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Following 9/11, state and local gov¿ts. formed fusion centers, collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity. Recognizing that the centers are a critical mechanism for sharing info., the fed. gov¿t. -- incl. the Dept. of Homeland Security, Dept. of Justice, and the Program Manager for the Info. Sharing Environ. -- is taking steps to partner with fusion centers. This testimony focuses on: (1) the characteristics of fusion centers as of 9/07; and (2) fed. efforts to help alleviate challenges centers identified. This report is based on an 10/07 report on 58 fusion centers and related fed. efforts to support them as well as updated info. obtained by reviewing plans describing selected fed. efforts. Includes recommend. Illus.
Contents: (1) Increase in Precursor Crimes: Causes; Decline in State Sponsorship; Amateurization of Terror; Shift in Threat Environ.; Enhanced Counterterrorism Measures; (2) Ex. of Terrorist Precursor Activity in the U.S.: Front Bus. and Charities; Counterfeiting Money; Counterfeit Goods; Fraud (Benefits, Food Stamps); Narcotics; Smuggling and Import/Export Violations; Bribery; Robbery/Theft; Phone Scams and Cell Phone Activity; Immigration and Identity Crimes; Incitement; Training; Div. of Labor within Terrorist Org.; Potential for Ident. and Infiltration; Fundraising and Longevity of Terror Campaigns; Precursor Crimes¿ Effect on Threat Environ.; (3) Fed. Role, and SLT Role in Intell./Invest. of Crimes; Coord. of Fed. and SLT Efforts.
This Interagency Threat Assessment and Coordination Group (ITACG) Intelligence Guide for First Responders is designed to assist state, local, tribal law enforcement, firefighting, homeland security, and appropriate private sector personnel in accessing and understanding Federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction intelligence reporting. Most of the information contained in this guide was compiled, derived, and adapted from existing Intelligence Community and open source references. The ITACG consists of state, local, and tribal first responders and federal intelligence analysts from the Department of Homeland Security and the Federal Bureau of Investigation, working at the National Counterterrorism Center (NCTC) to enhance the sharing of federal counterterrorism, homeland security, and weapons of mass destruction information with state, local, and tribal consumers of intelligence.
The 9/11 Commission investigating the September 11, 2001, attacks concluded that the nationOCOs intelligence community had failed to OCyconnect the dots, OCO thus ushering in the era of homeland security. As a result state and local fusion centers emerged; however, there is little research available addressing either their activities or effectiveness. Joyal explores these and related issues. Drawing upon the perceptions of those working in and closely with state fusion centers, particularly law enforcement, it appears that fusion centers are successful in improving law enforcementOCOs ability to collect and share information; however, they continue to struggle with several challenges, namely developing robust analytical capabilities and overcoming persistent subcultural obstacles."
Why GAO Did This Study. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, state and local governments formed fusion centers, collaborative efforts to detect, prevent, investigate, and respond to criminal or terrorist activity. Recognizing that the centers are a critical mechanism for sharing information, the federal government including the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), Department of Justice (DOJ), and the Program Manager for the Information Sharing Environment (PM-ISE), which has primary responsibility for government wide information sharing is taking steps to partner with fusion centers. This testimony focuses on (1) the characteristics of fusion centers as of September 2007 and (2) federal efforts to help alleviate challenges centers identified. This testimony is based on GAO's October 2007 report on 58 fusion centers and related federal efforts to support them as well as updated information GAO obtained in March 2008 by reviewing plans describing selected federal efforts and attending the second annual national fusion center conference. What GAO Recommends. While this testimony contains no new recommendations, GAO has recommended that the federal government define and articulate its long-term fusion center role and whether it expects to provide resources to help ensure their sustainability. PM-ISE agreed with the recommendation and is in the process of implementing it.

Focus on Fusion Centers

United States. Congress. Senate. Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs. Ad Hoc Subcommittee on State, Local, and Private Sector Preparedness and Integration

Published: 2009

Total Pages: 120


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This intelligence guide was prepared in response to requests from law enforcement executives for guidance in intelligence functions in a post-September 11 world. It will help law enforcement agencies develop or enhance their intelligence capacity and enable them to fight terrorism and other crimes while preserving community policing relationships. The world of law enforcement intelligence has changed dramatically since September 11, 2001. State, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies have been tasked with a variety of new responsibilities; intelligence is just one. In addition, the intelligence discipline has evolved significantly in recent years. As these various trends have merged, increasing numbers of American law enforcement agencies have begun to explore, and sometimes embrace, the intelligence function. This guide is intended to help them in this process. The guide is directed primarily toward state, local, and tribal law enforcement agencies of all sizes that need to develop or reinvigorate their intelligence function. Rather than being a manual to teach a person how to be an intelligence analyst, it is directed toward that manager, supervisor, or officer who is assigned to create an intelligence function. It is intended to provide ideas, definitions, concepts, policies, and resources. It is a primera place to start on a new managerial journey. Every law enforcement agency in the United States, regardless of agency size, must have the capacity to understand the implications of information collection, analysis, and intelligence sharing. Each agency must have an organized mechanism to receive and manage intelligence as well as a mechanism to report and share critical information with other law enforcement agencies. In addition, it is essential that law enforcement agencies develop lines of communication and information-sharing protocols with the private sector, particularly those related to the critical infrastructure, as well as with those private entities that are potential targets of terrorists and criminal enterprises. Not every agency has the staff or resources to create a formal intelligence unit, nor is it necessary in smaller agencies. This document will provide common language and processes to develop and employ an intelligence capacity in SLTLE agencies across the United States as well as articulate a uniform understanding of concepts, issues, and terminology for law enforcement intelligence (LEI). While terrorism issues are currently most pervasive in the current discussion of LEI, the principles of intelligence discussed in this document apply beyond terrorism and include organized crime and entrepreneurial crime of all forms. Drug trafficking and the associated crime of money laundering, for example, continue to be a significant challenge for law enforcement. Transnational computer crime, particularly Internet fraud, identity theft cartels, and global black marketeering of stolen and counterfeit goods, are entrepreneurial crime problems that are increasingly being relegated to SLTLE agencies to investigate simply because of the volume of criminal incidents. Similarly, local law enforcement is being increasingly drawn into human trafficking and illegal immigration enterprises and the often associated crimes related to counterfeiting of official documents, such as passports, visas, driver's licenses, Social Security cards, and credit cards. All require an intelligence capacity for SLTLE, as does the continuation of historical organized crime activities such as auto theft, cargo theft, and virtually any other scheme that can produce profit for an organized criminal entity. To be effective, the law enforcement community must interpret intelligence-related language in a consistent manner. In addition, common standards, policies, and practices will help expedite intelligence sharing while at the same time protecting the privacy of citizens and preserving hard-won community policing relationships.~
In the aftermath of 9/11, many law enforcement agencies (LEAs) shifted more resources toward developing counterterrorism (CT) and homeland security (HS) capabilities. This volume examines the effects the focus on CT and HS has had on law enforcement since 9/11, including organizational changes, funding mechanisms, how the shift has affected traditional crime-prevention efforts, and an assessment of benefits, costs, and future challenges.
The United States government-backed by the overwhelming support of the American public-takes a hard line against international terrorism. The tenets of official U.S. counterterrorist policy are: make no concessions or deals with terrorists; bring them to justice for their crimes; isolate and apply pressure on states that sponsor terrorism; and bolster the counterterrorist capabilities of countries willing to work with the United States. While these tenets are sound principles, their application, specifically overseas, raises difficult questions. Does the "no deal" policy actually deter terrorists acts? Are there cases where agreements might reduce terrorism, while advancing other U.S. interests? Do isolation and pressure really force offending states to alter their support for terrorists? What factors affect the willingness, not just the capability, of foreign governments to help the United States in counterterrorism? In this critical study, a career CIA officer provides a guide to constructing and executing counterterrorist policy, urging that it be formulated as an integral part of broader U.S. foreign policy. In the first four chapters, Paul R. Pillar identifies the necessary elements of counterterrorist policy, he examines why the United States is a prime terrorist target, and he reveals why the counterterrorist policies that seem strongest are not always the most effective. Chapter 5 examines the widely varying nature of terrorist groups and the policy tools most appropriately applied to them. Chapter 6 focuses on states that sponsor terrorism (including Iran, Libya, North Korea, and Cuba), along with those that enable it to occur (particularly Greece and Pakistan). Pillar examines ways in which the American public's perspective toward terrorism can actually constrain counterterrorist policy, and he concludes that terrorism cannot be "defeated" only reduced, attenuated, and to some degree, controlled. The final chapter summarizes his recommendations f
The United States has poured over a billion dollars into a network of interagency intelligence centers called “fusion centers.” These centers were ostensibly set up to prevent terrorism, but politicians, the press, and policy advocates have criticized them for failing on this account. So why do these security systems persist? Pacifying the Homeland travels inside the secret world of intelligence fusion, looks beyond the apparent failure of fusion centers, and reveals a broader shift away from mass incarceration and toward a more surveillance- and police-intensive system of social regulation. Provided with unprecedented access to domestic intelligence centers, Brendan McQuade uncovers how the institutionalization of intelligence fusion enables decarceration without fully addressing the underlying social problems at the root of mass incarceration. The result is a startling analysis that contributes to the debates on surveillance, mass incarceration, and policing and challenges readers to see surveillance, policing, mass incarceration, and the security state in an entirely new light.