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September 1998 This paper offers simple, robust operational rules for evaluating public spending in distorted economies-rules that are more complex than the border price rule but involve only one additional parameter: the marginal cost of funds. Anderson and Martin provide simple, robust rules for evaluating public spending in distorted economies. Their analysis integrates within a clean, unified framework previous treatments of project evaluation as special cases. Until recently it was widely believed that government projects could be evaluated without reference to the cost of raising tax revenues. The classic border price rule provided a simple and apparently robust procedure for project evaluation. But the border price rule developed in shadow pricing literature requires very strong assumptions to be valid when governments must rely on distortionary taxation and are unable or unwilling to cover the costs of the project through user charges. Anderson and Martin use a rigorous formal model in which governments must rely on distortionary taxation to explore the welfare consequences of governments providing different types of goods. They show that the border price rule is accurate only in one rather special case: when project outputs are sold at their full value to consumers - something that is difficult to do with a public good such as a lighthouse or a functioning judicial system. When a publicly provided good is sold for less than its full value to consumers, one must take into account the implications for government revenues of providing public goods. Anderson and Martin present project evaluation rules that are more complex than the border price rule but involve only one additional parameter: the compensated marginal cost of funds for the taxes on which the government relies. The rules suggested involve adjusting the fiscal revenues the project generates (or destroys) by the marginal cost of funds before comparing them with the assessed benefits to project producers and consumers. In the case of a protected but tradable good provided by the government, the result is a shadow price that is below the world market price. Where projects produce output that is sold without charge, the costs of the project inputs must also be adjusted using the marginal cost of funds. In intermediate cases where the government levies user charges that fall below the full value of the goods to the private sector, the revenue shortfall from the project must be adjusted by the marginal cost of funds. This paper-a product of Trade, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to assess the consequences of policy interventions. Will Martin may be contacted at [email protected].
This paper investigates the short-term effects of fiscal consolidation on economic activity in OECD economies. We examine the historical record, including Budget Speeches and IMFdocuments, to identify changes in fiscal policy motivated by a desire to reduce the budget deficit and not by responding to prospective economic conditions. Using this new dataset, our estimates suggest fiscal consolidation has contractionary effects on private domestic demand and GDP. By contrast, estimates based on conventional measures of the fiscal policy stance used in the literature support the expansionary fiscal contractions hypothesis but appear to be biased toward overstating expansionary effects.
This paper offers simple, ...
October 1998 The relationship between household wealth and educational enrollment of children can be estimated without expenditure data. A method for doing so-which uses an index based on household asset ownership indicators-is proposed and defended in this paper. In India, children from the wealthiest households are over 30 percentage points more likely to be in school than those from the poorest households, although this gap varies considerably across states. To estimate the relationship between household wealth and the probability that a child (aged 6 to 14) is enrolled in school, Filmer and Pritchett use National Family Health Survey (NFHS) data collected in Indian states in 1992 and 1993. In developing their estimate Filmer and Pritchett had to overcome a methodological difficulty: The NFHS, modeled closely on the Demographic and Health Surveys, measures neither household income nor consumption expenditures. As a proxy for long-run household wealth, they constructed a linear asset index from a set of asset indicators, using principal components analysis to derive the weights. This asset index is robust, produces internally coherent results, and provides a close correspondence with data on state domestic product and on state level poverty rates. They validate the asset index using data on consumption spending and asset ownership from Indonesia, Nepal, and Pakistan. The asset index has reasonable coherence with current consumption expenditures and, more importantly, works as well as-or better than-traditional expenditure-based measures in predicting enrollment status. The authors find that on average a child from a wealthy household (in the top 20 percent on the asset index developed for this analysis) is 31 percent more likely to be enrolled in school than a child from a poor household (in the bottom 40 percent). This paper-a product of Poverty and Human Resources, Development Research Group-is part of a larger effort in the group to inform educational policy. The study was funded by the Bank's Research Support Budget under the research project Educational Enrollment and Dropout (RPO 682-11). Deon Filmer may be contacted at [email protected].
The pamphlet (which updates the 1995 Guidelines for Fiscal Adjustment) presents the IMF’s approach to fiscal adjustment, and focuses on the role that sound government finances play in promoting macroeconomic stability and growth. Structured around five practical questions—when to adjust, how to assess the fiscal position, what makes for successful adjustment, how to carry out adjustment, and which institutions can help—it covers topics such as tax policies, debt sustainability, fiscal responsibility laws, and transparency.
If the United States grants Vietnam most favored nation status, both countries would benefit. Vietnamese exports to the United States would more than double, and Vietnam would gain substantial welfare benefits from improved market access and increased availability of imports. For the United States, lowering the current high tariff against Vietnam would improve welfare by reducing costly diversion away from Vietnamese products.
October 1998 Many governments have faced serious fiscal instabilities as a result of their growing contingent liabilities. But conventional fiscal analysis and institutions fall short in addressing contingent fiscal risks. What approaches in fiscal analysis and standards for public sector management would foster sound fiscal performance? And how can policymakers be made accountable for recognizing the long-term costs of both direct and contingent forms of government activity in their decisions? Governments are increasingly exposed to fiscal risks and uncertainties for three main reasons: * The increasing volume and volatility of international flows of private capital. * The state's transformation from financing services to guaranteeing that the private sector will achieve particular outcomes. * Moral hazards arising in markets because the government is perceived to have residual responsibility for market outcomes. Sources of fiscal risk may be direct or contingent (a liability only if a particular event occurs). Whether direct or contingent, they are either explicit (recognized as a government liability by law or by contract) or implicit (a moral obligation reflecting public expectations and pressure from interest groups). The recent Asian crisis revealed that major moral hazards exist in markets and that sizable hidden fiscal risks may arise from contingent forms of government support. Governments must understand and know how to handle contingent liabilities if they are to avoid the danger of sudden fiscal instability and realize their long-term policy objectives. They can reduce fiscal risks by incorporating contingent liabilities into their analytical, policy, and institutional public finance frameworks. Governments can address fiscal risk through three channels in particular, says Polackova: * By including contingent and implicit financial risks in their fiscal analysis and (to deter moral hazard in the market) by publicly acknowledging the limits of state responsibilities. * By reflecting the cost of contingent liabilities in policy choices, budgeting, financial planning, reporting, and auditing. * By developing institutional capacity to evaluate, regulate, control, and prevent financial risk in both the public and private sectors. Given the increasingly serious implications of contingent government liabilities for the fiscal outlook of countries, Polackova argues that it is time for the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and others to: * Incorporate government contingent fiscal risks in their analysis of a country's fiscal sustainability, policies, and institutions. * Require countries to disclose information regarding their exposure to contingent fiscal risks. * Help countries embrace contingent liabilities in their analytical, policy, and institutional public finance frameworks. This paper-a product of the Poverty Reduction and Economic Management Sector Unit, Europe and Central Asia Region-is part of a larger effort in the region to enhance the Bank's analytical and operational work in public finance. The author may be contacted at [email protected].