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This paper identifies a possible shortfall in United States (US) military planning, the experience of US Central Command (CENTCOM) planners in dealing with the Central Asian States. Their emphasis is understandably focused on Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. This paper develops for these planners the most likely threat to stability in CENTCOM's area of responsibility-ethnic conflict caused by spillover from neighboring countries. This paper also attempts to counter critics in the January-February 2000 Foreign Affairs who maintained that our obtuse military ties are not sensible nor sustainable. They described our current activities as a manner reminiscent of ill-advised US activities in Latin America in the 1970s. All of these condemnations from authors Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, although mostly unfounded, are perceptions that senior economists and political scientists hold. This paper helps CENTCOM "fire for effect" in developing and implementing a dynamic engagement strategy in this important region.
This paper identifies a possible shortfall in United States (US) military planning, the experience of US Central Command (CENTCOM) planners in dealing with the Central Asian States. Their emphasis is understandably focused on Iraq, Iran, and Pakistan. This paper develops for these planners the most likely threat to stability in CENTCOM's area of responsibility—ethnic conflict caused by spillover from neighboring countries. This paper also attempts to counter critics in the January–February 2000 Foreign Affairs who maintained that our obtuse military ties are not sensible nor sustainable. They described our current activities as a manner reminiscent of ill-advised US activities in Latin America in the 1970s. All of these condemnations from authors Amy Myers Jaffe and Robert A. Manning, although mostly unfounded, are perceptions that senior economists and political scientists hold. This paper helps CENTCOM “fire for effect” in developing and implementing a dynamic engagement strategy in this important region. This paper develops the theoretical framework of ethnic conflict, generated both internally and from spillover. This framework is then applied to Central Asia, illustrating it as a complex region of numerous ethnic groups in a bad neighborhood with some powerful bad neighbors. These neighbors, as well as the United States, have vital interests in engaging in this region. These interests—derived from the national security strategy—revolve around vital, important, and tertiary interests including humanitarian issues. The proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and transnational drug smuggling are major threats, while Central Asian resources and US influence and credibility are major goals of US and CENTCOM involvement here. This involvement has been seemingly disjointed and even at odds with other governmental agencies. CENTCOM activities— currently limited to only three of the five republics—are rated on effect and analyzed into general courses of action. This paper sets the stage for all CENTCOM policies by establishing “bounding” questions that can be used to guide productive CENTCOM engagement through the complexities of Central Asia and its possible ethnic conflict.
A leading authority on Central Asia offers a sweeping review of the region's path from independence to the post-9/11 world. The first decade of Central Asian independence was disappointing for those who envisioned a straightforward transition from Soviet republics to independent states with market economies and democratic political systems. Leaders excused political failures by pointing to security risks, including the presence of terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. The situation changed dramatically after 9/11, when the camps were largely destroyed and the United States introduced a military presence. More importantly the international community engaged with these states to give them a "second chance" to address social and economic problems. But neither the aid-givers nor the recipients were willing to approach problems in new ways. Now, terrorists groups are once again making their presence felt and some states may be becoming global security risks. This book explores how the region squandered its second chance and what might happen next.
Democracy promotion, security and energy are the predominant themes of US policy in Central Asia after the Cold War. This book analyses how the Bush administration understood and pursued its interests in the Central Asia states, namely Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan. It discusses the shift in US interests after September 11 and highlights key ideas, actors and processes that have been driving US policy in Central Asia. The author examines the similarities between the Bush and Obama administrations’ attitudes towards the region, and he points to the inadequacy of the personality focused, partisan accounts that have all too often been deployed to describe the two presidential administrations. To understand US Central Asian policy, it is necessary to appreciate the factors behind its continuities as well as the legacies of the September 11 attacks. Using case studies on the war on terror, energy and democracy, drawing on personal interviews with Americans and Central Asians as well as the fairly recent releases of declassified and leaked US Government documents via sources like the Rumsfeld Papers and Wikileaks, the author argues that the US approached Central Asia as a non-unitary state with an ambiguous hierarchy of interests. Traditionally domestic issues could be internationalised and non-state actors were able to play significant roles. The actual relationships between its interests were neither as harmonious nor as conflicted as the administration and some of its critics claimed. Shedding new light on US relations with Central Asia, this book is of interest to scholars of Central Asia, US Politics and International Relations.
Japan’s decision to attack the United States in 1941 is widely regarded as irrational to the point of suicidal. How could Japan hope to survive a war with, much less defeat, an enemy possessing an invulnerable homeland and an industrial base 10 times that of Japan? The Pacific War was one that Japan was always going to lose, so how does one explain Tokyo’s decision? Did the Japanese recognize the odds against them? Did they have a concept of victory, or at least of avoiding defeat? Or did the Japanese prefer a lost war to an unacceptable peace? Dr. Jeffrey Record takes a fresh look at Japan’s decision for war, and concludes that it was dictated by Japanese pride and the threatened economic destruction of Japan by the United States. He believes that Japanese aggression in East Asia was the root cause of the Pacific War, but argues that the road to war in 1941 was built on American as well as Japanese miscalculations and that both sides suffered from cultural ignorance and racial arrogance. Record finds that the Americans underestimated the role of fear and honor in Japanese calculations and overestimated the effectiveness of economic sanctions as a deterrent to war, whereas the Japanese underestimated the cohesion and resolve of an aroused American society and overestimated their own martial prowess as a means of defeating U.S. material superiority. He believes that the failure of deterrence was mutual, and that the descent of the United States and Japan into war contains lessons of great and continuing relevance to American foreign policy and defense decision-makers.
Russian influence in Central Asia is waning. Since attaining independence, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan have forged their own paths—building relationships with outside powers and throwing off the last vestiges of Soviet domination. But in many ways, Moscow still sees Central Asia through the lens of the Soviet Union, and it struggles to redefine Russian relations with the region. In The Fight for Influence, Alexey Malashenko offers a comprehensive analysis of Russian policies and prospects in Central Asia. It is clear that Russian policy in the formerly Soviet-controlled region is entering uncharted territory. But does Moscow understand the fundamental shifts under way? Malashenko argues that it is time for Russia to rethink its approach to Central Asia. Contents 1. Wasted Opportunities 2. Regional Instruments of Influence 3. Russia and Islam in Central Asia: Problems of Migration 4. Kazakhstan and Its Neighborhood 5. Kyrgyzstan—The Exception 6. Tajikistan: Authoritarian, Fragile, and Facing Difficult Challenges 7. Turkmenistan: No Longer Exotic, But Still Authoritarian 8. Uzbekistan: Is There a Potential for Change? Conclusion Who Challenges Russia in Central Asia?
This monograph highlights key factors in South Asia imperiling U.S. interests, and suggests how and where the U.S. military might play an expanded, influential role. It suggests seven steps the military might take to better advance and defend U.S. interests in South Asia, the Middle East, and Asia at large. Washington should intensify involvement in South Asia and become more influential with the governments there. Given the area's potential for violence, it should also shape part of the U.S. military to meet potential crises.