. "Congratulations to Les Grau and Chuck Bartles on filling a gap which has yawned steadily wider since the end of the USSR. Their book addresses evolving Russian views on war, including the blurring of its nature and levels, and the consequent Russian approaches to the Ground Forces' force structuring, manning, equipping, and tactics. Confidence is conferred on the validity of their arguments and conclusions by copious footnoting, mostly from an impressive array of primary sources. It is this firm grounding in Russian military writings, coupled with the authors' understanding of war and the Russian way of thinking about it, that imparts such an authoritative tone to this impressive work." -Charles Dick, former Director of the Combat Studies Research Centre, Senior Fellow at the Defence Academy of the United Kingdom, author of the 1991 British Army Field Manual, Volume 2, A Treatise on Soviet Operational Art and author of From Victory to Stalemate The Western Front, Summer 1944 and From Defeat to Victory, The Eastern Front, Summer 1944. "Dr. Lester Grau's and Chuck Bartles' professional research on the Russian Armed Forces is widely read throughout the world and especially in Russia. Russia's Armed Forces have changed much since the large-scale reforms of 2008, which brought the Russian Army to the level of the world's other leading armies. The speed of reform combined with limited information about their core mechanisms represented a difficult challenge to the authors. They have done a great job and created a book which could be called an encyclopedia of the modern armed forces of Russia. They used their wisdom and talents to explore vital elements of the Russian military machine: the system of recruitment and training, structure of units of different levels, methods and tactics in defense and offence and even such little-known fields as the Arctic forces and the latest Russian combat robotics." -Dr. Vadim Kozyulin, Professor of Military Science and Project Director, Project on Asian Security, Emerging Technologies and Global Security Project PIR Center, Moscow. "Probably the best book on the Russian Armed Forces published in North America during the past ten years. A must read for all analysts and professionals following Russian affairs. A reliable account of the strong and weak aspects of the Russian Army. Provides the first look on what the Russian Ministry of Defense learned from best Western practices and then applied them on Russian soil." -Ruslan Pukhov, Director of the Moscow-based Centre for the Analysis of Strategies and Technologies (CAST) and member of the Public Council of the Russian Federation Ministry of Defense. Author of Brothers Armed: Military Aspects of the Crisis in Ukraine, Russia's New Army, and The Tanks of August.
Volume 5, Deep Maneuver: Historical Case Studies of Maneuver in Large-Scale Combat Operations, presents eleven case studies from World War II through Operation Iraqi Freedom focusing on deep maneuver in terms of time, space and purpose. Deep operations require boldness and audacity, and yet carry an element of risk of overextension - especially in light of the independent factors of geography and weather that are ever-present. As a result, the case studies address not only successes, but also failure and shortfalls that result when conducting deep operations. The final two chapters address these considerations for future Deep Maneuver.